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The socialist market economy was written into the Chinese Constitution in
1993. From then on, the Ministry of Labour stopped officially denying the existence
of strikes in China For the past several years. there have been numerous reports of
labour unrest. However, there is in no law regulating strikes. Strikes are prohibited in
China.
This thesis is designed to conduct a cornparison of Canadian a d Chinese Iaw
respecting the right to sac. Chapter 1is devoted to analysis of the right to strike
under Canadian Law in two aspects. The fmt aspect is the question of whether there is
a right to strike under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. Three
judgments of Alberta Reference are carefully examined. The second aspect is the
right to strike under Canada labour Law. This analysis focuses on statutory regulations
and case law to examine the Canadian theory of conflicted interests, the basis for a
right to strike in Canada.
Chapter II of the thesis deals with the right to strike under the Chinese
constitutions. The right to strike was not included in China's fmt Constitution.
Although the 1975 and 1978 constitutions guaranteed a right to strike to Chinese
citizens, it was removed nom the 1982 Constitution. This chapter discusses the
reasons why the Chinese constitution does not protect the right to strike. This
discussion focuses on the doctrine for no right to strike in today's China,which is the
same interest among the state, the enterprises and the workers.
Chapter III of the thesis is concentrated on the nght to smke under Chinese
labour law. In accordance with the Constitution, strikes are prohibited under Chinese
labour law. The formal mechanisrn to resolve labour disputes in Chinese includes
consultation, mediation, arbitration and lawsuit.
The last chapter is to provide law reform recommendations in relation to the
Chinese legal system respecting the right to saike. The necessity of a right to süike in
today's China is the conflicted interests under the socialist market economy. Specific
legal reform suggestions will be provided respecting the relevant statutes.

Specid thanks given to my supervisor

Dianne Pothier

INTRODUCTION

A. Thesis Topic

The thesis topic is Right tu Strike - A Cornpanson of Canadiun and Chinese
Lnw. The underlying objective of the thesis is to conduct a comparison between

Canadian and Chinese Iaw, focusing on the right to suike. With the introduction and

comparison as the foundation, the thesis attempts to provide legd reform suggestions
in relation to the Chinese legal system in regard to the right to strike in China.
Given the substance of my thesis, my audience includes two kinds of people.
The first part is the general reader with interest in Chinese and Canadian labour law.
What they want to know from my thesis is to have some ideas on either Canadian or

Chinese labour law. The second part of my audience is the people who want to pay
attention to the intricacies of labour law. It may include law school professors and
students, government officers and trade union members. They will demonstrate their
interests in my thesis either theoreticdly or practically. Hence, my thesis should be
both simple and complicated. Simple enough for the first part of my audience to
understand and complicated enough for the second part to be educated.
While describing my thesis topic, it is significant to note that 1am not trying to fuUy

develop the factors that influence the differences of these two kinds of legal systems.

My reason is that it is a complex issue which includes various aspects, such as
econornic structure and the political system. That will be a complete thesis topic

itself, but not the one 1want to write. Instead 1 will address the factors insofar as it

will be needed to set the context for my cornparison and assess why my suggestions
are practical.

B. Why 1Chase the Thesis Topic

As previously noted, this thesis is designed to make a cornparison between

Canadian and Chinese law. There are two reasons for why 1 have chosen this thesis
topic.

The first reason is that I want to introduce Canadian labour law to China and
introduce Chinese labour law to Canada. 1 felt embarrassed after 1came to Canada
when 1 was asked by no fewer than ten people whether we had trade unions in China.

Not to mention that they did not know the Labour Law of the People's Republic of

China,which came into force just three years ago. It is difficult for Canadians to have

information about China since there are few things about China in the newspaper
penodicals or on television.' In the rneantime, a lot of Chinese people have little
knowledge about Canada. Much attention has been paid to the United States and some
Chinese people even think that Canada has a similar labour law system to the
-

---

For example, the C h i n w Communist Parcy held its 15" national meeting in the year 1997. In that
meeting, the CCP elected its new leadership for the next 4 years. At the same tirne, Princess Diana w u
killed in a trafic accident, the Canadianjournalists made lots of reports on the Iatter and paid Iittle
attention to the former. 1think it is not wise to ignore such an important news in a country that inchdes
one-third of hwnan kind.

Amencan one? 1hope through my research, 1could create awareness of the different

legal system to both Chinese and Canadian people.

The second reason is that 1hope to build a mode1 that cm be implemented in
today's China to regulate strikes. Strikes are prohibited under the Chinese legislation.
Since the govemment regards strikes as a threat to its sovereignty, the right to strike is

a very sensitive issue in China Few scholars are w i h g to do research although much
research work needs to be done. More specifically, under the market economy in
today's China, workers are in a weak situation as opposed to employers. They are
liable to be prejudiced by employea whose interests are in conflict with theirs. It is
the time to provide Chinese workers a ri@ to strike to advance their interests.

C. Methodologicai Prospectus

As is clear from the thesis topic, the methodology 1 will be utilùing in
developing my thesis is the comparative one. Comparative law is an intelIectua1
activiv with law as its object and comparison as its process. Within my thesis topic,
the object of my cornparison are Canadian and Chinese legislation respecthg the nght

to saike. What I want to emphasize in rny comparative rnethodology is that since

Of course, Canadian labour law is different h m the Amencan one, although they have some
similarities. For instance, Labour Boards in Canada have generally rejected the United States approach
toward replacement workers which recognizes the employer's right to hire permanent replacement
workers during econornic strikes. Under the Canadian legisfation, an employee who participates in a
lawful, timely strike is protected under the statutes with respect to the retum to work. But, in the U.S., a
striker may lose her job to a replacement worker during economic strikes. For more discussion, see P.
Weiler, 'Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Represtntation"
(1984) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 35 1.

there is no right to strike in today's China, my comparison of these two Iegal systems
focuses on their different theoretical base. In Canada, the assumption of connicting
interests between employees and employers is the b a i s for the right to strike; while in

China,the assumption of unity of interests among the state, the enterprises and the
workers is the basis for no right to suike. Therefore, my comparison of Canadian and
Chinese legislation pays much attention to the analysis of these two different
doctrines.
The starting point for my comparative research is dissatisfaction with Chinese
theory, with the hope to fmd some useful insights from Canadian theory. It is the
proposition that China should adopt some solutions from the Canadian system that
drives me to conduct this comparative research. 1attempt to look inside the Canadian
system in ordet to produce a practicable mode1 for China to regulate strikes. With the
law reform proposais in relation to the Chinese legal system, my comparative research
will be nor only a method of thinking - the investigation of the Canadian Iaw provides
China a working hypothesis - but also a method of working: How dws this hypothesis

actually set forth under the Chinese legal system?
However, there are limitations on my thesis writing. First, my one-year study
in Dalhousie Law School is not long enough to enable me to get fuUy familiar with
Canada labour law. That is the reason why 1 chose to concentrate on the theoretical
base of Canadian and Chinese labour law to conduct my cornparison because I want
to develop the theme that comects these two kinds of legislation. Second, there are
few Chinese materials on the issue of the nght to strike. 1am very glad, however, that
some foreign scholars have done serious research on this topic and this research has

helped me in rny thesis work. In addition, the absence of case law in China and

Engiish as a foreign language to me make the writing of my thesis more chailenging.

D. Contents of the Thesis

The tenn of "socialist market economy" was written into the Chinese

constitution in May 1993.' For the first time in the history of the People's Republic of

China, the planned economy lost its dominance after four decades. On July 5, 1994.
China promulgated its f î t labour code in an effort to establish and safeguard a labour
system suited to the socialist market economy.'

These two events mark an important change in labour relation in today's
China As a result of excessive and ngid control by govemment planners, labour
relation under the planned economy had been assumed to have a fundamentally
different nature than in the Canadian situation. The establishment of a socialist market
economy provides a chance to reexamine labour relationship in today's China from a

new perspective. Through an andysis of the nght to strike in Canada in Chapter 1, the
thesis is intended to provide China a completely different doctrine respecting labour
relation.

3

Chen Qiuping, ''Constitution Arnended to Advance a Market Economy" (1993) 17 Beijing Review

(BR) 14.
Ari 1 of the Labour Law.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodongfa [LabourLow of the People's Republic of China] July 5,
1995 in Ministry of Labour of the PRC, Labour Law of the People's Republic of China (Beijing:

Chincse Labour Publishing House, 1994).

As indicated above, the s t h g point for this comparative research is to find a

practicable mode1 for China to regdate strikes. In order to accomplish this objective,
a large portion of the thesis concentrates on the Chinese legal system. Because the
Chinese assumption of identity or unity of interest among the state, the enterprises
and the workers is the bais for the whole system of Chinese labour Law,
understanding this theory is of considerable importance to understand the absence of a
right to strike in China. Therefore, the second chapter of the thesis is devoted to

analysis of the right to strike under the Chinese constitution with sufficient attention
to highlight the Chinese doctrine of "identity of interest'', a different doctrine ficm the
Canadian one.
The third chapter of the thesis deals with the right to strike under Chinese labour
law. To a considerable extent, the analysis focuses on the Chinese system of
collective bargaining and the mechanism to resolve collective disputes. Although the

1994 Labour Law of the People's Republic of China provides for colIective contracts
and sets forth a mechanism to resolve labour disputes, it does not indicate any

substantial change in the goveniment's repressive attitude toward a right to snike.
Strikes are prohibited for any purpose in China.
The last chapter of the thesis deals with law reform proposais in relation to the
Chinese legal system. Various kinds of ownership under the market economy have
brought significant changes in China's labour relation. In today's China, the
conflicting interests between the two parties in labour relation canot be ignored any

longer. For the past several years there have been numerous reports of labour
disturbances and the Ministry of Labour has stopped oficially denying the existence

of strikes since the year 1993. It is ùme for China to conduct some legal refom in
regard to a right to strike to prevent and resolve industrial conflict.

CHAPTER 1

THE RIGEIT TO STRIKE IN CANADA

Introduction

The right to strike is not expressly granted by the Canadian constitution. It is
recognized and protected in labour relations legislation on the b a i s of assumed
conflicting interests between employers and employees, the two parties to labour
relations. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the right to strike under the
Canadian legislation to provide a b a i s for the subsequent discussion of no right to
strike in China and the Iegal reform suggestions in relation to the Chinese legal
system.
The fmt part of this chapter is a discussion under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedums.' Three cases reached the Supreme Court of Cana& for its
initial mling in regard to whether the right to strike is a constitutional right. The
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter does not guarantee a

right to strike. The central decision was given in the Reference Re Public Service
Employees Relations Act (Alta): which will be the case mainly examined below. The

second part of this chapter is an investigation of the right to strike under Canadian
labour law including the following: requirements of a strike, definition of "strike".

employee status during a lawful strike and support of a l a 6 1 strike. This discussion
consists of the statutory provisions and the case Iaw for the purpose of drawing a clear
picture of the right to strike in Canada.

A. Under the Charter

The right to strike is not explicitly guaranteed under the Cmadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Since &dom of association, a fundamental freedom
guaranteed in S. 2 (d) of the Charter, indicates the right to participate in the lawful
activities of the association,7 it is a relevant provision to the right to strike under the
Charter. The jurisprudence in the lower courts was divided on the nature and scope of
freedom of association. On the one hand, the trial decisions of a number of provinces
have endorsed a constitutive definition of freedom of association, holding neither
collective bargaining nor strike activity is protected by freedom of association.* On
the other hand, the decisions in Ontario and Saskatchewan cases have adopted broader
defmitions, concluding that in guaranteeing workers' freedom of association, the

Dolphin Delivcry Ltd v. Retaii. %lesale and Drpamnenr Store Union, Local 580 ( 1 984). 10
D.L.R. (4 th) 198 (B.C.C.A.); Public Sewice Alliance of Canada v. The Queen, (1984) 2 F.C.899;
Naufouridland Association of Public Empfoyees v. The Queen in Right of N&oundlund (1985). 14
C.R.R. 193 (Nfid. S.C.T.D.); Re Prime and Manitoba Lubour Board (1983),3 D.L.R. (4 th) 74 (Man.
Q-B.);H a & i Police W c e r sandNC08sAssociation v. City of Halifar (1984). 1 1 C.R.R. 358

(S.C.N.S.T.D.).

Charter also guarantees the kedom to pursue common purposes and to engage in

collective activities?
Three cases reached the S u p ~ r n Court
e
of Canada in regard to whether the
right to suike is constitutionalized. In PSAC v. Canada (A.G.), 'Othe union challenged

'

the validity of the Public Sector Compensation estr rai nt ACS' which effectively

deprived federal public servants of the right to bargain collectively for a two or thRe

year period by v h e of provisions extending existing and expired collective
"
agreements with statutorily prescribed wage increases. In R WDSU v. ~ushtchewan.

the union challenged The Dairy Workers (Maintenance of Operatioru) AC^'^ which

had the temporary effect of prohibiting a threatened and otherwise la-

rotating

strike by daky employees, and ordering resolution of the dispute by interest

arbitration. In Reference Re Public Service Employees Relurions Act (~lta),"the

union challenged Alberta statutes which placed restriction on public service
employees by prohibiting the iight to strike and imposing a specific form of
compulsory interest arbitration for unresolved disputes.

9

Re Service Ernployees ' International Union. Local 20.4 and Broadway Manor Nursing Home ( 1983).
44 0 . R . (2d) 392; Re Chung and Amalgameted Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (1986), 54 O.R.
(2d) 650; Re RetaiL Wholesale & Deparnent Store Union, Locais 544,496, 635 and 955 und
Govenunent of Saskatchewan (1985). 19 D L R . (4 th) 609; Bkck v. Law Society of Alberta, 119861 3

W.W.R. 590 (Alta. C.A.).
'O

87 C.L.L.C. 14,022; [l987] 1 S.C.R. 424.

l3S.S.

'4

1983-84. c. D1.1.
(Bill No.44).

Supra note 6.

The question presented in each of these three cases was slighîiy different, but
essentidy what the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to decide was whether or
not the nght to stlike and to bargain collectively is protected under S. 2(d) of the
Charier. In the opinion of the unions, the right to strike is included in S. 2(d)'s
guarantee of 'freedom of association'. However, the Supreme Court of Canada gave a
negative answer in ail these three cases; the majority held that the Chaner does not
guarantee a right to strike. Its central decision was delivered in the Alberta Rderence
case, which provides the reasons on which the other two decisions are based; the
Albertu Reference is accordingly the one that will be examined below.

Four of six judges held that kedom of association did not include protection for
the right to strike. The judgment of half of the court was delivered by LeDain J., with
Beetz and La Forest IJ. concurring. Mcïntyre J. wrote a separate concumng judgment
in which he stated that the right to strike is not included in S. 2(d) guarantee of
fieedom of association, but he gave no expiicit answer to whether the Freedom to
participate in collective bargaining might be constinitionally protected. A dissenthg
judgment was delivered by Dickson C.J.C.,with Wilson J. concurring. The Chief
Justice held that striking and collective bargaining are protected freedoms within S.
2(d). These three judgments will be discussed in t u .

1. The Judgment of LeDain J.

The judgment of LeDain J. is the briefest one among the three judgments.

LeDain J. expressly recognized &dom of association under S. 2(d) of the Charter in

two situations: where the individual wishes to create, support and engage in the
interna1 activities of an organization; and where the individual wishes to exercise, in
combination with others, the fieedoms specifically protected by the

If is

within this framework that LeDain J. asserted the nghts to bargain collectively and to

strike are not fundamental rights or fieedoms because " ...they are the creation of
legislation, involving a balance of cornpethg interests in a field which has been
recognized by the courts as requiring a specialized expertise."16
The definition of freedom of association given by LeDain J. is similar to the
one given by McIntyre J.. It puts emphasis on the scope of fieedom of association.
LeDain J. suggested that freedorn of association shodd not include broader freedorns

beyond those specified under the Chafler, in contrast to what Dickson C.J.C.argued
in his dissent. Nor did LeDain 3. agree with Dickson C.J.C.that the protection of

fieedom of association, in the area of labour relations, should include the protection to
pursue the activities for which the organization is established.17 It is regrettable to Say
that LeDain J.' definition fails to recognize the purpose and value of fieedom of
association for working people, which potentially enable them to exercise o5me
degree of control over their working life and enhance the justice in the workplace the major thnist of Diskson C.J.C.'s dissent." More specifcally, it is stmngly

15

See G. England, "Some Thoughts on Constitutionalizing the Right to StrikeW(1988)13 Queen's LJ.
169 at 173.

l6

Supra note 6 at 12,151.

"The following section will provide more analysis of the Chief Justice's definition of freedom of
association.

'*

More discussion on this point will be pmnded in die following analysis of the Chief Justice's
judgrnent.

questionable to assert that the rights to strike and collective bargaining are mere
matures of statute. The reality is, they are creahms of working class action.19

LeDain J.'s reai concem on constitutionalizing the right to strike was that the
courts should not have to deal with coilective bargaking policy because the courts are
iil-equipped to act as social engiaeers in collective bargaining matters which require a
level of expertise.'0 This "hands-off" approach is an important element in the
Canadian labour policy. In the legislative scheme, the "hand-off" approach is to set
general ground rules (for instance, the restrictions on the nght to svike ) within these
general parameters, to enable the parties to reach their own coilective agreements.
This general cornmitment to free collective bargaining plays a positive role in keeping

indusmal peace.*' However, the "hands off" approach advocated by LeDain J. is at a
differenet level, of not wanting court selecting of legislative policy. In my view, this is
not a sound approach under the Charter. Under the Charter, especidy in S. 1, the
courts are expected to deiiberate on the substance of legislative policy choices. If the
courts choose to interpret freedom of association narrowly just to avoid the tough
policy decisions that S. 1 requires, it is inconsistent with the substantive fairness of the
courts' policy choices.

l9 Pmfessor G. England argued in his article that süiking and collective bargaining have been social
rights used by working people to improve their lot in industry from the eariiest days of nineteenth
century Canadian capitaiisrn, Although tegishaon assists unions in important ways, it merely
acknowiedges as a fait accompli the social rights of striking and collective bargaining which were
established by the struggles of working people. Supra note 15 at 178.

"supra note 6 at 12,151.
"

iî.

The following discussion of rhc right to strike under Canada labour law will provide more analysis of

In sum, LeDain J. supported the proposition that worken' right to strike and
bargain coilectively cannot possibly daim the protection of the Chaner. LeDain J.'s

main concem is that although the legislature cm change the balance of power
between the labour and the capital of employrnent by favouring whatever side, the
courts should not LeDain J.'s judgment, which represents the half decision of the
court, is too brief to deliver in a case of this importance.

2. The Judgment of McIntyre J.

The thuty-three-page judgment for McIntyre J. refers explicitly to the issue of
the nght to strike. In the f m t part of the judgment, Mchtyre J. addressed the meaning
of freedom of association. He identified six possible approaches to define freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution. 1. Freedom of association provides
protection only to associate with others in common pursuits or for certain purposes,
but does not protect either the objects or the actions of the group. 2. Freedom of
association is the fieedom to engage collectively in those activities that are already
protected in the constitution for each individual. 3. Freedom of association "stands for
the p ~ c i p l that
e an individual is entitled to do in concert with others that which he
may lawfblly do alone, and conversely. that individuals and organizations have no
right to do in concert what is uniawful when done indi~iduall~.""4. Freedom of

association protects collective activities %hich may be said to be findamental to our

Supra note 6 at 12.154.

culture and traditions and which by common assent are deserving of protection."u 5.
Freedom of association affords constitutional protection to ail those lawfbl goals that

are essentid to the purpose of an association. 6. Freedom of association extends its
protection to al1 associational activities, subject oniy to limitation under S. 1 of the
Charter.

McIntyre J. categorically concluded that the fourth approach, the fifth
approach and the sixth approach are unacceptable definitions of freedom of
association." Of the remaining approaches, Mchtyre J. held that the fmt approach is
sound because it affords the essentiai freedom enjoyed pnor to the adoption of the
Charter by protecting the nght to join with others in lawful common pWuits and to

establish and maintain associations. The second approach that protects the right to
engage collectively in those activities which are constitutionaily protected for each
individual embraces the purposes and values of the freedoms which were identified

earlier. Tuming to the third approach, McIntyre J. considered it an acceptable
interpretation. McIntyre J. suggested that freedom of association does not protect any

group activity that is not protected under the Charîer for the individual merely by the
fact of association because the Constitution does not provide greater rights for groups
than for individuals. Then McIntyre I. gave his own definition on the meaning of
r these words:
freedom of association under the C h a ~ ein

It foliows from this discussion that I interpret freedom of association in S. 2(d)
of the C h a ~ eto
r mean that Charter protection will attach to the exercise in
association of such rights as have Charter protection when exercised by the
Supra note 6 at 12,155.

''Supra note 6 at 12.156.

individual, Furthemore, fieedom of association means that freedom to
associate for the purposes of activities which are lawful when perfomed
alone. But, since the fact of association w u not by itself confer additional
rights on individuais, the association does not acquire a constitutionally
guaranteed &dom to do what is u n l a d l for the hdividuaLz
McIntyre J.'s defktion of freedom of association included the two situations
speiied out in the definition given by LeDain J.. Moreover, McIntyre J. held that
freedom of association encompassed the third situation, it protected the individual
who wishes to pursue. in concert with othen. activities which are lawful for the

individual to pursue done. The bais of McIntyre J . 3 definition was the ''face'" of
the Charter, which suggests that the meaning of freedom of association should be

dictated by the words themselves. Since the right to strike is not independently
protected under the Charter, it c m only be protected under freedom of association, if
such activity is p e d t t e d by law to an indi~idua.1.~

McIntyre J. provided two reasons to advance his conclusion that freedom of
association did not encornpass protection for the right to suike. The first reason is that
"the Charter upon its face cannot support an implication of a right to strike"." That is,
there is no specific reference to the right to strïke appearing in the Charter as it does
in the Constitution of France, Italy and Japan. Mchtyre J. asserted that the omission
of sunilar provisions in the Canadian constitution speaks strongly against any
implication of a right to strike.

LI
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True, there is no explicit provision in regard to a right to strike under the
Charter, as in the Constitutions of the countries that Mchtyre J. spelled out.

However. it is surprising that McIntyre J. did not take into account of the inference of
those countries that provide constitutional guarantees of striking on the ground that

the strike is intemationaily recognized as a fundamental freedom, as Dickson C.J.C.
argued in his dissent.% addition, McIntyre J. made no reference to the International

hbour Orgunization Convention 87 on Freedom of Association," which was ratified
by Canada in 1972. As Dickson C.J.C.said in his dissent, the Convention has k e n
interpreted such that freedom of association includes a right to strike and a
considerable body of jurisprudence has reached the same concIusion. It is an accepted
principle in the Canadian constitution that "a value enjoying status as an international
human nght is generally ascribed a high degree of importance under S.

It is

cmtended, therefore, that the freedom of association under the Charter ought to
include a right to strike.
McIntyre J.'s second reason was "grounded in social policy against any such

irnpli~ation".~%fcIntyre J. considered the public interest depends on the security of the
balance between twc sides which have equal strength, the organized labour and the
employen of labour, and care must be taken in considering whether constitutionai
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protection should be given to one side while leaving the other subject to the social
pressures. McIntyre J. made this point as follows:
To intervene in that dynamic process at this early stage of Chaner
development by implying constitutional protection for a right to strike would,
in my view, give to one of the contending forces an economic weapon
removed from and made immune, subject to S. 1, to legislative control which
could go far towards fkeezing the development of labour relations and
curtailing that process of evolution necessary to meet the changing
circumstances of a modem society in a modem ~ o r l d . ~ ~

Mc1ntyx-eJ.3 judgment in the above regard is open to criticism for his
incorrect assumption of the two equally powemii forces in labour relations. This is
very contrary to the actual circumstance of labour relations where individual workers

are too powerless to protect their own interests unless they are collectively organized
and have the right to collectively withdraw labour. It is quite a disappointment that
McIntyre J. failed to capture the value of striking and collective bargaining in
potentially enhancing justice for the individual in the workplace, which is the main
thmst of the Chief Justice's dissent.

In the judgment, McIntyre J. also discussed the adverse effecü of
constitutionalizing the right to strike. First, Mchtyre J. believed that ''specialized
labour tribunals are better suited than courts for resolving labour problems, except for
the resolution of purely legal question^."^ If the right to strike is constitutionalized,

much of the value of specialized labour tribunals would be lost since the courts
should deal with such matters as its application, its extent, and any questions of its

''Ibid.
Y

Supra note 6 at 12,161.

legality. Second, ''the function of the freely-elected Legislatures and Parlia~nent"~'
does not aliow the intrusion by the courts into the field of Legislation. If the nght to
strike is included in the Charter, courts will have to resolve the question of the
application of S. 1 of the Charter to determine whether some attempt to control the
right to strike may be permitted. This is "a nature peculiarly apposite to the functions
of the Legislature"? Here McIntyfe I. shared the same concen as that of LeDain J.

that the courts should avoid having to make decision about collective bargaining
policy. As discussed in the f m t section, it was an unsound approach under the
Charter because it was designed to keep the courts away from the substantive fairness

policy choices.

In sum, McIntyre J. held that the nght to strike did not fail within freedom of
association on the ground of the Charter text and social policy. McIntyre J.'s
judgment, while more detailed, shared the major points of LeDain J's judgment.
Unfominately, it also shared the similar weakness of LeDain J's judgment, b a t is. the
failure to capture the essential meaning of either collective bargaining or the Charter
itself."

" Supra note 6 at 12.162.
Ibid.
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3. The Judgment of Dickson C.J.C.

The dissentingjudgrnent of Dickson C.J.C.. with Wilson J. concumng,

consists of sixty-eight pages. In his judgment, Dickson C.J.C. addressed the extent of
freedom of association under S. 2(d) of the Charter, as LeDain and McIntyre JJ. did in
their judgments.

Mer an extensive analysis of the authorities which include the Judicial
Cornmittee of the Privy Councii, Canadian case law, United States jurisprudence and
international law, Dickson C.J.C.pointed out that in order to understand the meaning
of Section 2 (d), it should be noted that ''the purpose of S. 2 of the Charter must

extend beyond merely protecting rights which aiready existed at the tirne of the
Charter's entren~hment"~~
because the meaning of the Charter's provisions should
not to be determined solely on the basis of preexisting nghts or freedoms. Similarly,
the scope of the provisions "should not be confined by the fact of legislative
regulation in a particular subject area"39on the ground that the nature of judicial
review under a written constitution should not be "circumscribed by what the
legislature has done in the past"? but "be consistent with the principles set down in
the Constitution".J'

" Supra note 6 at 12,177.
39

Ibid.

Ibid.

' Ibid.

Like his coiieague McIntyre J., the Chief Justice discussed several approaches
to defuillig &dom of association. The fmt one is a constitutive approach that entails
freedom of association as a &dom to belong to or to form an association. On this
view, the constinitional protection of freedom of association does not guarantee
associational actions except the protection of individual's status as a member of an
association. Dickson C.J.C. did not consider it a sufficient approach. He stated that

"

... if freedom of association only protects the joining together of pesons for cornrnon
proposes, but not the pursuit of the very activities for which the association was
formed, then the h e d o m is indeed legalistic, ungenerous, indeed vapid.'"*
The second approach is the derivative approach. "In the Canadian context, it is
suggested by some that associational action which relates specifically to one of the
other freedorns enumerated in S. 2 is constitutionally protected. but other associational
activity is net.'"' Dickson C.J.C. considered it an unacceptable Limitation on freedom
of association because it ignores the fact that freedorn of association is an independent
freedom expressed explicitly in S. 2(d) of the Charter.
The third approach argues that freedom of association should be interpreted
narrowly and restrictively on the ground of its political nature. Dickson C.J.C.
reasoned that S. 2(d) is a fundamental freedom whose fundamental nature relates to
the central importance to the individual of her interaction with feliow human beings.

In the Chief Justice's conclusion regarding freedom of association, he a p e d
that freedom of association includes the right to do collectively what one can do as an
42
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individual, but it entails a more extensive function which supplements individual
action:
The purpose of the constitutionai guarantee of freedorn of association is, I
believe, to recognize the profoundly social nature of human endeavors and to
protect the individual from stateenforced isolation in the punuit of his or her
ends.
What fkedom of association seeks to protect is not associational activities qua
particular activities, but the freedom of individuals to interact with, support,
and be supported by, their feilow humans in the varied activities in which tbey
chwse to engage?

The Chief Justice's definition of freedom of association is more reasonable
than the defuiitions given by LeDain and McIntyre JJ.. In his d e f ~ t i o nDickson
,

C.J.C.addressed the point that the express inclusion of freedom of association under
S.

2(d) of the Charter infers broader freedoms, beyond those specifically protected

under the Charter, are intended to be encompassed, othenvise S. 2(d) would be otiose.

More importantly, Dickson C.J.C. realized that the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of association should protect the freedom of the individuals to engage in the
activities for which the organization was established." Otherwise, this freedom was
"legalistic, ungenerous, indeed vapid"?
Moreover, Dickson C.J.C. rejected the argument that collective bargainhg is

an associational activity with purely economic ends, and should not be accorded
constitutional protection, by emphasizing the intrinsic value of work to people.
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w not apply to every type of association. For instance. if an organization
is established to overthrow the governrnent, 1 do not think it can be granted the constitutional protection
of freedorn of association. It is not necessary to discuss this issue in the thesis because the Chief
Justice's judgment is in a specific area of labour relations.

"Supra note 6 at 12.178.

Dickson C.J.C. held that what happened to the individual at the workplace could not

be kept behind the factory door. The Chief Justice said that "the conditions in which a
person works are highly significant in shaping the whole compendium of
psychological emotional and physical elements of a person's di@@ and self
respect"," and thus, the Chorîer, as its purpose of enhancing human dignity in the
widest societal sense, should deal with justice in the workplace. Because suiking and
collective bargaining can help to enhance justice in the workplace, it should be
included in the fundamental freedoms under the Charter.
The distinguishing feanire of Chief Justice Dickson's judgment is his
recognition of the vital role of association in pursuing the needs and interests of
working people. The Chief Justice said:
Freedom of association is most essentiai in those circumstances where the
individual is liable to be prejudiced by the actions of some larger and more
powerful entity, Like the govemrnent or an employer. Association has always
k e n the means through which political, cultural and racial minorities,
religious groups and workers have sought to attain their purposes and fblfil
their aspirations; it has enabled those who would otherwise be vulnerable and
ineffective to meet on more equal ternis the power and strength to those with
whom their interest interact and. perhaps, conflict?
These remarks in the Chief Justice's judgment are tremendously significant.

They explained the importance of freedom of association in enabling the individual to
resist the power of the employer and obtain some degree of control over her working

life. If is on this ground that the Chief Justice advanced his conclusion that striking
and collective bargaining should be constitutionally protected by S. 2(d) of the
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Charter. These rights, of course, are not absolute. A Iegislature could still restrict
their exercises if both the circumstances and the alternatives, for instance, binding
arbitration, satisfied the judges under S. 1 of the Chorter.
Under our existing system of industrial relations. effective constitutional
protection of the associational interests of employees on the collective
bargaining process rtquires concomitant protection of their freedorn to
withdraw coLlectively their services, subject to S. 1 of the Charter.*9
The significance of the above statement is that on the recognization that the
right to strike is protected under the Charter, the Chief Justice is prepared to approve

under S. l a reasonable limit on this right in accordance with the requirement in a free
and democratic society.

In sum, Dickson C.J.C.held in his judgment that the right to strike and the
right to collective bargaining are protected freedoms within S. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Chief Justice's judgment, dthough it was dissenting, is more impressive than the
other two. Not only did it recognize the purpose and value of association, but it also
realized the invaluable significance of collective bargaining and nght to strike in
promoting justice in the workplace," and in protecting workers from the coercive
powers of the state."
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B. Under Labour Law

The era of free collective bargaining in Canada began at 1944 with the federal
govemment's P.C.1003, the National War Labour Order? This regulation
recognized the rights of private sector worken across Canada to organize, to bargain
collectively and to strike. To make these rights effective, the statute established state
sanctions against an employer who refused to recognize and bargain with a trade
union. In 1948, P.C.1003 was superseded by the Industrial Relations Disputes
Investigation A d 3 giving these rights a permanent legislative basis under federal

jurïsdiction. Similar legislation was adopted by al1 provinces covering al1 employees
in the private sector.
The Canadian system of collective bargaining is based on the recognition of

inherent confiict of interests between the ernployers and employees. On the side of the
ernployers. their desire is the control of an efficient and profitable enterprise. For the
employees, their desire is to increase wages, fringe benefits and control their day-today working methods. Through the process of collective bargaining, the two parties

may voluntarily reach an agreement on the terms and conditions of employment.
However, it is not always the case that the parties can resolve their disputes at the

bargaining table. Either the trade union or the employer may reject contract proposais
made by the other side. If the parties really are to be free to agree, then they must be
52
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entitled to disagree. Logically, the system should consist of the mechanisms to break
those unavoidable deadlocks at the bargainhg table. Thus. the legislahue dlows the
parties to use a number of methods to try to force their opponents to settle on their
own t e m . The strike is considered to have significant value to advance the interests
of the employees in industrial relations. The lockout is the counter-part to the strike
on the employer's side of the equation. Discussion of the "Iockout" is outside the
scope of this thesis.
This part of the chapter provides an introduction to the right to strike under
Canadian labour law. It is composed of four sections: requirements of a strike,
d e f ~ t i o nof "strike", employrnent relationship during a lawful strike and support of a
lawful suike. Both statutory provisions and case law are used in each section to
illustrate the oasis of the Canadian system - conflicted interests between the two

parties of labour relations, in which, within lirnits, each side is entitled to punue its
own interests.

1. Requirements of a Svike

This section on the requirernents of a strike consists of two parts. One is the
procedures to declare a legai strike. The other is the prohibition on a strike including
timeliness restrictions and purposive restrictions. The fmt part is mainly set out under
the statutory provisions, while the second part is mainiy described under the case law.

a Procedures in a Strike

There are strict limitations in the statutory legislation when a strike can legally
occur. The discussion of this issue focuses on the Canada Labour Code.%Section 89
of the Code sets out al1 of the conditions under which a strike becomes ~ e ~ a l . ' ~
Section 91 is the provision under which the employer may apply for a declaration of

an unlawful strike.
Section 89 provides:
(1) No employer shall declare or cause a lockout and no vade union shall
declare or authorize a strike uniess

(a) the employer or trade union has given notice to bargain collectively
under this Part;
@) the employer and the trade union

(i) have failed to bargain collectively within the period specified in
paragraph 50(a), or
(ii) have bargained collectively in accordance with section 50 but have
failed to enter into or revise a collective agreement;
(c) the Minister has
(i) received a notice, given under section 7 1 by either party to the
dispute, infonning him of the failure of the parties to enter into or
revise a collective agreement, or
(ii) taken action under subsection 72(2); and
(d) seven days have elapsed after the date on which the Minister

(i) notified the parties of his intention not to appoint a conciliation
officer or conciliation cornrnissioner or to establish a conciliation
board under subsection 72(1),
(ii) notified the parties of his intention not to appoint a conciliation
commissioner or to establish a conciliation board under section 74, or
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These limitations also apply to a lockout by an employer.

(iii) released a copy of the report of a conciliation commissioner or
conciliation board to the parties to the dispute pursuant to paragraph
78(a).
(2) No employee shall participate in a strike uniess
(a) the employee is a member of a bargaining unit in respect of which a
notice to bargain collectively has been given under this Part; and
(b) the requirements of subsection (1) have k e n met in respect of the
bargaining unit of which the employee is a member.
Section 91 reads as follows:
(1) Where an employer alleges that a trade union has declared or authrized a
strike, or that employees have participated, are participating or are likely to
participate in a strike, the effect of which was, is or would be to involve
the participation of an employee in a strike in contravention of this Part,
the employer may apply to the Board for a declaration that the strike was,
is or would be rinlawful.

(2) Where an employer applies to the Board under subsection (1) for a
declaration that a strike was, is or would be unlawful, the Board may, after
affording the trade union or employees referred to in subsection (1) an
opportunity to be heard on the application, make such a declaration and, if the
employer so request, may make an order.
(a) requiring the uade union to revoke the declaration or authorization to
strike and to give notice of such revocation forthwith to the employees to
whom it was directed;
(b) enjoining any employee from participating in the stxike;
(c) requiring any ernployee who is participating in the strike to perform the
duties of his employrnent; and
(d) requiring any trade union, of which any employee with respect to
whom an order is made under paragraph (b) or (c) is a member, and any
officer or representative of that union, forthwith to give notice of any order
made under paragraph(b) or (c) to any employee to whom it applies.
Section 89 sets out detailed procedure for the trade union to declare a Iegd
strike. According to the provision, no trade union should declare or authorize a strike
unless the trade union has given notice to bargain collectively, negotiations have
failed to produce or revise a collective agreement, conciliation prccedures have failed,

and seven days have elapsed from the date on which the Minister advised the parties
of her intention not to appoint a conciliation officer or board, or seven days have
elapsed since a copy of the report of the conciliation board has k e n released to the
parties of the dispute. Where an employer aileges that a trade union has declared or
authorized a strike, or that employees have participated in or are iikely to participate
in a strike, such an employer may apply to the Board for a dedaration that the strike
was, is, or would be unlawful under section 9 1. The Board may, after affording the

trade union or employees a hearing, make such a de~laration.~~
Section 89 and Section 9 1 go hand by hand respecting the procedure of a legal
suike. On the one hand, the legislature recognizes that inflicting economic harm on
the employer is the ultimate lever by which a union extracts concessions in collective
bargaining, and thus it empowen trade union the right to declare or authorize a strike.

On the other hand, the thnist of Canadian labour law is to confine the use of strike
weapon to the negotiation of new contract terms, and in tum the statute gants the
employer the right to allege an iUega.1strike. These two kinds of provisions seek to
regulate striking as an economic sanction of ernployees for the purpose of the
settiernent of collective agreements.

56 Section 89 is the general nile in regard to the right to strike. In speeific cases. the general law can be
overridden by a specific law that makes illegai what would othetwise be a legal smke or lockout, for
example, back to work legislation passed by Parliament. However, to meet the contingency that there is
no Parliament to pass the back to work legislation, the Governor in Council rnay make an order to defer
the strike or lockout in accordance with Section 90(1) of the Ca&
Lobour Code. This section
provides the limitation on the right to strike during the period between Parliaments. The rationale is
that it is in emergencies that back to work legislation would n o d l y by resorted to.

b. Timeliness Restrictions

Under Canadian law, a strike for collective bargaining objectives would be
unlawful if it is uniimely. Generally speaking, the timeliness restrictions mean strikes
are prohibited before certification and are banned during the terms of ail collective
agreements.

( 1). Prohibition of Strikes before Certification

Strikes cannot be used to force an employer to bargain. Employees must
obtain bargaining rights through the procedures provided in labour relations
legislation. Any economic pressure designed to secure union bargaining rights, by
which a trade union can claim to act as bargaining agent of employees and negotiate
with the employer for a collective agreement, is forbidden.

This is a sound restriction since the purpose of the statutory protection of
striking is to enhance the economic interests of the workers vis-à-vis employers. On

the recognition that it is impossible for the employees to deal with their employer on
an individual bais, Canada labour law gants the employees the right to have trade
union representation in order to bargain collectively to promote their economic
interests. The purpose of the legislation is to build a unified, disciplined centre of
power for the employees as a counterpoise to the economic power wielded by their
employer. Since the certified or voluntarily recognized union obtains legal exclusive
power to represent al1 employees covered by the certification or voluntary recognition

agreement, it is as capable as any other kind of power of king abused: of king a
source of oppression to those workers whom it is supposed to serve. Thus, the same
labour laws which nurture union power have the responsibility to ensure the union
leadership is hiily accountable to the employees. For this reason, in every Canadian
jurisdiction there now exists a statutory procedure, known as certification, or an
alternative. known as voluntarily recognition, to guarantee that the union enjoys the
support of a majority of employees. A strike before certification, however, is designed
to secure bargaining rights for a specifc union. Although it is the result of the
economic conflicts between employers and employees, it should not be protected
under the legislation because a recognition strike runs counter the purpose of the
statute. The Supreme Court of Canada illustrated this subject in the following case.

In Gagnon et al. v. Fodation Maritime Ltd

.- the defendants caused a

stoppage of work by employees due to peaceful picketing after their request for
recognition of their unions with a view to entering into a collective agreement was
refused by the respondent on the ground that the unions had not been certified. The
Supreme Court of Canada held, on further appeal by the defendants, the work
stoppage was clearly a strike in contravention of S. 22(1) of Labour Relations A#,
which was applied to prohibit a strike without pnor cornpliance with the provisions of
the Act respecting certification. Kerwin C.J.C wrote:

The purpose of this statute and others of the same nature in Canada is the
prevention of strikes and lock-outs and the maintenance of industrial peace.
As none of the unions said to be represented had bean certified or, so far as the
-

- .

"( 1961) 28 DLR. (2d) 174 (S.C.C.).
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evidence in this case goes, authorized in any manner to act on behalf of any of
the employees, the attitude taken by the officers of the respondent on Iuly 15th
was correct.

In respect to the fact that the defendants brought the work stoppage in order to
compel the respondent to contract with their unions which had not k e n certified,
Kerwin C.J.C shared the opinions held by Ritchie J. and Bridges J.A. and assened
that the cessation of work was an uniawful strike as k i n g conuary to the provision of
the Act.
1agree with the leamed trial Judge and with Bridges J.A., that the action of the

defendants in causing or inducing them to cease to work was a tortious act for
which they are liable in damages. It is clear frorn the evidence that the purpose
of setting up the picket h e was to inflict injury upon the respondent by
halting the work for the purpose of compelling it to contract with the unions
whom, as far as the evidence goes, represented no one.
As indicated above, a collective agreement is between the employer and her
employees containing the terms and conditions of employment. Striking as an
economic weapon should be used for the purpose of negotiation of a new collective
contract. The underlying recognition of the case is that it emphasized that the union is
prohibited from exercising economic sanction in its efforts to acquire bargaining right
under the legislation. Prior to the introduction of the certification system. an employer
could refuse to negotiate a contract with a trade union even if it had 100 percent
support of employees. However. the certification system brought different means of
resolution of what used to give nse to recognition strikes. For the unions, certification
results in compulsory collective bargaining. The employer must deai with a certified
union about the conditions of employment for the employees concemed. whether they

are in favour of the union or not. This bargaining authority remains in effect until and

unless the union is displaced or decertz~edin the same kind of formal board
proceeding which produced the initiai certification."

Thus, instead of initiating a

recognition strike, the trade union receives legal bargaining authority through
certification when it secures the support of the majority of the employees in the unit
defmed by the labour board. Understandably, an uncertified trade, since it has not
been regarded as the representative of any of the employees, cannot cause a work

stoppage in order to compel the employer to contract with it. The right to strike set out
in the system of collective bargaining is for the purpose of the stability of industrial
peace. It is not a weapon that any one can use for any purpose.

(2). Prohibition of Strikes during the Tenns of Collective Agreements

A collective agreement which is in effect has binding force on both the trade
union and the employer as well as the individual employees. Section 56 of Canada
Labour Code provides:
A collective agreement entered into between a bargaining agent and an

employer in respect of a bargaining unit is, subject to and for the purposes of
this part, binding on the bargaining agent, every employee in the bargaining
unit and the employer.

" Section 36(1) of the C a ~ à Labour
u
Code provides: When a trade union is certified as the
bargaining agent for a bargaining unit, (a) the trade union so certified has exclusive authonty to bargain
collectively on behalf of the employees in the bargaining unit; (b) the certification of any made union
that was previously certified as the bargaining agent for any employees in the bargaining unit is deemed
to be revoked to the extent that the certification relates to those employees; and (c) the trade union so
certified is substituted as a party to any collective agreement that affects any employees in the
bargaining unit, to the extent that the collective agreement relates to those employees, in the place of
the bargaining agent named in the collective agreement or any successor thereto.

not used to induce an agreement, wouid not be pmtected under the legislation in the
Iight of governing labour-management relation^.^'

c. Purposive Limitation

Generally. a Iawful strike is designed to gain economic objectives and is used
only as a collective bargaining sanction when negotiations break down. Since a strike
for political protest is not the direct result of the conflicted interests in labour
relations. whether it is under the umbrella of the statutory legislation depends on
whether the work stoppage is aimed specifically at an employer behind the political
motivation in the cessation of work. The best exarnple to address this issue is the oneday work stoppage at the time of the "National Day of Protest" called by the Canadian

Labour Congress on October 14, 1976 to protest the federal anti-inflation program
which placed limits on the wage increases obtainable through collective bargaining.

" A related issue is the treatment of the "hot declaration" clauses in collective agreements. Hot
declaration clauses typically give members of a bargaining unit the right to refuse to execute work that
has corne fiom or is destin4 for an employer who has been declared by the union to be unfair. The
question arises whether it constitutes a strike where unions and their members are acting pursuant to
such clauses. In Ontario, such clauses have k e n characterized as unlawful attempts to contract out of
the statutory prohibition on collectivejob action during the term of a collective agreement and a
coltective empIoyee work refusal that relies on such a clause is nevertheless a strike. Case noticed:
Empress Graphics and GCIU, Lm. 500 M (Re), [1989] O.L.R.B. Re? 587.
In British Columbia, the approach to hot declaration clauses is quite different, Before 1987 the Labour
Relations Board had held the refusais to work by employees pursuant to hot declaration did not
constitute a strike, not because of the subjective element in the definition of strike, but because they
were exercising rights expressly given to them under their collective agreement. See Pacifie Press Lrd.
(1986). 13 Can. L.R.B.R.(N.S.).74. In 1987, British Columbia adopted legislation to nuIli@ contract
clauses (since repealed). thereby, ensuring that action in accordance with hot declaration would
constitute disobedience of a lawful order of one's employer. The Indusirid Reiauons Councii (the
successor to the British Columbia Labour ReIations Board) continued to hold, however, that the hot
declaration clauses were still effective to the extent they relateci to work coming fiom a person whose
collective agreement was regulated by the C d a Labour Code. See Pue@ Press Ltd. (1988), 18
C m ,L.R.B.R. (N.S.) 373 at 386-387.

Labour boards and courts across Canada held different opinions on whether the work
stoppage was s strike.

The British Columbia Labour Relations Board argued that the work stoppage

was not a strike under the provincial h u r Relations Code," which contained an
express purposive component:
'strike' includes
(i) a cessation of work, or (ii) a refusal to work, or (üi) a refusal to continue to
work, or (iv) an act or omission that is intended to, or does, restrict or limit
production or services, by employees in combination, or in concert. or in
accordance with a common understanding, for the purpose of compelhg their
employer to agree to ternis or conditions of employment, or of compelling
another employer to agree to terms or conditions of employment of his
employees, and 'to saike' has a simiiar meaning;

The Board reasoned that since the work stoppage had a political rather than a
collective bargaining purpose, it did not amount to a strike within the precise legd
meaning of that term under the Labour Relations Code. Chairperson Weiler stated:

The Code deals with the entire range of labour / management disputes and
establishes this Board, broadly representative of both labour and management,
as the tribunal to adrninister that body of law. By contrast, political work
stoppages involve disputes between unions and a government. Neither the
resources of the Code nor this Board have much, if anything, to contribute to
the resolution of those problems (even less than we have to contribute, for
example, to the administration of the criminal law on a picket line.. .). If the
law inserted the Code and the board into the middle of that type of political
dispute, the effect would Likely simply be to damage the ability of these
instruments to make a valuable contribution to labour/management relations in
the long m. For that reason as well, we decline the invitation of Hydro to
expand on the explicit definition of "strike" under the Code so as to draw the
Day of Protest under the umbrella of the Code and within the jurisdiction of
thi~
Chairperson Weiler's decision should be given particular attention as he stated
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S.B.C. 1973 (2 nd Sas.), c.122, ss. 1(1), 79.88.

" British Columbia Hydro Md Power Authoriry. [1976] 2 Cm.L.R.B.R. 4 10. at 4 18-4 19.

that the Code deals with the relations between the employer and the trade union, not
those between the trade union and a govemment. His ground for not treating the work
stoppage as a strïke focused on its political purpose - desigaed to influence the
Trudeau governrnent to change its mind about wage controls. Since it was not an
instrument to try to compel an employer to senle a dispute about its conditions of
employment, it will not be controlled by a labour statute or a labour board.
The Nova Scotia statutory definition of a strike is similar to the one in British
n strike:
Columbia statute. The Trade Union AcP provides the d e f ~ t i o of
l(1) In this Act,
(v) "strike" includes a cessation of work, or refusal to work or continue to
work, by ernployees, in combination or in concert or in accordance with a
common understanding, for the purpose of compelling their employer to agree
io tenns or conditions of employment or to aid other employees on compelling
their employer to agree to t e m or conditions of employment; and "to strike"
had a corresponding meaning;

In Re Robb Engineering a d United Steelworkers of America, Local 4122I.' a
Nova Scotia arbitrator had held that participation in the National Day of Protest did
not violate the strike prohibition provision in the valid collective agreement due to the
purposive restriction in the provincial definition of strike. The Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal stnick down the arbitraiion award. The court argued that other types of
cessation of work such as the case at bar which was motivated by political protest,
were also encompassed by the definition. Mackeigan C.J.N.S. said:

R.S.N.S. 1972, c.19, s.104.
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(1978). 86 D.L.R. (3d) 307 (N.S.C.A.).

If S. 48(2) and the related general prohibition of stnkes during the Life of an
agreement do not ban on organized concerted stoppage of work by a union or
other leadership when the stoppage is not aimed specifically at an employer, a
completely iilogical gap would appear in the Iegislative scheme for achieving
industrial peace. 1respectfidly reject the argument that to define a strike so
broadly is to interfere with &dom. Workers are free to participate
individually in politics and are fkee, indeed, to cease work individually for any
mason or for no reason, subject to job d e s as to absenteeism. They are not
free to combine by agreement to quit work. Unions' political activities are
simitarly not restricted, but political freedorn doses not permit disregard of the
law. Unions in exchange for the right of bargaining are pledged to settle, by
arbitration or otherwise, "without stoppage of work" (S. 40(1) of the Act), ali
differences with employea, and are required not to cause any work stoppage.
The Legislature has ordained that a strike may be used only as a collective
bargaining sanction when negotiations break down.
The distinguishing feature of Mackeigan C.J.N.S .* s judgment is his
recognition that strîke shouId be confmed in the area of collective bargaining. The
Chief Justice of Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed that workers are protected under
the legislature to participate individuaüy in politics and to cease work individually,
but they are not protected to organize concerted stoppage of work by a union or other
leadership at any time. Strike actions, which will bring economic harm on the
employer whatever the motive, should be used only when negotiations break down.
Therefore, the National Day of Protest as an orgaoized work stoppage is an illegal

Without a subjective-purpose component in its provincial definition of strike,
the Ontario Labour Relations Board held the work stoppage on the National Day of

Protest was an unlawful strike. Strike is defined in section 1( l)(n) of the Labour
Relations AcP6 as including, "a cessation of work, a refusal to work or to continue to

work by employees in combination or in concert or in accordance with a common

understanding, or in a slow-down or other concerted activity on the part of employees
designed to resaict or Limit output". This defuiition differs substantially fkom those
adopted by some Canadian jurisdiction without the reference to a purpose of
compelling the employer or another employer to agree to terms or conditions of
employment.

In Domglas Ltd. v. United G l w and Ceramic Workers of North America et
a1.I the board held the provincial defdtion of strike encompassed activity that was

politicaily motivated. Chairpeson Carter wrote the following:

Our conclusion is that the definition of strike found in The Labour Relations
Act is wide enough to encompass the conduct in question. The ovemding
purpose of the Act is to regulate all aspects of the relationship between the
employer and the employees represented by the union of their choice. Fxedom
to organize employees for collective bargaining purposes is protected by the
law, and is no longer a matter of self-help. There now exist strict prohibitions
against employer interference with organizing activity, supported in sorne
cases by the procedural device of a reverse onus of proof. The self-help
remedy of strïke action, in turn, has been severely restricted, to be used only as
a method of ultimately resolving collective bargaining disputes. Al1 other
strikes, including politically motivated suikes, have k e n prohibited in order
to keep to a minimum conduct disruptive to production and harrnfid to general
labour relations harmony. The strike, in our view. was intended by the
Iegislature to be only a collective bargaining sanction, to be applied in a
particular labour relations situation, and to be used in no other context.
whether political or otherwise.
These rernarks are tremendously significant. Not only do they emphasize the
overriding purpose of the labour relations legislation, which is to regulate al1 aspects
of industrial relations, but also they speciQ the circumstance under which a political
protest should be included in the definition of strike. The Day of Protest by the
employees acting as a collective group was organized by their union and was effective

15'

76 C.LL.C. 16,050 (O.L.R.B.).

to shut down the operations of their employer. This job action did intlict h m on the
employer - the interruption of production. Thereby, it was sufficient to amount to an

iliegal shike.

2. Definition of "Strike"

Most Canadian labour relations statutes contain a definition of "strike", which

has three components: ( 1) a cessation of work or a refusal to work, (2) by employees,
(3) in combination or in concert or in accordance with a common understanding. In

addition, several provincial statutes introduce a further component: the purpose of
compelling an employer to agree to te-

or conditions of employment.6%e federal

definition of strike contains the three components as noted. The federal definition of
strike is that:
'strike' includes a cessation of work or a refusal to work or to continue to
work by employees, in combination, in concert or in accordance with a
common understanding and a slowdown of work or other concerted activity on
the part of employees in relation to their work that is designed to restrict or
iimit
Generally, strïkes are activities of employees in combination or in comect or
in accordance with a common understanding designed to restrict or limit output. It is

unlikely that there could be a one-person strike? However, it is not enough to

H.W. Arthm et al., Labour h w and Industrial Relations in C
&

(Toronto: Butterworths, 1993)

at 270.
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Cunadu Labour Code, S. 3(1).

Thomas Fuller Construction Co. v. Rochon [ 19571 O.W.N. 455, 10 D.L.R. (26)670,57C.LL.C.
15,349 W.C.).

constitute a stdce that more than one employee stops work. There must be a common
character of the employees' action. That is, the job actions that are taken in concert or
in accordance with a common understanding must be aimed at limiting or restricting
output.

The purpose of the strike is very important in the system of collective
bargaining. It is understandable that collective bargaining between union and
employer deals with the terms and conditions under which labour will be purchased
by employers and will be provided by employees, and the two parties have very
different perspectives on this subject. Since the employers have the rights of property
and of capital, they are able to propose the t e m upon which it will purchase labour
for its operations. In tum, the employees have the collective right to withdraw their
labour rather than to accept their employer's offer.
Clearly, the stoppage of work initiated by the union affects both sides. The
employer's operations may be shut down without any employees to mn them. The
employer loses the flow of revenues. At the sarne time, the employees are out of
work, deprived of their earnings, but generally getting some strike pay. Both sides are
being hurt economically. Why does the trade union choose to bear the economic loss
on its members raîher than to accept the offer of the employer? The union wants to
force the employer to reach a mutually acceptable agreement about the terms and
conditions of employment. In this way the economic purpose of strikes plays an
important role in a collective bargaining relationship. The following two cases
analyze the basic point of seike as a fonn of economic pressure.

In British Colwnbia Tenninal Elevator Operationi' Association on behnlfof
the Saskatchewan ulir,eat Pool v. Grain Workers' Union,Local 333," the employer

aiieged an udawfui strike on the evidence of a concerted refusal by its employees to
work any overtime foliowing the employer's decision to lay off a number of
employees due to a lack of work. The trade union argued that, since the coLIective
agreement contained a clause which gave employees the right to rehise overtime
work, the rehisal. even if concerted, did not amount to an illegal suüce. Regardless of
whether work was obligatory and whether direct evidence was presented that the

union authorized or orchestrated the employees' refusal to work overtime. the Board
held that the refusal constituted aa uniawful strîke for the foilowing reasons:
Here the parties were in the midst of collective bargaining. The employees in
the bargaining unit had engaged in a concerted refusal to work overtime in
circumstances where, in the normal course, a sufficient number would have
accepted work. In addition, the employer had been told that the union was
clearly opposed to the concept of resorting to overtirne when lay-offs were in
effect. In light of the above, and in the absence of any evidence to the c o n w ,
the Board must conclude that the union was the architect of the employees'
concerted refusal. We found therefore that a strike contrary to section 89 was
in effect.

...it must be clear that the statutory definition of 'strike' cannot be changed by
an agreement of the parties. Nor can the public purpose of 'industrial peace'
behind the no-strike provision be avoided by 'contraction out' of the legal
obligations of the Code.. ..Of course, the parties can negotiate an employee's
individual right to refuse to work and these clauses wili be applied in
accordance with their given interpretation, subject to arbitration. However, the
union or its rnembers cannot use such a clause to circumvent the Code by
giving employees the right to refuse collectively to work contrary to section
89. Each separate segment of the Code definition of 'strike' is signifiant and
must be read in conjunction with the other segments. Actions which are
acceptable, for individual employees, because of the collective agreement
provisions, may constitute an unlawful stdce when done 'in combination, in
" 94 C.L.L.C.

16,060.

concert or in accordance with a common understanding,' that is aimed in
relation to their work,at restriction or limiting output.. ..
There are several points underlying the logic of the definition of "strike*'in
these remarks. However, the most important one is the point of the strike as an
economic sanction. That is. the principle in deciding whether a refusai to work
constitutes a strike depends on a f d n g of the purpose to resvict output of the
employer. As discussed above, a collective action by employees will affect both sides.

On the empIoyer's side, its revenues may stop flowing because she may have to stop
the whole or some of her business. It is for this purpose that the trade union wants to
initiate the work stoppage. Being afraid of the continuous econornic loss, the
employer will be forced to corne back to the bargaining table. Therefore, if a refusai to
work is aimed "at restriction or limiting output", it f d s within the statutory definition
of "strike".
By contrast. an overtime ban was not found to constitute an illegal strike in the
case of Otis Elevator Co. v. I. II.E X . Local 82 " since the action was not designed to

elicit an econornic response from the employer. Although the ban had been introduced
late in the collective bargaining process and was to run until a new agreement was
reached, the union's action was aimed at preserving excess work to offset an
anticipated layoffs in construction starts. There was no attempt to compel the
employer to alter the terms of employrnent in the job action. The Board held that the
ban on overtime was not a strike because the purpose of the ban was to improve the

" [1976] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 65.76 C.L.L.C. 16.051 (B.C.).

union's position upon expiration of the collective bargaining by preserving work. The
Board made the point after a legislative anaiysis of the defdtion of strike:
It is only activity which is calculated to bnng an economic response from the
Employer which can be said to have k e n done "for the purpose of compelling
an employer to agee to teand conditions of employment". When the end
is properly an objective of negotiations, the activity is proscribed on the basis
that pressure may only be exerted in a legal strike under the Code. But here the
implementation of the ban in and of itself achieved the object the Union
sought - preservation of work for some future date. No response was required
from the Employer who was not envisaged as part of the solution which the
Union decided to seek. In short. there was no response sought or required from
the Employer which might improve the position that the Union had aiready
adopted. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the "purpose" of the ban
was to compel the employer to terms and conditions of employment.
The significance of these rem&

is the recognition of the purpose for the

refusal to work. It is the central test for detemiinhg wbether a collective action taken
by the employees is or is not a strike. As mentioned several times, collective job

actions by the employees should be confined in the area of collective bargaining
because striking will cause economic harm to both the employees and the employer. It
is the economic loss on both sides that makes the two parities soon realize that it is
much less painful to agree, even if they do have to move considerably closer to the
texms proposed by the other side. Even more important, it is the credible threat of the
impending strike action that makes it more powerhil than the actual result of a strike.
Thus, without any atternpt to compel the employer to the terms and conditions of
employment, the work stoppage did not constitute a strike.

3. Employment Relatioaship during a Lawful Strike

The right to strike is not expressly granted by Canadian labour legislation or
the constitution. It is implied fiom the right of employees to take part in the "lawful

activities" of unions. A general principle in Canadian labour law in regard to the
employment status of a striker is that an employee who participates in a lawful, timely
strike is protected under the statutes with respect to the return to work. In the
rneanwhile, the statutes establish prohibitions against employer retaliatory action
designed to eradicate the union or punish strikers." Section 94 (3)(a)(vi)of Canada
Labour Code provides:

No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer s h d refuse to employ
or to continue to employ or suspend, transfer, lay off or otherwise discriminate
against any person with respect to employment, pay or any other term or
condition of employment or intimidate, threaten or othenvise discipline any
person, because the person has participated in a strike that is not prohibited by
this Part or exercised any right under this Part.
Issues that arise are the approach towards the legality of hiring permanent

strike replacement^.'^ In Canada, there is no general prohibition on the use of

Although rhe federal jurisdiction guarantee suiken*pension rights. 1 wiIl not discuss the effect of
strikes on employment benefits such as pensions, sick pay, vacations and holiday pay. For this
discussion, see G. England, "The Legal Response to Striking at the Individual Level in the Cornmon
Law Jurisdictions of Canada" (1976) 3 Dal. LJ. 440.
74

British Columbia sets out a definition of replacement workers in its Labour Relations Code. A
replacement worker is defined as a worker who (1) is hired or engaged after the earlier of the date on
which the notice to commence collective bargaining is given and the date on which bargaining begins;
(2) ordinarily works at another of the employer's places of operations; (3) is tra&erred to a place of
operation in respect of which the strike or lockout is taking place. if he or she was transferred after the
exlier of the date on which the notice to commence bargaining is given and the date on which
bargaining begins; or (4) is employed or engaged by the employer, or suppIied to the employer by
another person to perfom (5) the work of an employee in the bargaining unit that is on strike or
lockout, or (6) the work ordinarily done by a person who is performing the work of an employee in the

replacement workers. Among the provincial legislation, Quebec gives particular
protection of employment relationship during a lawful strike. The anti-strike-breaking
provisions in Quebec Labour Code greatly curtail the employer's ability to maintain
.~~
of that province not only prevents the
operations during a ~ n i k eLegislation
employer h m using newly-hired employees to perform the work of the struck unit,
but also prevents her fiom using any employees in the stnrck bargaining unit or other
bargaining units for that purpose. What the employer is aliowed to maintain
production is to use those managers employed at the stmck plant to perfonn the work,
or subcontract some, or aii, the operation with the prohibition against using the stmck
e~tablishrnent.'~The British Columbia provisions have folIowed Quebec and prohibit
employers from using the services of a paid or unpaid replacement worker during a
lawful strike or lockout. The provisions, however, dlow employees in the stmck unit
to retum to work while the svike continues." In Ontario, provisions to prohibit the
use of replacement workers were enacted in 1992 but repealed in 1995. The former
Ontario provisions. unlike Quebec. permitted employers to re-deploy bargaining unit
employees at the strike location to perform stnick work subject to these employees
exercising their right to refuse such assign~nents.~~
bargaining unit that is on strike or lockout. See S.B.C.1992, c. 82, S. 68. There is no federal definition
of replacement workers.
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B.C. Labour Relations Code, S.B.C. 1992, c.82, s.68.
Case noticed: Canadian Mini- Warehoue Propenies Limited v. Temuters Local 31. ( 1995), 95
C.L.L.C. 220-068 (B.C.L.R.B.), and Great Vancouver Regional Distnct v. VancouverMunicipal and
Regional Employees' Union, ( 1 994), 95 C.L.L.C.220-003(B.C.L.R.B.).

'* Ontario Labour Relurions Act, S.O. 1992, c. 21, ss. 3 1-33.

However, even where replacement workers are generally pennitted, they are
ody recognized as having a tempcrary, precarious status. As noted, Canadian labour
law seeks a balance of power between the trade union and the employer. The
underlying issue is the fundamental difference between the parties about what
bargaining rights entail. From the union's perspective, employees retain a permanent
connection to their job and see it as an invasion when someone else takes over their
job. From the employer's perspective, the obligation to bargain is an obligation to

bargain over the terms and conditions of work for the ernployees in order to operate
her business. In tum, the legislation maintains employees' status during a l a f i l
strike and protects them against retaliation for exercising their rights to strike on the
one hand, and on the other, the employer is allowed to insulate itself from the
economic pressure by hiring replacements in order to continue operation during a
strike.

In the case of Canadian Airline Pilots ' Association and Eastern Provincial
Ainvays Ltd.," the employer hired 18 new pilots to maintain operation during a lawful

strike of the pilots. The employer also promised those new employees that they would
retain their jobs after the saike in preference to the strikers. Some nine weeks into the
strike, the employer proposed a clause in the "return to work agreementy7which would
keep the new pilots and those pilots who crossed the picket line dunng the strike on
the active work force out of seniority. The clause also provided the employer with a

60 day opportunity to selectively recall those pilots it wished, out of seniority, or
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Can. L.R.B.R. (N.S.) 368 at 409.

alternatively not to recd those that it did not wish to recall. Furthemore, the union
and the pilots would be required to forego their right under the collective agreement

to grieve their displacement by junior pilots. The Board held that the clause offered by

the employer in the "retum to work agreement" which suspended seniority rights and
ensured the continued employment of the new pilots was an unfair labour practice.
Vice-Chair Jamieson presented the argument when he wrote:

EPA takes the position that in the absence of statutory provisions providing
for the rehstatement of employees at the end of a strike, and, where there is
nothhg to restrain an employer fiom operation during a strike or restricting
the hiring of new employees, its insistence that the new pilots not be replaced
by retuming suikers. is not unlawful.

If the Code only contained S. 107(2), which is a standard provision in most
jurisdictions [preserving the 'employee status' of strikers], it would be open to
argument that to retain 'employee status' does not necessarily mean a
guarantee of a job. But, Parliament went much further than S. 107 (2) to protect
the continued employment of those who exercised their rights under the Code.
The construction of S. 184 (3)(a)(vi)could leave absolutely no room for doubt
that employees cannot be deprived of any terni or condition of employment
whatsoever because of participation in a lawful strike. If an employee is so
deprived, a reason, other than the exercise of the right to strike, must be
present.
These remarks were made in the context of the employee status during a legal
strike and there were two important issues underlying the Iogic of diis argument. First,
Vice-Chak Jamieson believed that the legislation does not prohibit the employer from
operation during a strike. The employer can have replacement workers to maintain her
operation. However, the replacement workers are only recognized as having a
temporary, precarious status. As noted, striking as an economic sanction is used by
the employees to advance their interests in the course of collective bargaining. Since
replacement workers are always used to counteract the pressure exerted by a strike,

their interests are not only divergent h m but also squarely opposed to those of the

permanent workers. As a matter of confiîct of interest, their interest Lies on the side of
the emptoyers. Thus, the use of replacement workers puts a risk on both the strikers'
jobs and the future of f k e collective bargaining.

Second, Vice-Chair Jarnieson emphasized that the legislature prohibits
employer's disciplinary action against the employees due to their participation in
lawful strike activities. The protection against discipline or other forms of penalty for
having participated in a lawfil strike is apparent in the Canada Labour Code. The
legislature has characterized the refusal to re-employ striking employees as an unfair
labour practice. In accordance with the Code, anything dom in concert to restrict
output is a strike and such activity is protected when it is undertaken at the right tune.
The employer's retaliatory action designed to eradicate the union or punish strikers is
an unfair labour practice. In addition, Canadian labour law has granted extremely
broad protections to employees' organizational rights. The employees are protected in
taking various kinds of more imaginativejob-related activities other than the
traditional strike to apply pressure on employen. They may choose to impose an
overtime ban, a work to rule campaign. a work slow down. or a partial work stoppage.

All these activities are lawfbl if they are done at the right the."
What rights and resources does the employer have in response to a legal strike
initiated by a trade union? In essence, an employer, for its part, is free to take
measures designed to limit the disruptive effect to the strike activities. The employer

See Communications,Electronic, Electrical, Technical and Salaried Workers of Canada and
Graham C d f e TV/FM (/986),12 Can. L.R.B.R. (N.S.) 1.
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is also fiee to exercise its right to lockout employees. The employer is not, however,
fke to take any of the actions spelled out in the Code against employees for engaging

in a Iawful ~trike.~'

4. Support of Lawful Strikes

In the course of a strike or a lockout, union picketing has always k e n a focus
of the conflict. Ernployers want to continue operations during a strike. They attempt
to maintain access to the premises, so that supervisors and employees in nonstriking
units can corne to work and materials are moved in and out. In the most hotly
contested disputes, employers may hire replacement workers. Stdcers want to inflict
economic harm on the employen. They seek to disrupt an employer's normal

operation by dissuading their own members and fellow bargaining unit employees, as
well as customers, suppliers, and other employers from doing business with their
adversary.

Since picketing may occur with or without a strike in progress and the strike

rnay or may not be a lawful one, it emerges as a phenomenon "distinctly separate

from,though more often than not tactically intertwined with, a strüce or suike-like
pressure"."
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The precise extent of the protection afforded striking workers depends on whether the strike is legal.
In McGavin Tomrnu~~ter
Lrd. v. Ainscough, 119761 1 S.C.R, 7 18, the Supreme Court of Canada

discussed the issue as to whether it is unfair labour practice that employer terminate the employment
relationship due to an illegal strike.

G.Adams, Canadian Labour Law 2d ed.(Aurora: Canada Law Book Inc., 1998) at I 1- 17.

Although Alberta, British Columbia, New Brunswick and Newfoundlaad have
defined the legal problerns surrounding picketing in their respective labour statutes,
most Canadian legislation is silent on this issue? Courts and Labour Boards play a
significant role in developing the regulation of picketing.

There is no general prohibition on the use of replacement workers under
Canadian labour Law. As discussed in the above section, except in Quebec, British
Columbia and formerly Ontario, the legislature leaves the employer free to use
supervisors or hire replacements to operate the business during a strike, or take other
steps to limit the disruptive effect of strike activity. Thus, the employer has k e n

given the legal frcedom to frustrate a lawful strike, to dilute any financial h m to its
business. Understandably, the trade union will assert that the law must take the sarne
attitude toward its owo efforts to edist the aid of other unionized employees to try to
compel the third parties to stem their flow of assistance to the stmck employer. The
classic weapon used by trade unions for that purpose is the picket line.

The legitimacy of union picketing has always been one of the most
controversial topics in Canada labour law. The purpose of a strike is to cause a
collective work stoppage and the picket line is intended to and does cause work
stoppage by the employees. But the strike action is legal only in order to resolve a
dispute with an employer about the negotiation of a new collective agreement.
Logicaily, the immediate target of the picket line should be the party directly involved
-

--

. -

" Generally, picketing is understood to involve these elements: ( 1 ) the target directeci toward the
employees in the same unit and other observes, (2) the presence of one or more persons, (3)
communication by spoken or written messages, or through behaviour, and (4) an intention by presence
or communication to disrupt employer's operation and secure a sympathetic response from third
persons.

in the dispute. Since picketing potentiaily involves intimidating third-parties and
infringing the rights and freedoms of such parties in addition to the smck employers,

Canadian courts make a clear distinction between primary and secondary picketing.
Picketing at the place of business of the stnick employer is primary. Both
labour boards and courts tend to d o w a wide scope for primary picketing in support
of a legal strike. As noted, the peculiar vimie of the strike weapon is that its impact is
felt by both sides. The strikers are out of work and without their wages; the
employer's operations may be shut down and its revenues may stop flowing. If the
law is wiliing to tolerate that impact from the typical strike, it is reasonable that
peacefd picketing should be allowed to produce the same result."
Picketing of anyone other than the struck employer (for instance, a corporation
which continues to seli the stmck employer's goods) is secondary. The approach to
secondary picketing has generally been to prohibit or restrict it. Some scholars have
listed three reasons which have been relied upon to totally or partiaîly prohibit the use
of secondary picketing. First, the existence of secondary boycott causes potential

harm to the prirnary employer's business, which may be much greater than that of a
strike and picketing at her premises. Second, secondary boycotts may injure the

The law governing primary picketing is essentially the general ton law and criminal law. The
ptesumption in favour of picketing in support of a lawful smke will yieid to the prohibitions against
physical obstruction, assault, property damage and trespass corning from the generai law. In Harrison
v. Carmel!, (1976) 2 S.C.R,200,the appeIlant charged fhe respondent under The Petty Trespasses Act,
R.S.M. 1970, c. P-50, of unlawfuily trespassing on the sidewalk of a shopping centre during a lawfùl
strike. Considering the respective values to society of the right to property and the right to picket, the
court held the owner of the land was able to vindicate his property rights by a trespass action. This
decision, however, was dissent from the one of Chief Justice Laskin, the member of the Supreme Court
of Canada with the rnost significant labour background. Laskin C.J.C.held in his judgment that the
respondent picketer was entitied to the privilege of entry and to remain in the public areas without
obstruction of the sidewalk or incommoding of others when she pursued Iegitimate cfairns against her
employer through the peaceful picketing in furtherance of a lawful strike.

interests of other businesses and of consumers, who are not engaged in the dispute.

Third, where secondary boycott takes the form of appeals to other workers to cease
work, such action not only prevents them from earning theïr Living but also creates
dangers to the society through widespread indusuial disruption."

In Retail, Wholesale and Depamnent Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin
Delivery Ltd.', the Suprcme Court of Canada suggests that peaceful picketing is
protected by the Charrer of Rights and F r e e d m under the guarantee of Freedom of
expression, subject to demonstrably justified Limitations; in accordance with which
secondary picketing against the third party is unlawful. In this case, the appellant

union was the federally certified bargainhg agent for the employees of hvolator
Courier Incorporated. The respondent, Dolphin Delivery Ltd., was a company
engaged in the courier business in Vancouver and the smunding area. In June 1981,
Purolator locked out its employees in a labour dispute. Prior to the lockout, Dolphin
made deliveries for Purolator in its area and afterward, for Supercourier, a company
c o ~ e c t e dwith Purolator. Dolphin canied on its business in roughly the same marner
with Supercourier as it had formerly done with Purolator. In October of 1982, the
appellant applied to the British Columbia Labour Relations Board for a declaration
that Dolphin and Supercourier were allies of Purolator in their dispute with the
appeilant. Such a finding would have rendered 1awN the picketing of Dolphin's
business premises under British Columbia legislaiion, and consequently would have

LUSupra note 68 at 29 1;
Case noticed: Heather Hill Appliances Lrd v. McConnack, [ 19661 1 O.R. 12 (H.C.J.).
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affected its business in that its collective agreement provided that the employees'
refusal to cross a la-

picket line was not a violation of the agreement or grounds

for disciplinary action or discharge. The appeal was dismissed.
McIntyre J. held in his judgment that the respondent was a third Party not
concemed in the labour dispute. The anticipated picketing was secondary picketing
which was protected as h d o m of expression under S. 2@) of the Charter, but was
saved by S. 1. The following remarks are in the context of secondary picketing:
This case involves secondary picketing - picketing of a third party not
concemed in the dispute which underlies the picketing. The b a i s of Our
system of collective bargaining is the proposition that the parties themselves
should, wherever possible, work out their own agreement.
When the parties do exercise the nght to disagree, picketing and other forms
of industrial conflict are likely to follow. The social cost is great, man-hours
and wages are lost, production and services will be dismpted, and general
tensions within the community may 5e heightened. Such industrial conflict
may be tolerated by society but only as an inevitable corollary to the collective
bargaining process. It is therefore necessary in the general social interest that
picketing be regulated and sometimes lirnited. It is reasonable to restrain
picketing so that the conflict will not escalate beyond the actual parties. While
picketing is, no doubt, a legislative weapon to be employed in a labour dispute
by the employees against their employer, it should not be permitted to h m
others....
The approach to the legitimacy of picket line is that the permissible target of
picket line should be the primary employer - that employer with whom the union is
negotiating, and whom it is trying to compel to make favourable concessions in order
to settte the agreement. As mentioned above, there is no general prohibition on the

use of replacement workers under the legislation. The employer is free to replace
striking employees, to try and operate the business during a strike if it can, thus
effectively diluting the financial harm of a lawful strike. Since the stnkers are now out

of work subsisting on meagre strike pay. the same legislation protects unionsTright of
picketing to mistrate that employer's endeavour. Therefore. the legislation keeps a
balance between the two parties of labour relations; it does not want to favour
whatever side. However. secondary picketing of third parties is not in comection with

a lawfil strike. To a certain degree, the secondary employer is unconcemed in the
primary disagreement and it does not have the power to make the concessions that
will senle the new contract te=

between another employer and her employees. The

secondary employer may have power to put pressure on the ones who do have power
to make the concessions, but the union is not ailowed to take advantage of that
indirect power in a fiee collective bargaining system because it is icconsistent with
the neutrd legal principle in the legislation.
Aside from this view. McIntyre I. gives another convincing argument that
picketing should "be regulated and sometimes limited. The argument is that
legislature should maintain a balance between the rights of unions to employ
picketing in the primary dispute against their employer. and the rights of the
secondary employers to remain free from the effect of labour disputes between other
parties. Thus, the legislature does not aUow vade unions to expand rights associated
with economic conflict beyond the parties directly involved in the conflict.

In a primary picketing case. British Colwnbia Govemment Ernpfoyees' Union
v. Attorney General of British Columbia,Attorney General of Cana&, Intervenor,"

the question was whether the limit on picketers' right to freedom of expression under

"88 C.L.L.C. 14,047.

S.

2(b) was justified as reasonable by S. 1 of the Charter. This case deals with the

balance between the rights of trade unions and the rights of Canadian citizens.

In this case, the appellant union established picket lines at ail law courts in
British Columbia in the course of a lawful strike. AU persons who crossed the picket
Iine, however, were considered to have honoured it if they fmt obtained a pass from
the union. Although it was primary picketing which is in general pennitted, the Chief
Justice of British Columbia Supreme Court granted an injunction restraining
picketing and other activities calculated to interfere with the operations of any court.
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the injunction. This view was offered by
Dicksoa C.J.C.when he wrote:

An issue here is the validity of a comrnon law breach of criminal law and
ultimately the authonty of the court to punish for breaches of that law. The
court is acting on its own motion and not at the instance of any pnvate Party.
The motivation for the court's action is entirely "public" in nature, rather than
"pnvate". The criminal law is k i n g applied to vindicate the rule of law and
the fundamental freedoms protected by the Charter. At the sarne time,
however, this branch of the criminal law, Iike any other, must comply with the
fundamental standards established by the Charter.
The Court has held that picketing in the context of a labour dispute contains

an element of expression which attracts the protection of S. 2(b) in Dolphin Delivery.
However, Canadian citizens have hindamental rights to unfettered access to courts. If
the injunction lirnits right to fieedom of expression, that injunction is wholly
proportional punuant to S. I of Charter.
It folIows from the foregoing that the S. 2(b) c l a h falls to be decided under S.
1. Freedom of expression protected by S. 2(b) of the Charîer is obviously a
highly vaiued right as in the individual liberty refiected in a modem
democratic society by the right to strike and the right to picket. A balance
must be sought to be attained between the individual values and the public or
societal values. In the instant case, the task of striking a balance is not difficult

because without the pubüc nght to have absolute, free and unrestricted access
to the courts the individual and private right to freedom of expression would
be lost. The greater public interest must be considered when detemiinhg the
degree of protection to be accorded to individual interests.
Considenng that the Court upheld the decision in Dolphin Delivery,this case
is a good example to express the purpose of the Canadian legislature to regulate
industrial conflict. On the recognition of the inherent conflicted interests between the
employers and the employees, the Canadian legislature attempts to control the
conflict. It is clear that the work stoppage of a strike caused economic harm to both
sides of the labour disputes. Beyond this. the damage inflicted by strikes in the social
interest should be taken into account. By and large, the attitude of Canadian
legislature in the context of industrial conflict is to confine the use of the strike
weapon to the negotiation of new contract te=,

to economic interest disputes. Union

picketing, a basic strike weapon, should be used to exen economic pressure on its
adversary in order to the settlement of an agreement. The most that c m be said is that
the courts generdy do not interfere with peaceful picketing in support of a lawful
suike. But the protection of primary picketing is subject to restraint by injunction
when it is outweighed by other competing interests, such as the preservation of the
fundamental rights of Canadian citizens. Thus, the trade unions are neither pennitted
to exert economic pressure on a neutral third pariy that is not in connection with a
lawful strike occurring between other parties, nor permitted to expand the right of
picketing to inflict darnage on other public interests." Furthemore. the legislation sets

"

-

Since the legality of picketing mainly depends on whether it is primary picketing or a secondary one.
the centre issue in many cases becornes one of charactenzation.The borderline between lawful prirnary
picketing and unlawful secondary picketing may turn on elements of geography,of the relationship

forth a legal ban to essential public services in Limited circumstances. The legislative
prohibition of right to strike is accompanied by a mechanism for dispute resolution compulsory interest arbitration. As a substitute for strikes, interest arbitration is
designed to invite in a third Party to break the deadlock at the bargaining table when
the right to strike is removed by statute."

The issue of the right to saike in Canada is not only in the context of labour
law. Under the Charter, the right to strike is not a fundamental right. Although the
Supreme Court of Canada gave a negative answer in the b'collecrive bargaining
triiogy", the real concem of the Court is to avoid making decisions about collective
bargaining policy. However, the Canadian courts have long k e n making policy
decisions about the balance of power in industrial disputes, and thus the case law is an
important part of the nght to strike under Canada labour law.
The Canadian system of collective bargaining is based on the assumption of
conflicting interests between the employes and the employees. This system does have

its dark side: industrial conflict and work stoppage. A characteristic feature of

between striking ernployees and a neutrai third party. See Consolidated Bathurst Packaging Ltd and
Canaàian Papenvorkers' Union,Local 595, [1982] 3 Cm. L.R.B.R. 324.
"More discussion

of interest arbitration will be provided in M e r chapters.

Canadian labour law is that it intends to Limit and regdate collective employee
actions.

The discussion of the right to strike under Canada labour law in this chapter
consists of requirements of a strike, deffition of "strike", employment relations
during a legal sûïke and the law of picketing. Each of them may look legally and
conceptudy distinct, but is comected by its purpose to control the codicting
interests. More broadly. the regime of regdation of strikes in Canada is about
regulating economic conflict between parties with conflicting interests. The

requirements of a strike give a peculiar legitimacy to a collective employee action,
which is, a IawM strike as an economic sanction must occur in a certain time. It is to
justiS strike action as a means of the settlement of a new collective agreement. The

defmitioa of "suike"puts emphasis on the purpose of the job action, which is
designed to restrict or limit production. It is to confine the use of scrike weapon to the
resolution of economic interest disputes. In accordance with the neuval legal principle

expressed in the Alberta Refererzce case, the legislature provides protection of
employment relationship during a lawful strike on the one hand, and on the other

hand, sets forth restriction on secondary picketing to control the industrial conflict.
Hence legislatures play a positive role in industrial stability and collective bargaining
at the same time.

CHAPTER II

THE RIGHT TO STRIKE UNDER THE CHINESE
CONSTITUTION

Introduction

The fmt Constitution of the People's Republic of China and the Constitution
in force today do not protect a right to strike in China. However, the right to strike
once appeared in the 1975 and 1978 constitutions. This chapter attempts to provide a
historical analysis of the right to strike under the Chinese constitutions, illustrating
the reasons China had a right to strike in its 1975 and 1978 constitutions as well as

the reasons for no right to suike under the 1954 and 1982 constitutions.
This chapter is divided into two parts: the investigation of the four
constitutions and the analysis of no right to strike in today's China. A larger portion
of this chapter will concentrate on the second part because the theoretical basis of the

unity interests theory is the basis of the whole Chinese legal system of labour
relations.

A. The Four Constitutions

The People's Republic of China was founded in the year 1949. In the p i o d of
less than 50 years, the Chinese govenunent has promulgated four constitutional codes
after the New China was barn.'' They were promulgated in 1954, 1975, 1978 and

1982 respectively. Among these four constitutional codes, the 1975 and 1978 codes
expressly recognized the right to strike. However, the 1954 and 1982 codes did not
guarantee the right to strike in China. This section is to provide background
information for these four constitutions, focusing on the provisions in regard to the
fundamental nghts and duties of Chinese citizens. On the basis of these provisions,
this section will discuss respectively the legislative purposes of these constitutions.

1. The 1954 Constitution

The fmt Constitution was promulgated on September 20,1954?' From 1949
to 1954, the so-called Cornmon Programme took the place of constitutional
principles." In January 1954, a Cornmittee for the Drafting of the Constitution was set
In order to make a distinction between the Republic China (19 12-1949) under the government of the
Kuomintang and the People's RepubIic of China (1949- ) under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
the CCP calls the Republic China the Old China and the People's RepubIic of China the New China
91 The English translation of the 1954 Constitution is in T. Chen. The Chinese Commun& Regime
(London: Pal1 MaIl Press, 1967)75.

* Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshung Huiyi Gongtong Gangfin [Common Progranune] September
1949, in Dept of Law, Renmin University of China, Reference Materials to Labour Law (Beijing:
Renmin University Press, 1984) at 1, in Chinese.

up under the Chairmanship of Mao Tse Tung, the Chairman of the Central
Government. After the draft was ready, it had been discussed in the highest regional
circles by, in aii, 8,000 people? The final draft was published on the 14th of lune.
The fit Constit~~tion
was passed on 1st September 1954 by the Fit National
People's Congress.
The 1954 Constitution had four chapten, which were preceded by a Preamble
that described briefly how the country was united and how ali nationalities in China
Lived in haxmony. The four chapters were General Principles, the Stare Stnicture,
Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, and National Flag, State Emblem and
Capital. The fmt Constitution granted the Chinese people freedom oE speech,
correspondence, the press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration, and
religion. It did not guarantee the freedom to strike. Article 87 of the first Constitution

Citizens of the People's Republic of China have fmedom of speech, freedom
of procession, and freedom of demonstration. By providing the necessary
material facilities, the state guarantees citizens enjoyrnent of these freedorns.

In addition, article 100 of the 1954 Constitution imposed a duty on Chinese citizens
to uphold labour discipline and keep public order?
The 1954 Constitution was based on the mode1 of the Constitution of USSR,
which did not set out a right to strike." Being a socialist country, one of the few
socialist countnes in the world at the t h e when it was established and today, the

" 'Topical

Study: The Constitution Draft". (1954) 4 1 China News Analysis (C.N.A.) 1 at 2.

100 of the 1954 Constitution provides: Citizens of the People's Republic of China must abide
by the Constitution and the law, uphold discipline at work, keep public order and respect social ethics.

94 Article

People's Republic of China learned a lot of things h m the Soviet Union, the fmt
socialist country in the world. In most cases the Chinese government adopted die
system from the Soviet Union without any change. The 1954 Constitution was one of
the results of learning fiom the Soviet Union because it was drafted in often word-for-

word imitation of the 1936 Russian constitution.%

The second reason that there was no right to strike in the fmt Constitution
relates to the situation of the national economy. After eight years of devastating war
with Japan followed by a prolonged civil war, the Communist govemment faced a
war-tom economy suffenng from severe inflation and unemployment." The nation's
new leaders attempted to improve the economic situation by increasing production.

The First Five-Year Pian, a naûon-wide economic plan, was launched on January 1,
1953.9aA number of economic campaigns were under ~ay.'~Ch.ina
entered a new

phase of economic development. Under this circumstance, the nght to strike, which

Article 125 of the 1936 USSR Constitution reads: In conformity with the intcrests of the toilers and
to the end of strengthening the socialist social order. citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law: (a)
fieedom of speech, (b) freedom of the press, (c) freedom of assembly and meetings, and (d) fieedom of
Street parades and demonstrations. These civil rights are assured by granting to the toilers and their
organizations the uses of printing establishments, stocks of paper. public buildings, streets, means of
communications, and other materiai conditions essential for their realization. See A.Y. Vyshinsky, The
Law of the Soviet State, tram. H.W.Babb (New York: The MachiIIan Company, 1948) at 6 18.
95

'Russian Influence in 1954" ( 1954) 64 C.N.A. I at 2;
For more discussion about the Russian influence in China, see Chapter IV 'The Soviet Mode1 ( t 9521955)" in Bill Brugger, China: Liberarion and Transjiomtion 1942-1962 (New Jersey: Barnes &
Noble Books, 1981).
%
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N.R. Lardy, "Econornic Recovery and the 1st Five-Year Plan", in Denis Twitchett & John K.
Fairbank eds., The Cambridge Hisrory of China,vol. 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983) 144, at 144.

""Economy Drive", (1953) 9 C.N.A. 7.

may interfere with economic development, was not appropriate to be guaranteed by
the fmt Constitution.

The Chinese govemment regards the f m t Constitution as "a very good"
constituti~n;'~~whereas
some Chinese scholars referred to it as "a socialist
constitution" which "promoted socialist transformation and advance of socialist
construction, and guaranteed Chinese success in its transition from a New-Democratic
to a socialist society in accordance with the national conditions."101The 1954
Constitution, however, played a very slight role in Chinese social life since the
Communist China was not ruled by law; it was ruled by m a d m During the Cheng
Feng Reform in 1956, the best-know legal experts from outside the Party were invited
to a "free discussion" about law and legal life. A distinguished lawyer and joumalist

Ku Chih-chung spoke about the Constitution, which - he said - existed merely in

name. For example, Art. 87 decreed 'Freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, freedom of association', in fact, it was not so. Mr. Ku said there

was no freedom of the press, and associations a l I stand uncier the arbitrary power of
the magistrates. "Everybody considen the Constitution a useless paper, and from the

cornmittee Chairman Liu down to the ordinary citizen nobody cares for the
Constitution."

lm Peng Zhem, "Report on the Draft of the Revised Constitution of the People's Republic of China".
( 1 9 8 2 ) 5 0 B R 9 , at 1 1 .
'O1 "Constitution of the People's Republic of China" in Chinese Eneyelopaedia (Jurisprudence)
(Beijing, Shanghai: China Encyclopaedia Press, 1984) at 794. in Chinese.

lm

"Rule by Man or by Law". (1957)203 C.N.A.3 at 7.

'O3

"Class Law Unmasked", (1957) 203 C.N.A. 3 at 6.

Mr. Ku's statement provided a picture of the nature of the Chinese
constitution: the constitution is a constitution for show. As the Editorial of the
People's Daily wrote in October 1957: "Al1 important questions of politics and law
must be decided by the Party''.Io<The constitution in China is only in the legal notions
and the Party can take away whatever rights and fteedoms are guaranteed by the

Chinese constitution.lMThe right to saike, even if it had k e n protected under the
1954 Constitution, would not have k e n necessarily respected.'" But there was not

even any pretext of the protection of a right to suike!
Were there any actual strikes under the 1954 Constitution? The simple answer

is yes. Before the year 1966, strikes in China, although they were not initiated by
Chinese unions, were mainly for the econornic purpose, such as the increase of wages

and welfare. The policy of dealing with the strikers was the traditional Chinese way of
self-humiliation. That is, the troublemakers have to "be humble and cautions". When
it failed, the party cornmittees or the police would take disciplinary action or institute

The record of the protection of human rights in China is not good. A farnous case is chat even Liu
Shaoqi, the late chairman of the PRC, did not enjoy the fundamental rights supposedly protected by
law. See L. Dittmer, Liu S b - c h i and the Chinese Cultural Revulurion (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1974); Li Tien-min, Liu Shm-chi, (Taipei: Institute of International Relations. 1975).
IW

"Eternal Law",( 1957) 203 C.N.A.1.

l M Mr. KUwas regarded as a nghtin afkr his 'Yrce" speech about the Chinese constitution. His name
was mention& on Chinese Youth DaiIy with such comments: "Mr. Ku Chih-chung made a sharneless

attack on the Constitution. He should leam that the Constiîution protects the freedom of the People; but
he will be disappointeci if he hopes that the Constitution will protect the fieedoms of speech, press, and
assembly, of traitors, counter-revolutionaries and rightist elements".
IM The following analysis of the 1975 and 1978 constitutions, under which the right to smke are
paranteeci, will provide more discussions on this issue.

criminal charges against them. Meanwhile, the trade union should persuade the
workers that their cornplaints were ill founded.lm

In the period of the Culturai Revolution, there were large-scale work
stoppages in China.lMHowever, these were not strikes in the usual Canadian sense.
The work stoppages in the Cultural Revolution were politicaily inspired for class
struggle because the masses were to ïiberate themselves by class struggle against the

people within the Party who were in authority and were taking the capitalist road. In
addition, the ACFTU, the oniy Iegal union in China was disbanded as reactionary at
the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.'" As discussed in chapter I, strikes in
Canada are confmed in the area of collective bargaining. It should be used as an
instrument to try to compel an employer to agree the terms and conditions of
ernpl~yment."~
Although there have k e n some political strikes in Canada, the
legislation scheme is based on the assumption that strikes are economic. Whether a
svike for political purpose is under the umbrella of the statutory legislation depends

on whether the work stoppage is aimed specificaily at an employer behind the
political motivation."' The large-scale work stoppages in China during the Cultural
Revolution were not aimed at economic interests. The workers were enabled to

--

- -

'" "How to Deal with Unruly Workers?"
lm

p
p

1957) 183 CN.A. 1 at 2.

'Workers on Strike". (1967) 644 C.N.A. 1.

The CulturaI Revolution is ftom the year 1966 to 1976, which is aiso called 10-year interna1 disorder.

'* ACFTU means All-China-Federation of Trade Unions. More discussions of the ACE.TU will be
provided in the next section of this chapter.
"O

British Columbia H y h and Power Authorïty, [1976] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 4 10.

"' See purposive restriction on strikes in chapter 1.

"smash revisionism, seize back that portion of power usurped by the bourge~isie"."~
The strikes were used as a weapon to ensure that China "continues to advance in giant
strides dong the road of s~cialism"."~
These work stoppages, therefore, did not
constitute strikes in the usud Canadian sense.

2. The 1975 Constitution

The Draft Revised Text of the 1975 Constitution was subrnitted by the central
cornmittee of the Cornrnunist Party of China to the First Session of the Fourth

National People's Congress in January 1975 for its deliberation. It was unanimously
adopted by the Congress on January 17, 1 9 7 ~ . 'The
' ~ 1975 Constitution, like the fmt

one, was starting from the Preamble, which recorded "glorious history of the Chinese

people's heroic s t r ~ ~ ~ l e It" .was
" ~ divided into four chapten with the same titles as
those of the fmt Constitution. However, the number of articles had been reduced
from 106 to 30."~

One notable difference between the 1975 Constitution and the fmt
Constitution is that the 1975 Constitution added one freedorn to those of 1954,
freedom to strike. M. 28 provided:

"'

H. Harding 'The Chinese State in Crisis. 1966-69. in Roderick MacFarquhar ed., The Politics of
China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 148 at 23 1.
Ibid.
IL'

Chang Chun-chiao. "Report on the Revision of the Constitution", (1975) 4 BR 18.

IL*

Ibid, at 19.

Il6

The English translation of the 1975 Constitution is in (1975) 4 BR 12.

Citizens enjoy frcedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assernbly,
association, procession, demonstmtion and the fkedom to strike, and enjoy
freedorn to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to
propagate atheism.
Chang Chunchiao in the official explanation of the Constitution said that freedom to
strike was added to Art. 28 of the Constitution "in accordance with Chairman Mao's
proposal'r .117This is the main reason that the nght to strike was included in the 1975
Constitution. At the same time, the 1975 Constitution deleted the duty to uphold

labour discipline and keep public order which was under the 1954 Constitution.
Why did Mao suggest the right to strike should be included in China's

constitution? It is necessary to examine Mao's doctrine respecting strike actions.

In Mao's 1957 speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the
Pe~ple*',"~
he pointed out there were two qualitatively different types of
contradictions - those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people
themselves, and different methods should be used to resolve these different

contradiction^.^'^ "To point it briefiy", Mao stated, "the former are a matter of
drawing a clear distinction between ourselves and the enemy, and the latter a matter
or drawing a clear distinction between right and ~ r o n g ' ' . ' ~

Il7

Supra note 1 14 at 19.
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Imrnanuel C.Y. Hsu ed., Readings in Modern Chinese Hisrory (New York: Oxford University
Press, 197 1). 586.
Il9

ibid. at 586-588.

Under the capitalist system, the capitalist class is the dominant class as the
result of the private ownership of the means of production. The working class is a
class which is economicaily exploited and politically oppressed. In accordance with
Mao's theory, the contradiction between the capiialist class and the working class is a
contradiction between the enerny and ourselves. Only when the capitalist class is
overthrown will the working class become the master of the country and change their
status in the society.
The right to strike is a very important right for the working class to fight
against their enemy - the capitalist class. Through the work stoppage in a strike, the
working class could improve their working conditions and their living standards by
placing economic pressure on the capitalists. The more significant function of a strike
is in the political area, that is, a strike will possibly direct revolutionary activity. Since
the employees' striking action means not to foilow the discipline and the orders made
by the capitalist, it is to deny the existing distribution of power and authority, which is
a kind of class-consciousness. Further, ody if the working class had the classconsciousness could they organize themselves and fight for the state power against the
capitalist class and win it from the capitalist class at last.12'Hence,the right to strike is
of significant value for the working class in a capitalist society.

In socialist China,class contradictions and class struggle stiil existed.'= On
the Eighth Term Tenth Plenary of the Central Cornmittee held in September 1962, the
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G.England. "Some Observations on Selected Strike Laws" in K.Swan & K. Swinton. eds., Srudies
in Labour Law (Toronto: Buttenrvorth, 1983). 221
'22

Prearnble of the 1975 Constitution.

Party Central Cornmittee Plenary promised an increase in class struggle. The Party
declared that during the whole period of proletarian revolution and proletarian
dictatorship, there would be class struggle between the proletarian class and the
bourgeois class, between the two ways, socialism and capitalisrn. The Party wamed
people that Chinese socialism faced the following dangers: the reactionary ruling
class that had k e n overthmwn in its search for a restoration, the influence of the
bourgeois class and the power of old habit as weii as a capitalist tendency in the
activities of small producers. In addition, there were persons who had not yet k e n
reformed by socialism who wanted to quit the road of socialism and tum to
capitalism. Under these circurnstances, class struggle was inevitable and aii the
Chinese people should remember class struggle and keep on fighting against the
capitalist class.

Hence, the Chinese constitution should guarantee the right to strike

for the Chinese proletarian class as a way to bar the restoration of the bourgeois class.
More specificaily, Mao pointed out, the prevailing contradictions in the
socialist China are the contradictions among the people.'24These contradictions
comprise the contradictions between the govemment and the people, between the
leadership and led, and the contradiction arising from the bureaucratic style of work
of certain govemment workers in their relations with the masses.'* The way to settle
the contradictions among the people "is by the democratic method, the method of

Ifl

"Social Changes: Class Struggle". (1963) 457 C.N.A. I at 2 4 .
Supra note 1 18 at 587.

IU

ibid.

discussion, of criticism, of persuasion and education".'" Mao regarded bureaucracy as
a major obstacle to his ideal society and endorsed the strike ""asa means of strug@e
against the burea~cracy".'~
Mao's support played a significant role in Chinese official
recognition of the right to stnke in the 1975 Constitution.'"

The 1975 Constitution, although it had been greatly welcomed within and
without the Party at the time when it was published was "rather imperfect".'" It was
regarded as refiecting the views of the leftists by some Chinese s ~ h o l a r sand
' ~ ~the
The 1975 Constitution played a
work of "radical tide" by some foreign scho~ars.'~~

slight role in the Iegal history of Chinese constitutional law and it had lasted for only
a few years. ln
Although the 1975 Constitution granted the right to strike to Chinese citizens,
there was no effective mechanism for ensuring its irnplementation. In the year 1975.
China had very few statutes o n labour relations. The 1950 Trade Union Law. the only
important statute, provided Chinese workers the right to have union representation,

Ibid. at 589.
In

J. A. Cohen, "China's Changing Constinition"(l978) 76 China Q. 794 at 832.

Ibid.
In addition, strikes as a sign of protest against bureaucracy also received the support of Premier Zhou
Enlai. See Lewis & Ottley, "China's Developing Labour Law" (1982) 59 Wash. U. L.Q, 1 165 at 1 175.
Ir, Peng Zhen ,"Explanation on the Dr& of the Revised Constitution of the People's Republic of
China", (1982) 19 BR 18 at 18.
'30

ibid.

13' T. Saich, 'The Fourth Constitution of the People's Republic of China", (1983) 2 Review of Socialist
Law 113, at 122.

13* In the article of 'The Nature of the Draft". the author predicted that the draft of the 1975
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but the main function of the Chinese trade union was to guarantee Wifment of the
enterprises*production target. There was no provision giving concrete expression to
the constitutional right to strike.ln As noted in the above section, although there were

work stoppages in the period of the Cultural Revoiution, they are not the strikes of the
same meaning in the Canadian sense.

3. The 1978 Constitution

The 1978 Constitution was adopted on March 5, 1978 by the Fifth National
People's Congress at its First Session. It was designed for a new period of
Like the
development "in China's socialist revolution and socialist constr~ction".~~~
first and the second constitutions, the contents of the 1978 Constitution were
Prearnble, General Principles, The structure of the State, The Fundamental Rights and
Duties of Citizens, and The National Hag, the National Emblem and the Capital.
Compared to the 1975 Constitution, the 1978 Constitution had k e n enlarged to 60
articles.'35 It guaranteed the Chinese citizens freedom to strike, which was not there in
1954 and appeared in 1975. Article 45 reads as follows:

Citizens enjoy freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assembly,
association, procession, demonstration and the freedom to strike, and have the
right to "speak out freely, air their views fully, hold great debates and write
big-character posters."

'" The following chapters will provide more discussions of the 1950 T r d e Union Law.
'Y Yeh
13'

Chien-ying, "Report on the Revision of the Constitution", (1978) I l BR 15.

The English translation of the 1978 Constitution is in (1978) 1 1 BR 5.

Furthemore, the 1978 Constitution reasserted a duty upon Chinese citizens to "take
care of and protect public property, observe labour discipline, observe public order,

respect social ethics and safeguard state secrets", a duty in the fmt Constitution.
It seerns that the Party was very unwilling to provide a constitutional
guarantee of the rîght to strike under the 1978 Constitution. Yeh Chien-ying in his
report focused attention on reassertion of the duty to observe labour discipline and

public ~ r d e r . He
' ~ ~quoted Mao's 1959 call for "unity and iron discipline" and
maintained it as the spirit embodied in the 1978 Constit~tion.'~
Yeh did not even
mention Freedom to strike in his report. That the Chinese constitution is a constitution
only for show is not a wholly new idea, for the discussion of the first Constitution
provided much the same about this issue. However, the fact is the party had to tolerate
retention of freedom to strike in the 1978 Constitution, which was inserted into the
1975 Constitution by the "great leader and teacher Mao Tes Tung", even if it was just

for show.

The 1978 Constitution was argued as a compromise constit~tion.~~~
On the one

hand, it did not entirely abolish Mao's thoughts because it preserved the provision of
the nght to ~trike.'~~
On the other hand, it reflected the policy of modernization and

'= Supra note 134.

"Supra note 128 at 1196.
'"

Sec supra note 1 18 and the accompanying text
Although Mao died in the year 1976, the subsequent Chinese leaders cannot abolish Mao's thoughts in
Chinese politics life. In Yeh Chien-ying's teport on the revision of the 1978 Constirution, he quoted a
lot of Mao's saying to illustrate the Party's policy. Supra note 135.
Another important reason that the right to strike had to be kept in the 1978 Constitution is that Hua's
legitirnacy as Party Chairman rested upon his dleged appointment by Mao.

rapid economics growth set out by the subsequent leadership, Hua Guofeng and Deng
Xiaoping, by emphasizing work and labour discipline.'" Since the Ministry of Labour

had ofncidy denied the existence of strikes before 1993, it is dificult to get detailed
information of strike incidents in China Although the 1978 Constiîzition did not
specify when strikes were permissible, Chinese sources indicated official support of
strikes to protect workers' democratic rights and workers' health and safety."' The
reaction of the Chinese authorities to a svike for economic purpose is illustrated by a
December 1978 incident in which a woman was shot by Chinese police who f m d on
a group of workers protesting Iow wages at a Shanghai silk factory.lq

4. The 1982 Constitution

As noted, since the founding of the People's Republic, China has promulgated
four constitutions: the 1954, 1975, 1978 and 1982 constitutions. The 1978

Constitution was adopted in March 1978. Since then, great changes and developments
had taken place in China.?' The most important one was the Third Plenary Session of
the 1 1th Central Committee of the Chinese Cornrnunist Party held in December 1978,

which "rectified" the mistaises of the Cultural Revolution in al1 fields and "summed
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up the histofical experience" gained since the founding of the New ChinaiYThe 1978
Constitution, which was adopted "in a huq",'" no longer confomed to the realities

of the state in many ways.'" Thus. it was necessary to revise the Constitution to meet
the new conditions.

The work to discuss and revise the Constitution lasted for two years. In
September 1980, the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress made the
decision to set up a committee for the revision of the Constitution. In April 1982, a

draft version was published for a nation-wide discussion. It was claimed that
approximately 80 percent of the Nation's adults had participated in this discu~sion.'~~
The finai draft was adopted by secret ballot at the fourth plenary meeting of the Fifth
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on December 4, 1982.
The 1982 Constitution contains 138 articles in four chapters.'" Although it has
the similar chapters to the former three constitutions, the chapter of Fundamental

Rights and Duties of Citizens is the second chapter in the Constitution for the purpose
of emphasizing the citizen's rights.IJ9There is no freedom of strike under this
Constitution. Article 35 provides that 'titizens of the People's Republic of China

enjoy k d o m of speech. of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and

Supra note 1 0 at 9.

Hu Sheng. "On the Revision of the Constitution". ( 1982) 18 BR 15 at 15.
Supra note 100 at 9.
ln

"Dr& Constitution Being Revised. ( 1982) 50 BR 5.

The Engiish translation of the 1982 Constitution is in (1982) 52 BR 10.
Supra note 13 1 at 1 19.

of demonstration". More specificaily, Article 53 of the Constitufion imposes on

citizens the duty to "abide by the Constitution and the law, keep state secrets, protect
public property, observe labour discipline and public order and respect social ethics".
The Chinese govemment was satisfied with the 1982 Constitution when it was
promulgated. Peng Zhen in his "Report on the Draft of the Revised Constiilrton of
the People's Republic of China" said that the 1982 Constitution "is distinctively
Chinese and meets the needs of Chinese socialist modernization" since it had
incorporated a careful summary of the experience of China's socialist development
and drawn on international experience.'" In addition, the 1982 Comtitution had taken

into account both the current situation and the prospects for developments, it would

remain valid for a long period of tirne."'
As already noted, the 1954 Constitution was regarded as bbrelativelyflawless",
and thus the 1982 Constitution "maintains and develops the fundamental principles of
the 1954 C~nstitution".'~
As for the chapter of fundamental rights and duties of
citizens, "the provisions concerning citizen's rights draw on those of the 1954
Constit~tion".'~
The 1982 Constitution reinstates the duty on the citizens of the

People's Republic of China to upheld labour discipline and keep public order, a
provision which appeared in the 1954 Constitution. Simultaneously, the 1982

'"

Supra note 1 0 at 1 1.

bid.
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Constitution does not guarantee the freedom to strike, which was iricluded in the 1975

and 1978 constitutions. but not in the 1954 Conrrir~tion.'~
The right to strike, which had been included in China's 1975 and 1978
constitutions. was removed from the 1982 Constitution. Does it mean there is no nght
to strike in China? The official answer is YES.
The fmt reason came from a report of an official interview with Hu Sheng, the
Deputy Secretary General of the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution, by
Beijing Review's ~orres~ondents.
ls5 In this interview, Hu Sheng answered the
question of why the fieedom to strike was not included among the fundamental rights
of citizens. Hu provided two reasons for this omission. 1. The working people in
China could "utilize means other than sviking to express their demands and achieve

their aims".'562. In sociaiist China. "striking is not only disadvantageous to the state,
but also h

m to the interests of the workers .157 The explanation will be exarnined
97

in the following section respecting the Party's view of no right to strike in China.

In the Canadian sense. this interview cannot be an important reason for no
right to snike, but it embodied a dominant voice in China on this issue. As noted
Another reason that there was no right to strike in the 1982 Constitution. as some scholars argued. is
the Soviet model. The 1982 constitutional code was a constitutional code that closely akin to the system
orîginally imported from the Soviet Union in 1954- Since the Soviet Union did not set the right to strike
in its 1954 constitutional law, the Chinese government made the same provision in its constitutional
code. For more discussions in respecting this reason, see R. Baum 'The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese
Politics in the 1980~"~
in Rodenck MacFarquhar ed., The Politics of China (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997) 340 at 350, supra note 1 12.
For more discussions of the constitutions in the U.S.S.R., see Kevin Block, 'The Legai Status of
Strikes in the U.S.S.R." ( t 991) 12 COMP.Lab. LJ. 133.

'" Supra note 145.
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above, the 1982 Constitution,on paper, guarantees freedom of speech and f ~ e d o mof
the press to the Chinese people. In practical terms, the Chinese people do not enjoy
these freedoms. Since the Chinese government regards al1 strikes as for political
purposes and king threats to its sovereignty, it prevents any idea of the right to strike
fiom spreading in China? Therefore, on the one hand. it is rare that the Chinese
press provides an opinion that is different from the one the Chinese govemment has,
especiaily respecting the right to strike, such a sensitive issue to the Party. On the
other hand, it is dangerous to speak pubLicly that the Chinese people should have a
right to ~ t r i k e .That
' ~ ~ is the reason why ail the pubiished articles respecting the
fundamental rights were the following two kinds. One was to illustrate this omission.
to explain how correct it was; the other focused on the discussion of the protected
freedoms without mentioning the right to strike.
The second reason was that since the right to strike had k e n set separately in

1975 and 1978 constitutions with other fundamental rights, it was obvious that the
right to strike was not protected in the 1982 Constitution due to the absence of this
right. This point of view was quite similar to the one given by McIntyre J. in the
Alberta ~eference? McIntyre J. provided two reasons in his judgrnent explaining

'"

The subxquent discussion will provide more analysis respecting the Party's attitude toward a right
to strike in China.
Is9 According to ''China Country Report on Hurnan Rights Practices for 1 9 9 6 in March 1994. a
petition for workers to have freedom frorn exploitation, the right to strike, and the right to organize
nonofficial made union was cucdated in Beijing. The authorities detained Zhou Guoqiang, Yuan
Hongbing, and Wang Jiaqi after they presented the petition. See U.S. Dept. of State, ''China Country
Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996" (Feb. 1997) at 13, available in Lexis.
'60
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that the right to strike is not a constitutional right under the Charter. The fmt reason
is that "the Charter upon its face cannot support an implication of a nght to strike"."'j'

McIntyre J. made an international comparison between the Canadian Constitution and
the Constitution of France, Italy and Japan. Since the nght to suike is expiicitly

included in the Constitution of France, Itdy and Japan, the omissions of simiiar
provision in the Canadian constitution speaks strongly against any implication of a
right to suike. Thus, through different comparison - one being internai comparison
among the Chinese constitutions, the other k i n g an international comparison among
the constitutions of different countries - they corne to the same conclusion.
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, this kind of reasoning is quite weak. In

the context of the Chinese constitution. the right to strike can be implied in the
fundamentai rights on the ground that it is intemationdy recognized as a very

important human right under the U. N. human rights documents. China ratified the U.
N. International Covenant on Economic. Social und Cultural Rights in October 1997.

There are explicit provisions relating to freedom of association and trade unions in
this Covenant. Art. 8(l )(d) expressly protects the right to ~ t r i k e . Al
' ~ though
~
this

section contains that the right to strike must be exercised "in conformity with the Iaw
of the particular country", this qualification does not allow a signatory to eradicate or
substantially erode the right so as to render the section meaningless. In accordance
with these provisions, China has undertaken to ensure the right to strike. This right

16'

Ibid. at 12,160.
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should be protected in its domestic legislation though it is allowed to regulate the
right.

The third reason is the duty to observe labour discipline and public order set
forth in the 1982 Constitution. As noted, the right to strike is not protected under the
1954 Constitution. B y contrast, article 100 of the 1954 Constitution required the
Chinese citizens oot only to uphold labour disciple but also to keep public order and
respect social ethic. The right to strike was fmt included in the 1975 Constitwion. In

order to avoid inconsistency with the right to strike, the 1975 Constitution did not
declare that the citizens have a duty to observe labour discipline. Being a compromise
constitution, the 1978 Constitution maintained the freedom to strike and balanced it
by reviving the earlier duty of citizens to abide labour discipline and observe public

order. The 1982 Constitution, which "maintains and develops the fundamental
does not protect the nght to strike.
principles of the 1954 Con~titution",'~~
Simultaneously, it imposes on citizens the duty to observe labour discipline and
public order.

In China, the Constitution is the fundamental law of the state and has supreme
legal authority. The people of all nationalities, aU state organs, the armed forces, al1
political parities and public organisations and al1 enterprises and undertakings in

China must take the Constitution as the basic nom of conduct, and they have the duty
to uphold the dignity of the Constitution and ensures its implementation? Hence. al1
Chinese citizens have the constitutional duty to observe labour discipline and public
163
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Prearnble of the 1982 Constitution.

order. Since neither a strîke nor a lockout is protected under Chinese labour law. a
strike is considered in violation of both labour discipline and public order. and thus it

is Uegal.
Aithough in the official press the right to strike is not included under the 1982
Constitution, some Chinese scholars argue that the Chinese people have a nght to

svike under the 1982 Constit~tion.'~
According to Chinese legal theory, if the statutes
do not set a clear prohibition on something, the citizens have the rights to choose
whether to do or not to do it. This is the basis for the conclusion that Chinese people
have a right to strike under the 1982 Constitution because it does not prohibit the right

to strike despite its omission of this right. Like their Canadian colieagues, the Chinese
scholars also argue that the freedom to strike can be protected by the Constitution
under its guarantee of eiiher the freedom of speech or the freedom of association.
However, this kùid of opinion was a kind of underground opinion because in China

there is no real freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The freedoms guaranteed
under the Chinese constitution are mainiy for show, not for practice.

In sum, the right to strike once appeared in the 1975 and 1978 constitutions,
but is removed from the cunent Constitution. Although it may be arguable that
whether the right to stdce is guaranteed under the 1982 Constitution. as was
unsuccessfully argued in the Alberta Reference case. from the point of view of the
Chinese govemment there is no right to strike in China In addition, although the right
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This discussion, of course, is not a nation-wide discussion as the discussion for the Draft of the
Constitution. In the course of my preparation this thesis, 1 have intervieweci several Chinese
constitutional law specialists. This part of article is based on my interviews. However, 1 refrain from
mentioning them by name because their safety was more important.

to strike was a constitutional right under the 1975 and 1978 constitutions, there was
no way for the right to be carried out in China.

B. The Reasons for the Absence of a Right to Strüre in Today's China
As noted above, one of the reasons that there is no right to strike in today's

China is to preserve the basic provisions under the 1954 Comtitution in the 1982
Constitution. However, it is not the main reason. The following parts will discuss the
reasons from two perspectives, from the point of view of the Chinese government and
from my own point of view.

1. The View of the Chinese Govemment Explaining the Absence of a Right to

Strike in China

There are two reasons for the Chinese govemment to oppose a right to saike in
China. One is the theoretical reason, that is, the govemment holds that there is the
same interest arnong the state, the enterprises and the workers on the ground of the
socialist economic system. Although there are still labour disputes in socialist China,
they are said not to be the result of antagonistic contradictions, as those in the
capitalist countries. The other reason is the practicd reason. The 1981 Solidarity
movement in Poland greatly shocked Cornrnunist China The government thought the
right to strike played a significant role in helping the success of Solidarity and thus
the Chinese constitution cannot guarantee a right to strike.

a, The Theoretical Reason
The basic theory to support no right to suike in China is that there is a unity of
interest among the state. the enterprises and the workers. The subsequent discussion
will provide the basis for the identical fundamental interests in China from the

socialist econornic system. the history of People's Republic of China and the main
contradictions in today' s China.
The working class is the leading class in the People's Republic of China under
the 1982 Constitution.'" Consequently, the interests of the workers and the state are
identical. Moreover, because the state economy is the basis of the Chinese economic
system and is under the ownership by the whole people.16' there is a common interest
between the state-owned enterprises and the workers. Therefore, the interests of the
three are in harmony and without opposition. While a strike means a work stoppage in
the enterprise, it wili do great harm to the country. the enterprise and the individual
workers on the basis of the character of the People's Republic of China and the stateowned enterprises.
'60 Art. 1 of the 1982 Constitution provides:
The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by
the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The sociaiist system is the basic
system of the People's Republic of China. Disniption of the socialist system by any organization or
individual is prohibited.

'"

Art. 6 of the 1982 Con.stitutiorz provides:
The basis of the socialist economic systern of the People's Republic of China is socialist public
ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whoIe people and collective
ownership by the working people.
The system of sociaiist public ownership supersedes the system of exploitation of man by man; it
applies the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.
Art. 7 provides:
The state economy is the sector of socialist economy under ownership by the whole people; it is the
leading force in the national economy. The state ensures the consolidation and growth of the state
economy.

However. there are some contradictions existing on the basis of "the identical
The form of the contradiction in the area of labour relation
funchmental intere~ts".'~
is labour disputes. But labour disputes in socialist China are not antagonistic
contradictions as those in the capitalist countries. In the view of the Chinese
govemment. a labour dispute in China WUarise from the bureaucracy of the
administrative department. the viola-

of labour discipluie by a few laboures or the

misunderstanding of laws and regdations on labour by either the laboures or
management. Since the basic interest is the same, the dispute could be solved by the
ways of consultation or mediation.'" Hence. it is unnecessary for the labouren to use
the strike, a weapon used for working class to fight against capitalist class, to solve
the intemal contradiction among the working class itself.

.

Likewise, the wage system in China, a method to distinguish the interests of
the individuals from the enterprises and the state, is different from the capitalist one.

In socialist conditions. the working class has taken the ownership of the mems of
production. The profits gained from their work include two parts. One is used to be
the accumulation fund and the consumption f'und for the whole society. The other is

the individual consumption fund in the form of the wage of a labourer, which is
distributed according to the quantity and quality of labour provided by the labourer.

The fmt part of the profits is used to protect the long-term interest of al1 laboures,
and the second part of the profits is used to protect the recent interest of the individual
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Iiefangjun Bao Commentator, "Scientifically Understand and Handle Class Struggle in China",

(1982) 49 BR 16 at 17.

labouref~.'~
Accordingly, the socialist wage indicates the common interest among the
state, the enterprise and the individual workers.

In regard to the history of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese
govemrnent considered it unnecessary to include the rïght to sûike for improving the

living standards of the Chinese people. China is a country with one of the longest
histories in the world. It was an advanced country in its early days of feudalism.
However, the feudal China gradudy tumed into a semi-colonial and serni-feudal
country after the F i t Opium War in 1840 and the Chinese people suffered without
the national independence, democracy and &dom

since then.''' It was under the

leadership of the Chinese Communist Party that the Chinese people overthrew the
rule of Unperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism, won a great victory in the
New-Democratic Revolution and founded the People's Republic of

hin na."^

In addition. when the People's Republic of China was newly established, the
Chinese govemment bore the political and economic pressure from the western
'~
countries as well as the difficulties derived from the long-term ~ a r t i r n e .The
Chinese people and the Chinese People's Liberation A m y have defeated imperialist

and hegemonist aggression, sabotage and arrned provocation and have thereby
-
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"Labour Disputes*' in Chinese Encyclopaedia (Jurisprudence)(Beijing, Shanghai: China
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Guan Huai, One Hundred Questions to the 1992 Trade Union Law (Beijing: Chinese Workers'
Publishing House, 1992) at 185- 186, in Chinese.

'" Preamble of the 1982 Constitution.
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For discussion on this subject, see Bill Bmggle China: Liberation and Transformation 1942-1962
(New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 198 1) at 63-64, supra note 96.

safeguarded China's national independence and security and strengthened its national
defence.'71

In all these periods, a lot of Chinese people contributed their lives. The New
China is a country resulting h m the long-term stmggle of the whole Chinese people,
especidy the working class. The Chinese governinent believed that the Chinese

people realued fiom their personal experience Chat only when the people's
govenunent was consolidated could the working class gain the final success for their
revolution and gradually improve their living standards to the best one in the ~ o r l d . " ~

According, every Chinese citizen should work hard to build up their own country
without taking a strike which is "not only disadvantageous to the state, but dso
hannful to the interests of the worker~"."~

The third reason to oppose a right to strike in China is the theory of the main
contradictions in China. As indicated. the right to strike received its fust official
recognition in the 1975 Constitution due to the philosophical support of Mao Tse
Tung. Mao's 1957 speech "On the Correct Handiing of Contradictions Among the
People" was the theoretical basis leading to the inclusion of the right to strike in the
1975 Constitution. Ironically, it is also the guiding ideology explaining why the right
to strike is not included in the 1982 Constitution.

- - -

'74 Preamble of
'71

the 1982 Constitution,

Li Lisan. T h e Explanation of me Dr& of the Trade Union Act of the People's Republic of China

in Guan Huai One Hundred Questions to the 1992 Trade Union Law,278, in Chinese. Supra
note 170.
( 1%O)",

'" Supra note 145 at 17

In the article of "Scientificaily Understanding and Handling Class Stniggle in
China",'" written by Jiefangjun Bao commentator, the author declared that the
principal contradiction within the country was no longer that between the working
class and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between ourselves and enemy, but the
contradictions among the people in their different specific interests on the basis of
their identicai fundamental interests, and the contradictions between the advanced and
the backward and between the right and wrong in ideological understanding based on

the general goal. None of these social contradictions belong to the realm of class
struggle.'" Therefore, the method to resolve these contradictions should be
democratic method, which Mao had advocated in his 1957 speech.179
The previous
large-scale and turbulent class stniggle was not the fault of Comrade Mao Tse Tung
since "Comrade Mao Tse Tung, for his past, also unequivocally caiied on ail party
members to correctly understand and handle the two essentiaily different social
contradictions". 180
The author summarized that contradictions in Chinese society were
contradictions between the demand of the people for rapid economic and cultural
development and the existing state of China's economy and culture, which fell short
of the needs of the people.''' Hence, the chef task confronting the nation at that time
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was to concentrate all efforts on developing the productive forces, Uidustnalizing the
country and gradually meeting the people's incessantly growing material and cultural
needs. That was the correct and scientific method to resolve the Chinese
contradictions in the meantirne.'" The method of striking, a method used in class
struggle, ran counter to the chief task and should not be included in the Constitution.
The Chinese theory of no conflict of interests between the Chinese
governrnent, the enterprises and the workers is quite different from the Canadian
theory. As analyzed in Chapter 1, Canadian labour law, in the collective sphere, is
based on the recognition of inherent conflict of interests between the employers and
employees. Under the collective bargaining legislation, the nght to strike is generally
thought to exist. The purpose of collective bargaining is to settle the tenns and
conditions of employment that the two parities fmd mutudy acceptable. if no
agreement is reached. the employees may have recourse to a strike. or the employer to
a lockout, as a bargaining sanction. In order to guarantee the employees' right to take
collective action, the legislation provides protection of ernployment status to a striker
who participates in a legal strike with the prohibition against employer retaiiatory
action designed to punish strikers. Simultaneously, in keeping with its desire to
maintain industriai peace, the Legislation not only sets forth the purposive limitation

and timeiiness restriction on strikes, but also sets forth the restriction on secondary
picketing. Therefore, instead of ignoring the conflicting interests between the
ernployers and employees, Canadian labour law intends to recognize and regulate
industriai confiict.
'BZ

Ibid.

The Chinese theory of identical fundamental interests has k e n the foundation
for the whole Iegai system since the Communist China was established. This theory,
even if it had been acceptable under the planned economy, is not suitabie under
today's market economy. Chapter IV of the thesis will provide discussion respecting
the characteristics of labour relations under the planned economy and the market
economy. At present, it is necessary to conduct a brief anaiysis of labour relations in
today's China in order to examine the govemment's assumption of the same interests.

Fit of dl, there are private enterprises, foreign-capital enterprises as well as the
public owned enterprises under the market economy. The interests between the
employers and the employees in the former enterprises are conflicted due to the
private ownership of production. Second, even in the public ownership enterprises,
the interest of the labourers becomes independent vis-à-vis the interest of the
management on the ground that the state, with the main function of rnacro-regdation,
is no longer involved in the labour relations between an enterprise and the workers.
Hence, the conflicted interests should be regulated under the Chinese law to protect
the workers' legitimate rights and to keep industrial peace in China.

b.

The Practical Reason

The practical reason that there is no right to strike in today's China was the
advent of the Solidarity Trade Union in Poland. The Solidarïty movement in the 1981
succeeded in weakening the power of the Cornmunist Party and transforming Polish

society. The movement greatiy shocked the Communist countries. The PRC is no
exception. The right to saike has been omitted because of the lessons of Poland's
Solidarity movement.'" In order to elaborate an analysis of this practical reason, it is
necessary to provide a brief introduction of the SoIidarity movement.

Solidarit). began in Poland on 14 August 1980 with the strike at the Lenin
Shipyard for a wage claim.'" When that was followed by continuous strikes over the
country, it became a movement with the main objective of free trade unions.'"
Because of the participation of the workers from the key industries in the economy,
the PoLish United Worker's Party ( P M )and the government had stepped down and
the histonc twenty-one-demand Gdansk Agreement, which included the recognization
of free trade union, the guarantee of the right to strike and an end to the repression of
free speech, was s i p e d on 3 1 August.'&
Existing in a totaiitarian Soviet-style environment, the Solidarity Trade Union
movement could not simply take up the tasks associated with the trade union
activities. The Polish people wanted freedom and rule of law at least as much as they
wanted improved social benefits. Thus, Solidarity could not Iimit itself to defending
the svictly materiai interests of its members. As a result, the issues of truth in public

life and in the rnedia, social justice, and reform of the law which would not norrnally

'13' Byron Weng. '3ome Key Aspects of the 1982 Dr& Constitution of the Peoples*Republic of
China", (1982) 9 1 China Q. 492 at 504.
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be the province of trade union activity were important elements of the Solidarity
programme.'" Solidarity became a "national movement and stniggle for the
democratizaîion of society'?

[n October

1981. Lech Waiesa, the President of the LO-

million-member Solidarity was elected President with 55% of the votes.'"
SoLidarity has been regarded as a working-class rising against those who claim
to speak in its name, a mass movement inventing its own democracy in the face of
arbitrary goveniment and bureaucracy, a nation turning to its tiistory and its religion to
Although the Solidarity movement was
give fresh life to democratic freedorn~.'~
ended by the declaration of martial la^,'^' it greatly shocked the Chinese Communist

Party. The Chinese government treated it very carefuily. According to the China News
Analysis, the press in China had certainly been sparing in reporting Polish events. The
People's Daily. which devoted two of its six pages to foreign affairs and descriptions
of foreign countries, had carried only brief factual reports about Solidarity in Poland
and had abstained from comment. Undoubtediy Beijing was anxious that the idea of

Solidarity should not spread to China. lg2
% was easy ro understand the worry of the Chinese govemment. Fit. China

had a similar system to the one Poland had in the year 1982. Since the Solidarity

'" A. Swidicki, Political Triak in P o l 4 1981-1986 (NewYork: Croom Helm. 1988) at 1.
'" Supra note 184 at 2.
IS9

ibid. at 149 - 150,

'O

ibid. at 13.

19' See Chapter 1 'The Rigours of Martial Law" in A. Swidicki, Polirical T ~ linsPolnnd 1981- 1986
for more discussions. Supra note 187.

'=

"Clerks-and -Workers Congress". (1 982) 1229 C N A . 1.
The People's Daily is the most important official newspaper in China

movement greatly challenged the socialist system in Poland, the Chinese govemment
realized it should make every effort to prevent the independent trade union in China
Both Poland and China were socialist countries established on the model of the Soviet
Union. The two countries had a similar political and economic system. The vade
unions in these two countries were also the copies of the trade union in the Soviet
Union. The temporary success of the Solidarity movernent in Poland made the
Chinese govemment realize the socialist model of the Soviet Union was in great
danger. The Chinese govenunent thought that the failure of the socialist trade union in
Poland was the major factor for the failure of its socialist system.'" The Party
believed that if it did not have absoiute control of the Chinese unions, a Chinese
Solidarity would emerge at any time. The Chinese constitution, of course, shouid
reflect the Party's posture toward independent trade unions in China, such as the right
to strike, a very important right for an independent trade union, should not be

protected under the Chinese constitution. The subsequent discussion of the Partyunion relations will provide more analysis respecting the Party's attitude toward an
independent trade union.
An additional practical reason explaining the absence of a right to strike was

that the CCP had made a lot of rnistakes in its policies after it came to power. Since
the Solidarity movement was the result of the failure of the PUWP' domination in
Poland, the Chinese govemment was greatly afraid that the people's dissatisfaction

'"

For more discussion. see Chapter 20 "Shihing Trends of Trade Union Theories of Russia and Other
East European Countries and Comments" in Zhongtan et ai., A General Outline und Overview of Trade
Union Theories In Time of Transition Towards a Socialkt Marker Economy (Beijing: People's

Publishing House, 1997), in Chinese.

would be aroused if the right to strike were in practice. The following is a btief
description of what the CCP had done in China in the period of its domination.
After the People's Republic of China was established in October 1949. the
first business of

the Communists was the politicai revolution. "by which they aimed

to consolidate their power and f&gz

effective system of state and Party control

throughout the country'*.1WIn the penod of 1949 to 1982, China had several national
politicai movements. These are some examples. 1.The rectification movement in mid1950. It was a movement directed against bureaucratism and commandism in
economic and financial adrninistrati~n.'~~
2. The mass mobilisation movement in
late 1950-51. The targets of this movement were secret agents who worked for such
organizations as the Guomindang Military Secret Service or the Nationalist Youth
Corps? 3. The three anti movement from August 1951 to June 1952. Its main targets
were graft, waste and bureaucratism.'" 4. The five anti movement fiom January to
June 1952. The five targets were bribery, tax evasion. theft of state property, cheating

5. The sufan
on governent contracts, and stealing state economic inf~rrnation.'~~
movement in mid- 1955. It was a movernent to deal wiih current problems by
launching a campaign to wipe out hidden counter-revolutionaries.'" 6. The ante-

'" Supra note 112 at 17.
1%

Supra note 96 at 68.

'%

Ibid. at 73.

lW

Ibid. at 80.

Ibid. at 83.
lg9

Ibid. at 1 10.

rightist movement began in June 1957. It dealt specifically with 'rightist' critics who

had k e n vocal during the hundred flowers m ~ v e m e n t7. ~
T h e great leap forward
from 1958 to 1959. It was China's most radical experiment to restrucm the Chinese
economy and s ~ c i e t y . ~ '
The most serious political movement under the government of CCP was the
Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, "a great revolution that touches people to

their very s o ~ l s "The
. ~ ~Cultural
~
Revolution Ieft serious impacts on aspects of the
Chinese economy, politics and sociai life. The following are some of the impacts of

the Cultural Revolution. The total number of deaths attributable to the Cultural
Revolution is not clear. "It might not be unreasonable to estimate that approximately
half a million Chinese, out of an urban population of around 135 million in 1967, died

as a direct result of the Cultural ~ e v o l u t i o n . "The
~ ~ economic
~
loss was enornous.
According to Hua Kuo-feng's report in the People's Congress, between 1974 and
1976 industrial gross output value dropped by 100,000 million yuan, steel production
by 28 million tons, and state revenue by 40,000 miilion yuan. The whole economy
was on the brink of c o ~ a ~ sThe
e . most
~ ~ serious impact of the Cultural Revolution is

ZaO

Ibid. at 163.

Ibid. at 174.

"

H. Harding minese State in Crisis. 196669". in R. MacFarquhar ed.. The Politics of Chim. at
248. Supra note 1 12.
'O3

Ibid. at 244.

The People's Congress: The Doctrine.of the State" (1978) 1 1 14 C.N.A.1 at 3.
Hua Kuo-feng was the First Secretary of the CCP at that tirne.

on people's daily Life? Being afkid of the recurrence of the similar undertakings that
they will suffer again in fiinire, the Chinese people are a h i d to speak, and peer

carefully left and right. m e n two persons met they may have spoken the tmth; when
three persons met they would tell Lies; when four met they said nothing, merely
exchanging polite jokes. 9,206
The rise of the Solidarity trade union movement was a result of Polish
autocracy, economic failure and subservience to foreign domination under the
totalitarian domination of PUWP? Communist China, although it has its own
independence, faced the similar autocracy and economic failure in 1982 as the PUWP
had in Poland.
Under this circurnstance, the Chinese govemment was mortaliy afraid that the
movement of Soiidarity would emerge in China. Besides other political and economic
reasons, the Chinese govemment thought that the independence of trade union and the
right to strike played a significant role in helping the success of the Solidarity
movement. Just as Main Touraine mentioned in his Solidarity, " ui a situation in
which a Party-state entertains totalitarian ambitions, anything which wrests any
activity from its control immediately takes on a directly political character. The
demand for a free trade union is therefore in everyone's eyes an eminently political
a ~ t . " ~In' ~order to avoid any oppominity of independent trade union and fimily hold

For more discussion about of the consequcnces of the Cultural Revolution. see H.Harding 'The
Chinese State in CRsis. 1966-9" at 239. Supra note 1 12.
3DI 'The Culturai

Revolution - Yes or No?' (1978) 1137 C.NA. 1 at 6.

Supra note 13 1 at 13.

the state power, the Chinese govemment would not include a right to sûike in its
constitutional code.

2. My Point of View of no Right to Strike in China

My point of view of no right to strike in China consists of the theoretical and
practical reasons. The theoretical reason is that there is no distinction between a
political strike and an economic one. Since striking was maidy used for political
interests in the history of the CCP, the Chinese govemment regards sbike as a
political weapon more than an economic one. The practical reason is that there is no
independent trade union in China. This discussion will focus on the past and present
role of the Chinese trade union.

a. The Theoretical Reason

The biggest obstacle in the right to strike in China is that the Chinese
govemment regards every strike as being for political purpose and it is a threat to
sovereignty as well as to the national economy. On the basis of assurning the same
interest among the state, the enterprises and the worker, strikes have a fundamentally
different character in China than they do in the capitalist countries. Because the state
owns al1 means of production, every strike is aimed not only at management but also

at sovereignty of the nation. Moreover, under the socialist planned economy,

management cannot address strikers' dernands concerning wages and vacations. AU
these economic matten require a response from the govemment. Thus, every strike is
political because it is a s m d group of striken who place their personal needs above
the needs of the state and want to influence national economic policies. As weli as
the discussion of the identical fundamental interests, it is important to look inside the
history of Chinese industrial working class and the Chinese Communist Party to
understand the conclusion made by the Chinese govenunent in regard to the purpose

The Chinese factory industry has a shorter history than the western one.
Previous to 1895, there were isolated attempts to introduce modem methods of
manufacture to China, but it was not until after the Sino-Japanese War that factory
characteristic of the Chinese industry in
industry really began to d e v e 1 0 p ~A~typical
~

its early days was the low labour standards: Iow wages, long hours and bad workshop
conditi~ns.~'Wagner
in his Labour Legislation in China described the miserable
working conditions.
In many workshops men and young boys toi1 from early moming until late
into the night, working often by the night of flickering, smoky oil lamps. Child
labour, long hours, dirt, overcrowding, and a total lack of sanitation are taken
for granted. The buk of Chinese co~nmoditiesare still produced in hanclicraft
shops where workers know and expect nothing else and no govemment had
felt responsible for protecting

'

-

"A. Wagner. Lubour L,egïs&tion in China (Beijing: Yenching University. 1938) at p.3.
*'O

Ibid. at 17.

2"

Ibid. at 2.

A further characteristic was that a considerable number of the larger factories

in China were owned by foreigners located in the foreign concession^.^'^ This had
created m e r special difficulties in connection with securing improvement of factory

condition^."^ Hence, with the growth of factory industry. the dark days of the early
industriai revolution in the West were repeating thernselves in China, a semi-colonial
and semi-feudal country at that time. The Chinese working class. which was
proletariat exploited by the imperdism. feudalism. and bureaucrat-capitalism, had to
take up the task to fight for the prestige of China since the real basis for improvhg the

workea' standard of living is the freedom and independence of the nation.214Under
that condition. the shikes and organizationai activities, which are economic sanction
in labour relationship, were used more as a political weapon than an economic one.
"Strikes and organizational activities were directed chiefly toward upsetting the
economic and political interests of foreigners and creating disturbance for the 'feudai
m&,rists"'~215

"2

Ibid. at 19.

The foreign establishment in early republican China (19 12-49) had many facets. Foreign concessions or
senlernents were one of them. Foreign concessions were established in 16 treaty ports, which were
ports opened as a consequence of an international treaty or agreement. They were specificareas set
aside for foreign residence in which local jurisdiction and administration were in foreign hands. The
foreign residentid areas in Tientsin, Hankow and Canton for exarnple, were "concessions". In these
places, entire areas were expropriateci or pwchased by the Chinese govemment and Ieased in perpetuity
to particular powers (Great Britain, France, Gerrnany, lapan, Russia, Belgium, Italy and AustrianHungary at Tientsin; Greta Britain, France. Germany, Japan, and Russia at Hankow; Great Britain and
France at Canton.) The consul of the nation holding the concessional lease was the chief officiai of
each concession. Individual foreigners could obtain sub-leases to particular piece of property. For more
discussion of the foreign concessions, see A, Feuetwerker 'The Foreign Presence in China", in I.K.
Fairbank ed., The Cambridge Hisrory of China vol. 12, 128 at 129.
'13

Ibid. at 23.
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Ibid. at 61 - 64.
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Ibid. at 62.

The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921. "According to Ch'en
Kung-po, a participant of the F i t Congress, the fvst constitution of the CCP defined
the tasks of the party at organizing and educating the working masses to carry on class

struggie and socialist revolution and ultimately realize the proletarian dictatorship. ,9216
Amoog the periods from the foundation of the CCP in 1921 to its having gained the
state-power in 1949, the CCP directed its attention in both d areas and urban areas
to carry on class ~truggie.~l~
The rural area under the leadership of the CCP was calied
'red area', "where the peasants, especiaiiy the armed peasants, were waging political
and social battles to destroy the bastions of what they c d e d 'feudal China

799

.218 The

urban area under the leadership of Kuomintang was cded 'white area'. One of the
political works in the white area for the Communists was to organize the working
class to fight against Kuomintang,the representative of imperialism, feudalism. and
bureaucrat-capitalism in China. To go on strike was regarded as a weapon to weaken
the economic basis of the government of Kuomintang for the purpose of overthmwing

the reactionary government. The labour movement in the 'white area' was used io
promote the political revolution. In an open Ietter to the workers on October 16, 1928,
the govemment of Kuomintang described the destruction to the nation due to the
. ~ ~ letter
~
declared
labour unions and snike activities organized by the C o m ~ n u n i s t sThe

J. Chen 'The Chinese Communist Movement to 1927" in J. K. Fairbank ed., The Cambridge
History of China vol. 12 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983) 505 at 5 15, supra note 212,
217

See J. Chen, 'The Communist Movement 1927-1937" in John K Fairbank & Albert Feuerwerker
eds., The Cambridge Hhtory of China vol. 13 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 168 at
2 I 6-220.
2'8

Ibid. at 2 16.

'19

Supra note 209 at 68.

that the Comrnunists had taken advantage of them to incite famiers and workers to
acts of violence which had weakened the nation. The Communists had been accused

of organizing the workers for their own selnsh purposes, taking the Labour
Movement away from them. and using it for the destruction of the country.z0
It is true that the CCP did take benefit from its former policy to organize

workers and to initiate suikes. Strikes as politically destabiiising events did help the
CCP toward state-power. Even in the penod of the Cultural Revolution, strikes were
used for the poiitical purpose of class struggle. The personal experience of the CCP is
the most persuasive evidence that strikes are for politicai purposes. Being a h i d that

the same will be done to itself. the CCP cannot protect a right to strike to the Chinese
people.
It is understandable that the history cannot be forgotten. However. under the
opendoor policy. it is more important for today's China to leam from the outside
world. In the context of the thesis topic. the Chinese govemment needs to revise its
opinion respecting the right to strike. As discussed in Chapter 1, under Canadian
labour law, the right to strike is an economic right for the purpose of negotiation of
collective contracts. The employees are protected to take collective job action to try to
compel the employer to make concession when negotiations break down. The
economic efEect of a strike is not oniy on the side of the employer, but also on the side
of the employees. It is the economic harm that makes striking a significant weapon to
resolve labour disputes. As analysed in the case of National Day of Protest, where it

2x1Ibid.

was held to be a strike, it was because of the economic effect on the employer, not
because of the political ~ignificance.~'

b. The Practicaf Reason

The practical reason that there is no right to saike in China is that there is no
organization which is able to organize a strike. The subsequent discussion will focus

on the past and present role of the Chinese tmde union? In order to have a clear
picture of the Chinese ûade union, it is necessary fmt to provide the organizational
structure of Chinese unions.
Chinese trade unions are headed by a National Congress of Chinese Trade
Unions which is held every five years by a separate institution called the Executive
Committee of the ALI-China-Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)." The National
Congress has the authority to discuss and decide the policies and tasks of the national
unions, revise the Charter of the Chinese Unions,and elect the Execution Committee
and the Budgetary Examination Cornmittee.""The Execution Committee supervises

the national unions when the National Congress is adjoumed? It is authorized to

See chapter 1 for more detail.
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More legislative anaiysis of this issue will be provided in the next chapter.

a3 Article 15 of the Charter of the Chi~eseUnions in Dept. of Law,Renmin University of China,
Reference Materiah to Labour Law (Beijing: Renmin University Press. 1984) at 668. in Chinese.
Supra note 92.

Ibid. art. 16.
zzs Ibid. art. 17.

decide important matters concerniog the working people and to implernent the
resolutions of the National congres^.^

The second level of the organizational structure of the Chinese unions consists
of sectoral unions and regional unions. Sectoral unions exist in each major indushial
sector. such as textiles or machiaery. They are arranged in a national vertical
structure. The national sectoral union is directed by a national congress, similar in
form to the National Congress of Chinese Trade Unions." Each province and large
city also establishes a regional sectoral union under the joint leadership of the national
sectoral union and the general regional union at the next higher level." Regional
unions are organized horizontally to represent the different unions existing in a
geopphic area A congress is held every five years and a smaller executive body
called a union cornmittee takes care of routine union activities? In generai. this
horizontal organization is established at each level of the political hierarchy.
Therefore, the ACFTU and the National Congress of Chinese Trade Union sit at the

top of this dual organization?

In a Communist country, the Party-union relations play a significant role in
deciding the status of the trade union. The following is a brief look at the trade union
history to understand the Party-union relations in China.

ttb Ibid.

Ibid. art. 19.
Ibid.
Ibid. art. 20.
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Supra note f 28, at 1 t 77.

The ideological guidance of the Chinese -de

union is LRninist. According to

Leninist doctrine, unions were to act as a transmission belt to transmit policy from the

Party down to the masses and feedback upward from the masses. That is, the union
functions as the comecting link between Party and m a ~ s e s . ~
Since
'
the transmission
belt function is a two-way affair, the union should organize the masses to implement
the Party policy on the one hand, and report on "the will, the conduction, the level of

politicai consciousness" of the masses on the ~ t h e rIn. ~order
~ to function ideally in
its transmission belt role, the union needs a modicum of operational independence

h m absolute Party control to transmit back up to the Party the actual mood and
desires of the m a ~ s e sHowever,
.~
this kind of independence was regarded as a threat
to its rule by the Party and resulted in three crises after the New China was founded.
The fmt crisis climaxed in 1951, when the national union leadership under Li
Li-sanLUsought to function properly in its transmission belt role and emphasized
economic rather than political tasks." The Party accused the union of seeking
independence from the Party and succumbing to "economism", that is, considering
only the interests of the workers." The result was a return to absolute Party control."

The second crisis between Party and union was in 1957 under Lai JO-yu's
P. Harper 'The Party and the Unions in Communist China" (1969) 37 China Q. 84 at 86-87.
Ibid. at 88.
233

Ibid,

1Y First

Vice-Chairman of the ACFTU fiom August 1948 until May 1953.

Supra note 23 1 at 89 - 99.

ïbid. at 88,
'57

Ibid. at 99.

chainnanship." The A

m had endeavoured to lead the union away fiom Party

control by strengthening vertical rule ihrough the industrial union s t r ~ c t u r eThe
.~~
union argued that it must have operational autonomy from the Party if the role of
transmission belt was to be effective? The Party chose to interpret it as second
flowering of economism and determined that the transmission belt role was to move
in one direction, only-downwar~is.~~'
The Cultural Revolution produced a third crisis
in Party-union relations.u2 Despite the abiiity of some local unions to continue
functioning in areas in which Party had absolute dominance. the national union
system including the ACFIZT, was disbanded in 1966 as rea~tionary.'~~

The formal reemergence of the Chinese unions was the Ninth National Trade
Union Congress in October 1978.- Vice-Remier Deng Xiaoping delivered a speech
on behalf of the Party Central Cornmittee and the State Council. He emphasized the
need for vade union memben to play an active role in the management of
enter prise^.^^ The ACFTU set forth the workers' participation in management as its

fundamental task and the June 198 1 Provisional Regdations on the Staff- workers

Lai was appointed as Secretary - General of A C F N in April 1952 and elected as Chairman in 1953
until M a y 1958.

"Supra note 23 1 at 99 - 1 14.
Ibid. at 105.
24'

Ibid. at 113.
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Ibid, at 114 - 119.
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128 at 1 176.

"Mass ûrganizations Reactivated" (1978) 20 BR 10.

The Eighth National Trade Union Congress was held in 1957.

Congress granted the employees in the state-owned enterprises the right to participate
in democratic management through the estabiishment of SM-worker congres ses.^
On the 1lth National Congress of the ACTU, a revised Charferof the Chinese Unions

was adopted?' According the preamble of the Chafler,the trade unions of China are
the mass orga.iizations of the working class formed on a v o l u n t q b a i s led by the
Chinese Communist Party. Although the 1992 Trade Union Law does not state the

Party leadership over the trade union, the question of Party-union relations in China

has been settied since the second crisis under Lai JO-yu, this is, the unions are to be
wholly subservient to the Party.2a
The Party-union relations. in the eyes of the Party, then. is that, the Party must
lead the trade union and the trade union should accept the Party's leadership
voluntarily. On the one hand, the Party is the vanguard of the working class, while the
Supra note 128 at 1 176.
2* The legislation in respect to the staff-worken congress includes: iubour Law o f the People 's
Republic of China, Trade Union Law,Law of the People's Republic of China on State-Owned
indusrial Enterprises, and Provisional Regulations on StM- workers Congress. The main functions of
the staff-workers congress are set forth in Law of the People's Republic of China on State-Owned
Industrial Enterprises. According to this Act, the staff-workers congress has five functions: 1.Examine
the factory director's reports on business policy, management planning, annuai production plans,
capital construction plans, major technical renovation plans, employee training plans. plans for the
distribution and the use of funds retained by the factory, and plans for the exercise of the contract and
leasing responsibility system, and make suggestions and proposa1 regarding these reports. 2. After
examination, approve or disapprove the enterprise's wage increase plans, bonus distribution plans,
labour protective measures, regulations on reward and punishment and other important regulations and
rules. 3. Examine and decide on plans for the use of workers' welfare funds, housing distribution, and
other major welfare projtcts. 4. Evaluate and supervise leading cadres at various levels and make
suggestions on rewards, punishment, appointments and dismissals. 5. Elect factory directors according
to the decision of relevant govemment department and submit the result to the relevant department for
approval. For more discussion, see Shen Zuying. "Workers*Congres: Active in Enterprise
Management" (1992) 25 BR 24 at 24 and Vai Io Lo, 'Zabour and Employment in the People's
Republic of China: From a Nonmarket-Dnven to a Market-Dnven Economy*'(1996) 6 Int. & Comp. L.
Rev. 337 at 360.
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'Yrade Unions Meet in 1lh Congres" (1988) 45 BR 5.
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23 1 at 1 18.

trade union is the mass organization of the working class. The Party shouid

wholehearteâiy depend on the working class. its basis of the leadership. On the other
hand, k i n g a mass organization, the Chinese trade union should be under the
leadership of the Party. Aithough both CCP and the trade union are the organizations
of the working class. the CCP is more advanced than the trade union. Only under the
leadership of the CCP can the trade union march to a correct direction.249
The third aspect of the p s t and present role of Chinese unions worth
examining the relations between the trade unions and management. The Chinese
government has published two trade union acts since the year 1949; the one in force
today is the 1992 Trade Union Law?' In regard to the relations between the trade
unions and management, it protects the trade unions' Bghts to conduct their activities
independently in accordance with the law and prohibit management's interference."'
However, the legislation becomes somewhat confused at this point since management
are required to provide operational funds for trade unions under the law. Article 26 of
the 1992 Trude Union Law says:

The principle that the trade union should operate under the leadership of the Party is not set out in
the Trade Union Law. However, Article 4 of the Act provides: 'Trade unions shail obey and safeguard
the Constitution, take the Constitution as their basic principle, and independently conduct their
activities in accordance with the Charter of the Chinese Unions." Since the Four Fundamental
Pnnciples, which are: 1. adhere to the leadership of CCP;2. adhere to the socialist road; 3.adhere to the
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought; 4. adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship. are
the basic principle set in the 1982 Constitution, it is argueci that the trade unions should accept the
leadership of the Party according to the Constitution.
249

The two trade union acts are the 1950 Trude Union Law and the 1992 Trade Union Law.
For EngIish transition of the 1950 Trade Union Law, see T. Chen, The Chinese Communist Regime
(London: Pal1 Mal1 Press, 1967) 274, supra note 92. The 1992 Trade Union Lav is in Guan Huai, One
Hundred Questions ro the 1992 Trade Union Law (Beijing: Chinese Workers* Publishing House, 1992)
at 255, in Chinese, supra note 170.
Art. 18 of the 1950 Trade Union Law and art. 4 of the 1992 Trade Union Law.

Trade unions fun& shall be drawn from the following sources:
(1) membeahip dues paid by trade union members;
(2) the management of the stateswned and collective ownership enterprises,
institutional organization and organs shali ailocate each month to their
respective trade union organizations as trade union funds a sum equai to 2 per
cent of the total amount of wages of ail workers and staff members employed;
(3) the tac revenue from the enterprise or institutional organization to which
the trade union belongs;
(4) subsidies from the people's govenunents;
(5) other kinds of i n c ~ m e . ~

In addition, the 1992 Trade Union Law commits management to pay the
wages, bonuses and ailowances for the full-tirne union officids in the primary trade
unions." This provision is a departure from that of the 1950 Trade Union Law, which
States that wages of trade union officiais are paid by the trade union? These
provisions, as well as the provision which imposes on vade union the duty to organize
the workers to fulfil production target~,~'
means that Chinese unions lose the 1 s t

vestige of their independence vis-à-vis management which renders them nothing more
than executive organ of the administration, a thomy subject the Chinese trade union
had sought to resolve since the l i b e r a t i ~ n . ~
The questions whether trade unions are comptent to perform their job

adequately depends heavily on their staff members. Although the Charter of the
Chinese Unions sets forth that the Chairperson and Vice-Chair of the pnmary trade
-

tz2

The 1950 Trade Union Lmu had a similar provision. See art. 24 of the Act.

U3

Art. 35 of the 1992 Trade Union Law.

25j

Art. 17 of the 1950 Trade Union Law.
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Art. 8 of the 1992 Trade Union Law and art 9 of the 1950 Trade Union Law.

2s6 For

more discussion, see "How to Deal with Umtly Workers" supra note 107 at 1.

unions s h d be elected by the union members," many union officiais are appointed
by the Party cornmittee because of their political affiliations.*' What is more, it is

common that the Chairperson of a primary trade union is the director of the enterprise

The other staff members of the primary
or the secretary of the Party com~nittee?~
trade union are less educated and do not know how to protect the "legitimate rights
and interests" of the w o r k e r ~a, ~
duty committed by the Trade Union Law ."' In
reality, if the staff members take a position to support the demands of the worken,
they are in great risk of k i n g dismissed by the management.262

By contrast, the trade union in Canada is an independent organization?
According to Canada Labour Code, the trade union in Canada means "any
-

-

An- 25 of the Charter of the Chinese U n i m .
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Supra note 246 at 388-389.

2s9 W a n g Hongming 'Tollective Consultation: A Difficult Crawl",Worker's Daily March 14. 1996. at
4, in Chinese.
For more discussion, see Zhongtan et al., A General Ourline and Overview of Trade Union Theories in
Time of Transition Towards a Socialist Market Economy, at 256, supra note 193.
In addition, since the trade union officiais are regarded as "ciass IV cadres", very few of the cadres are
willing to be in this group. CIass 1 cadres are the Party cadres, class 11 the government, and class III the
engineers. These three groups can issue orders or make assignments as they wish. See P.Harper 'The
Party and the Unions in Communist China*' (1969) 37 China Q. 84 at 1 10, supra note 23 1.

Supra note 259 at 4.
Art. 6 of the 1992 Trade Union Luw.

"'

Supra note 259 at 4.
The Chinese trade union cadres are always face the risk of losing their personal interests if they choose
to support the interests of the union members. In the first crisis of the Party-union relations. the union
cadres faced the risk of losing their Party mernberships if they persisted in siding with the workers
against the leadership. For more discussion of this issue, see supra note 23 1 at 1 10.

The Canadian union is independent of the government and the employers. The trade union, the
govenunent and the employers are three parties to cooperate in keeping labour relations in harmony, In
some Canadian provinces, the labour relations board has mpartite rnembership, Le. a presiding officer
who is a neutral, and equal nwnbers of management and labour representatives, for example the Labour
Relations Board in Nova Scotia. In addition, the Canada Labour Relation Board and some other
provinces which comprise neutrd members only are in the course of changing.

organization of employees, or any branch or local thereof, the purposes of which

inciude the regdation of relations between employers and employee~.'*~
On the
assumption of conflicting interests, Canada labour law protects the Canadian unions
to exist for the purpose of securing improvements in conditions of employment
because economic is the primaiy reason why employees seek trade union
representation. In a society where jobs are not too plentifd. the employees have no
reai leverage in dealing with their employer on an individual basis. But the employees
can get a better deal through banding together to voice their grievances collectively.

Hence, the naturd task for a union is to promote economic interests of the employees.

Striking as an economic weapon is to fulfd this task.
As discussed in chapter 1, s a n g in Canada is used for the negotiation of
collective agreements. In order to make it function properly, the Iegislature sets forth
requirements of a strike. Under Canada labour law, striking is prohibited before
certification. A trade union cannot initiate a strike unless it is certified or voluntarily
recognized as a bargaining agent on behaif of the employees. Strikes are also banned
dunng the term of a collective agreement. An effective agreement has binding force
on both trade union and employer. In addition, the purposive restriction of a strike and
the fact that the political strikes are relatively rare in Canada are suficient to illustrate

the economic function of strikes. However, as a double-edged sword. striking will
cause economic damage on both sides of employment; both employees and employer
will suffer economic loss during a strike. Why does the trade union choose to bear the

"Section 3(1) of the CoMdo Lubour Code.

economic loss to its members rather than to accept the offer of the employer? The
answer is that the union wants to gain more for its members. It is true that the strikers

are depnved of wages in the period of a strike. This loss, however, is hopefuiiy
smaiier than that of the long-term loss in the lifetime of a collective agreement if the
employer does not make acceptable concession about the terms and conditions of
employment.
In order to protect the employees' organizational rights, the Canadian
legislature prohibits employer retaiiatory action designed to eradicate the union or
punish the strikers, and protects the employment relations during a lawful strike. For
the purpose of protecting the trade union's ability to represent employees effectively
and authentically, Canadian labour law focuses on keeping the trade union completely

fiee of employer control. The labour relations acts forbid the participation of
management in the formation or administration of a union, its selection by employees.
or its representation of them, as a bargainhg agent. Even the contribution of financial

or other support by the employer to the union is forbidden, except in circumstances
where the autonomy of the union is uniikely to be impaired?

For more discussion. see supra note 68 at 199;
Case noticed: Loblaws Workers' Council v. Super City Limited et al. ( 1964) 64 C.L.L.C-

(O.L.R.B.).
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III

The right to strike under the 1982 Chinese Constitution is similar to the one
under the Canadian Churîer of Rights ond Freedoms. Neither of them contains an
explicit provision in regard to the right to strike. However, in the case of China,it is
not only no constitutional guarantee of a nght to strike, but also no right to strike at
ali. Unlike the Canadian constitution, the Chinese constitution has binding force on

aiI Chinese citizens. They must abide by the Constitution. More specificaiiy, the

Constitution sets forth a duty on Chinese citizens to observe labour discipline and

public order. Since striking is not protected under Chinese labour law, it is reasonable
to Say that there is no right io strike in China?
The theoretical reason for no nght to strike in China from the point of view of
the Chinese government is the assurnption of identical interest arnong the state, the
enterprises and the workers on the ground of public ownership. This leads to the

Party's conclusion that all strikes are for political purposes. Logicaily, this
presumption is the basis for the whole Chinese legal system in the area of labour
relations. However, the labour relations under today's market economy greatly
challenge the assumption of hannonious interests. Therefore, it is useful for China to
take into account the Canadian example in order to keep its industrial peace?'

--

-

"There are more discussions on this subject in the next chapter.
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Chapter IV will provide more discussions on this subject.

cmu"mR III

THE RIGHT TO STRIKE UNDER CEHNESE LABOUR LAW

Introduction

As discussed in chapter II. the right to strike in China is not a constitutional

nght. To speak exactly. there is a legal ban on strikes under the1982 Constitution. Ls

there a statutory right to strike in China under Chinese labour law? The answer is NO.
Article 5 of the 1982 Constitution provides:
The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system. No
law or administrative or local d e s and regulations shall contravene the
Constitution. AU state organs. the m e d forces, ail political parties and public
organizations and al1 enterprises and undertakings must abide by the
Constitution and the law. Al1 acts in violation of the Constitution and the law
must be looked into. No organization or individual may enjoy the privilege of
k i n g above the Constitution and the law.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental law of the state that has the supreme legal
authonty and no statutes shall contravene the Constitution, the right to suike is
prohibited under any Chinese statues. including the legislation on labour relations.

This chapter deals with the nght to strike under Chinese labour law. Although
the right to stnke is not a statutory right in China either, Chinese labour law does

have some provisions relating to trade unions and labour disputes. The discussion of
the right to strike under Chinese labour law will highlight these provisions which rely

upon the government's theory: the harmony of the interest m m g the state, the
enterprises and the workers.

A. The Hhtory of Chinese Labour Law

The People's Republic of China did not have a labour code until the year 1994. In
the period of the fmt 45 years, the Chinese govemment promulgated several statues
to adjust labour relations as well as the Party' labour policies? The following
discussion is designed to provide background information on Chinese labour law,
with emphasis on Lobour Law of the People's Republic of Chino, the fmt labour code
in China.

1. The Penod to Resume the National Economy ( 1949-1953)

Socialist China was established after an eight-year Sino-Japanese war
foilowed by a four-year civil war between the Communist Party and the Kuornintang.

China suffered greatly because of such a long wartime. The existing financial
difficulties made the govemment committed to the consolidation the country in its
founding ~ e a r s . ~

za The govemment's labour policies were the most important sources to be used in the area of labour
relations before the Labour Law of the People's Republic of China was published. However, ail these
policies did not take the form of statutes and the Party could change them whenever it wished to. In
addition, these policies were not published to al1 the citizens and there are few origind materials on this
issue. Hence, although the labour policies played a significant role in the area of Chinese labour
relations, it is difficuit to have a detailed discussion on them. However, the subsequent andysis of
Chinese labour law will refer to those relevant poIicies where there is no specific statute on the subject
under discussion,
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Supra note 96 at 57 - 59.63 - 64.

As a socialist country, the state-owned enterprises should be the laigest pan its

national economy. However, in the Republic of China, the pnvate economy played an
important role in the national economy. It was impossible to change al1 the private
enterprises into the state-owned enterprises in one day. Accordingly, there were two
kinds of labour relationships in these two kinds of enterprises. One was the sociaiist
labour relationship in the state-owned enterprises and the other was the capitalist
labour relationship in the pnvate enterprises.
Chinese labour legislation, in this period, focused on two aspects to suit the
situation. First, the labour legislation was used to help the govemment in restoring the
Chinese national economy. The gove-ent

published several regdations relating to

social insurance, occupational health and safety. trade unions and the administration
of labour force? Second, the labour legislation focused on promoting the
development of the state-owned enterprises and transfemng the private enterprises
into the state-owned ones. Several policies had been published in the state-owned
enterprises and pnvate enterprises respectively in regard to the workers'
participation?'

In the year 1950, the Chinese govemment prornulgated its fmt Tmde Union
Law of the People's Republic of China, which set out the characteristics, nghts and
-

--

~ J In
O 195 1 and 1953, the State Council respectively promulgated Labour Insurance Regulnrions of rhe
People S Republic of China to provide coverage for injury, sickness. disability. death, maternity, and
retirement pensions. This regulation is in Dept. of Law,Renmin University of China Reference
Materiah to Labour Law (Beijing: Renmin University Press, 1984) at 5 11, in Chinese, supra note 92.

27 1

The state-owned enterprises were required to establish a regulation cornmittee which shouid include
a certain number of the representatives of their staff; while in the private enterprises, a negotiation
cornmittee made up by the capitdist and the worker should be established. Also, the capitalists were
expected to conclude a colkctive agreement with their workers. See Guan Huai, Labour Law (Beijing:
Law hiblishing House, 1996) at 123, in Chinese.

obligations of the Chinese trade unions, the relationship between the trade unions and
the government, and the relationship between the trade unions and the state-owned

enter prise^?^ The 1950 Trade Union Law, however, did not provide the Chinese
worken a right to suike. On the contrary, it committed Chinese unions the
responsibility to fulfd production targets and to maintain labour discipline. In the
context of resolution of labour disputes, the Ministry of Labour published Regulations
on the Proceduresfor Resolution of hbour D i s p ~ t e sDifferent
.~
procedures were set
out to solve the labour disputes in the public ownership enterprises and the private
enterprises?

2. The Period of Econornic Construction (1953- 1957)

This is a period in which the Chinese govemment concentrated on economic

construction. After nearly four years' socialist transformation, there were no private
enterprises in China. Most of the pnvate enterprises had been changed into the public
and private regdation enterprises. a kind of enterprise in which the original capitalist
no longer had the ownership of the enterprise but still kept the power to manage the
business and the right to share the profit of the enterprise. In 1953, the Chinese

"ibid. at 232.
Luodongbu Guanyu kiodong Uicngyi Jiejue Chengxu de Guiding [Reguhtions on the Procedures
for Resolutian of Labour Disputes],November 26, 1950 in Dept. of Law, Renmin University of China,
Reference Materials to Labour law (Beijing: Renmin University Press, t 984) 755, in Chinese. Supra
note 92.
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The following section wiil provide more discussion on this issue.

govemment launched its fmt five-year plan and the New China was well prepared for
a weli-planned economic construction.

The labour legislation in this period aimed to fulfil the objective of economic
construction. The 1954 Constitution which set forth the principles of dealing with the
labour relationship had k e n affir~ned.~'~
More specificdy. the government
announced several special acts and regulation:; in the area of the labour relationship.

In 1954, the State Council promulgated Lubour Regulations in the State-owned
.~~
Enterprises, a regulation to stipulate labour discipiine in the w ~ r k p l a c eThe
procedures to admit. transfer or dismiss the worken had been standardized in the
regulation. In order to adjust the labour relationship in the public and private
regulation enterprises, the Chinese govemment took back the power to decide the
remuneration from the capitalists and regulated the wage system by itself."
The most important statute respecting the right to strike in this period is the
1954 Constitution. As analysed in chapter II, there was no right to strike under the

fmt Constitution. It is very difficult to discuss the illegai strikes in this period because
the Chinese govemment denied the existence of strikes in China. However, the

Chinese press implied there were svikes in this period?'' The strikes, of course, were

27s

Articles 9, 10, 15, 16.91 - 93,96 in the 1954 Constitution.

no Guoying Qiye Neibu Luodong Guithe Gangyao [Labour Regularions in the State-owned
Enterprises], July 14, 1954, supra note 92 at 706.

rn Supra note 271 at 127.
Supra note 1W at 1.

In May 1957, the People's Daily issued directives on how to deal with fractious workers. The
instnictions were issued by Lai JO-yu,the Chairman of ACFKJ.

not organized by the trade unions. On the contrary, it was the duty of the trade union
to persuade the workers that their cornplaints were ill-founded?

3. The Early Days of the Period of the Socialist Construction (1958- 1966)

China had experienced its progress and drawbacks in this period. From the
year1956 to 1958, the Chinese economy was in a good condition. The govemment
concentrated on its economic construction and succeeded in the total output value of
both industry and agriculture." Unfortunately, the Chinese govemment officiais. who
did not have enough experience in socialist construction and were proud of the

success and anxious to obtain quick results, started the movement of "Great Leap" in
the year 1958 which led to economic cnsis?' However, the govemment conected its
mistakes in the winter of 1960 by making the policy of adjustment, consolidation.
replenishrnent and promotion in its economic construction."
The labour Iegislation in this period is suficient to illustrate this characteristic.
Between 1956 to 1958, the State Council promulgated four important regulations in
regard to remuneration on the principle of 'to each according to her work". These
regulations did help in arraaging a reasonable wage between both the on-the-job

Ibid.
Supra note 9 1 at 4.

Ibid. at 5.

Ibid.

workers and the retired workers." In the period of "Great Leap", not only was there
no labour legislation, but also the former labour legislation was abandoned. A new
distribution system was adopted by some enterprises, which was that the workers
could have free dinners and get fkee daily materials from the enterprise as the main
part of their original wages, and with a smaii amount of money to support their family
members. This kind of distribution system resulted in a nation-wide tendency of
egaiitarianism? From the year of 1960, the Chinese govemment began to resume its
labour legislation in accordance with its economic policy and published regdations
relating to wages, labour force and occupational health and safety."
There were no new statutes promulgated in the context of trade union or
labour disputes. Although the right to strike was not protected under the 1954
Constitution,there were some strikes in this period? The Party followed the sarne

policy toward the troublemakers, which is, to let them be humble and cautious fmt,
then to punish them if it failed.

4. The Period of the 10-year Interna1 Disorder ( 1966- 1976)

From May 1966 to October 1976, China was in its intemal disorder. The Cultural
Revolution began in May 1966 and al1 the country fell into a kind of fanaticism. Most

"Supra note 271 at 128.
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Ibid. at 128 - 129.
Ibid. at 129.

Trade Union and Industrial Workers", (1963) 482 C.N.A. Lat 6 .

factories stopped working and the intemal wars were everywhere. Laws were
criticized as the legacy of capitalism which should be discarded by the proletariat.
Chinese labour legislation was in the s m e disorder as the whole country. The
published labour legislation was discarded and very few new regdations had k e n
promulgated. The nation-wide egalitarianism and anarchism affected the labour
relationship. The piecework system had been cancelied by ail the enterprises and
labour discipline was abandoned s i n e they had been regarded as a kind of resvaint on
the workers." In addition, the national union system was abolished as reactionary in
1966.

One important thing that happened in this period is that the right to strike was
first provided in the 1975 Consritution after the New China was established. But there
was no provision in regard to the situations under which a strike was permissible. Nor
were there any statutes providing protection of this right. Large-scale work stoppages
did occur in the Cultwd Revolution. However, they were not the strikes in the usual

Canadian sense because the sviken were politically inspired for class struggle.

5. The Time after the Arrest of the "Gang of Four" ( 1976- )

There were iwo significant things in this period. One was the smashing of the
"gang of four" in October 1976; the other was the opening of the Third Plenary
Session of the 1Ith Party Central Cornmittee in December 1978. The "gang of four"
was regarded as the representative of the Left leadership and was aiieged to have done
-

- -- -

Supra note 27 1 at 130.

great h m to Chinese economic and political systems." Afier the smashhg of the
"gang of four", the CCP held an important party meeting, the Third P l e n q Session
of the 11th Party Central Cornmittee. The CCP made a decision to make every effort
toward the Chinese economic construction. The government started to adjust, reform,
conciliate and promote its economic system.
The Party's commitmc:nt to rapid economic growth has been affmed in the
1978 and 1982 constitutions. Although the right to strike was still included in the
1978 Constitution, the Constitution revived the duty to observe labour discipline and
public order on Chinese citizens. Moreover, the 1982 Constitution does not provide a

nght to strike.
Dunng this period, the govemment promulgated a number of statutes and
regulations in the area of labour relationship. The labour legislation had touched upon
almost every aspect of labour relationship, such as labour insurance, labour discipline,
labour disputes and working hours. The following statutes and regulations are more
notable in the issue of the right to strike. Fint, in 1987 the State Council promulgated
the Provisional Regulations for the Resolution of Labour Disputes in State

enter prise^.^^' It represents the fmt time that a formal mechanism was used in China
to resolve a labour dispute. This regulation was revised in the year 1993. In

L. B. WilIiams 'The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1968-82" in Roderick
MacFarquhar ed., The Politics of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 299-301.
307-3 10. Supra note 112.

Guoying Qiye Laodong Zhengyi Chuli Zanxing Guiding [Provisionul Reguiatiumfor the Resolution
of Labour Disputes in State Enterprises] July 3 1, 1987 (amended 1993). The English translation of this
regulation is in H.K.Josephs, ''Labour Refonn in the Workers' State: The Chinese Experience". (1988)
2 Joutnal of Chinese Law 202 at 280.

accordance with the resolution mechanism, the Ministry of Labour published severai
d e s concerning ways of dealing with labour disputes, in which no strike is aiiowed.

Second, the new Truàe Union Law, which gives Chinese trade unions more power

than that under the previous act, was published on Aprii 3. 1992. But the trade union
is not allowed to organize a strike. On the contrary, it has the duty to maintain
continuous production. Third, the Labour Law of the People 's Republic of China. the
fmt labour code in China, was promulgated on July 5, 1994.2mAfterwards, the
regulations conceming collective contracts came into force at the end of 1994. The
system of collective bargaining, which had disappeared for 20 years, was established
in today's China.

6. The 1994 Labour Law of the People's Republic of China

The Labour Low of the People's Repubfic of China is the outcome of an
extremely protracted cirafting process. The beginning of drafting dated back to the
1950s. M e r its fmt Constitution in the year 1954, the Chinese govemment decided

to make laws in every area. In the year 1956, a committee to draft the labour law was
established, consisting of law school professors and government officiais. The
committee did a lot of work in translating foreign labour codes and setting out the
framework of Chinese labour law. Unfortunately, the committee was dissolved in the

ZhonghUIl Renmin Gongheguo Laodongfa [LabourLuw of the People's Republic of China] JuIy 5.
1995 in Ministry of Labour of the PRC,Labour Luw of the People's Republic of China (Beijing:
Chinese Labour Publishing House, 1994). Supra note 4.

period of the "Great Leap" m~vement.~'
After more than twenty years, the committee
was reconstituted in the year 1978. They submitted its drafi to the State Council in
July 1983. Because the economic reform was in its fmt step and a lot of systems were
not settled, the draft was not passed in the National People's congres^.^
The third phase to dmft the Chinese labour law began in the year 1989.">1This

time the committee included the representatives from every aspect of the economic
system. They submitted their draft to the State Council in January 1991. However, the

drafi was not passed. In the year 1993, the Chinese govemment decided to establish
its sociaiist market system. Since the labour relationship under the socialist market
economy is different from the one under the socialist planned econorny, labour
legislation should reflect this change? On July 5, 1994, the Eighth Meeting of the
Standing Cornmittee of the Eighth National People's Congress passed the Labour
Law of the People's Republic of China, which had been through nearly forty drafts

before it was adopted. It became effective on January 1, 1995."
As noted, the nght to strike is prohibited under the 1982 Constitution. in

accordance with it, there is no provision in regard to a right to svike under the Labour

Law. The following are relevant provisions meriting attention.
Article 3 provides:

"' Supra note 27 1 at 140- 142.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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More discussion of the difierences between the labour relationship under the market and the planned
economy will be provideci in chapter IV.
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S e the Appendix for an overview of the Labour Law of the People's Republic of China.

Labourers shail have the right to be employed on an equal basis, choose
occupations, obtain remuneration for their labour, take rest, have holidays and
leaves, obtain protection of occupational safety and health, receive training in
vocational skills, enjoy social insurance and welfare, and submit applications
for sealement of labour disputes and other rights relating to labour as
stipulated by law.
Labourers s h d hilfill their labour tasks, improve their vocational skills,
follow mies on occupational safety and health, and observe labour discipline
and professional ethics.
Article 7 reads as foilows:

Labourers shail have the right to participate in and organize trade unions in
accordance with the law.
Trade unions shall represent and safeguard the legitimate nghts and interests
of labourers, and independently conduct their activities in accordance with the
law.
These two articles are provisions in regard to the right of Chinese labourers to
participate in the lawful activities of the trade union.'% Under article 3. the Chinese
labourers have "other rights relating to labour as stipulated by law" besides the
enumerated ones. Since the state guarantees the legislative rights and interests of trade
unions.'* other nghts in this article should include the right to participate in the
lawfûl activities of Chinese unions. Article 7 specifies the labourers' organizational
rights. They are protected "'to participate in and organize trade union in accordance
with the law". This provision looks similar to the one in the Canada Labour Code,
which States that "every employee is free to join the trade union of his choice and to
participate in its lawfbl activities". However, there is a notable difference between

%
'

There is no concept of employcc in China The working people arc cailed labourers.

2*

Ari. 4 of the 1992 Trade Union Law.

them in regard to the right to participate in the lawful activities of trade unions. As

discussed in chapter II, although there are different opinions in respect to the right to
strike under the 1982 Conrritution. the official answer to this question is NO.
Meanwhile, the Chinese citizens have a constitutional duty to observe labour
discipline and public order. Since the legislation does not protect the use of strikes to
~ s o l v labour
e
disputes, the lawful activities of Chinese trade unions do not include a
legal strike.= A strike is considered in violation of both labour discipline and pubLic
order. It is ïilegal to organize a strike in China.
On the assumption of the harmony of the interest of the state, the enterpnses
and the workers, Chinese trade unions have the duty to safeguard the overall interest
of the state and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the worken at the same
A strike is regarded as king not only disadvantageous to the state and

enterpnses, but also king hamiful to the interests of the workers themselves. In
consequence, the lawful activities of Chinese unions do not include a strike action.

More specifically, the legislation imposes on the Chinese union a duty to
promote econornic development. Under both the 1950 and 1992 Trade Union law,
trade unions must organize workers to fulfil the enterprises' production targets and to
fulfil the institutions' administrative plans? Aithough Chinese unions are granted the
nght to protect the interests of the worken,this protection must be under the premise

"More discussion on the resolution of labour disputes in China will be provided in the following
section299

Art. 6 of the 1992 Trade Union Law.

MO Art.

5 of the 1950 Trade Union Law; art. 6 of the 1992 Trade Union Law.

of doing no harm on the national interest."' Because the state owns di means of
production, every strike is a threat to the national interest. Thus, neither of these trade
union acts protects a right to strike.

In practice, the main responsibility of Chinese union is to oversee distribution
of housing - a kind of consumer good which is always in short supply, and to organize
recreational activities for workea. The ability of the union to protect the interest of
the workers against management is ofien ignored. Unions in most cases are
completely reduced to k i n g tools of management and, more paaicularly. of the Party
Cornmittee in the enterprise? If the union tried to consider economic interests of the
workers, the Party would accuse the union of seeking independence from the Party - a
k a t to its sovereignty." In case of work stoppages, trade union should persuade the
workers that their cornplaints are ill-founded and organize them to go back to work?
The union has the duty to maintain continuous p r o d u c t i ~ n . ~ ~
It is different from the case in Canada. As analysed in the Alberta Reference,
there is no constitutional right to strike in Canada either, but there is limited right
under the statute. The Canadian constitution does not automatically settle the issue of
the right to strike under the statute. It is left open to specific legislation. Under the

Art. 7 of the 1950 Trade Union Law; art. 6 of the 1992 Trade Union Law.

"

H.R. Zheng. "An Introduction to the Labour Law of the People's Rcpublic of China" ( 1978) 28
Harvard International Law Journal, 385 at 396.
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See the discussion of the thrtx crises of the Chinese unions in chapter II.
Supra note 107.

M3

Art. 25 of the 1992 Trade Union Law.

Ca&

Lubour Code and provincial legislation, a strike is protected to for the

purpose of negotiation of a collective agreement if it occurs in a timely fashion.
The Canadian trade union is an independent organization existing for
negotiation of terms and conditions of labour relations on behalf of the employees. As
discussed in chapter II, on the assumption of conflicting interests, the objective of
Canadian unions is to extract a higher return for the employees. It is understandable
that the employees and employer have a different status in labour market. For an

employee. she needs a job to earn a Living and jobs may be deficient. She cannot make
do without her employer, although she has the fi-eedom to quit the job if the wage is
low. But any sizeable employer could always get dong without a single employee,
whose ability and contribution is fungible and who is easily replaced if and when she
rnakes her exit. Thus, the employees have no real leverage in deaiing with their
employer on an individual basis. Gradually, the employees realize that if they band
together to voice their grievances collectively. they c m pool their bargaining power to
get a better deal from their employer, who will find it much more difficult to do
without al1 of them. It is the economic reason, which is the primary and the most
important reasoo, that the employees join a trade union. On this recognition, the
Canadian legislature grants the employees the right to have union representation and
protects the economic hnction of the trade union. In order to make the Canadian trade
union function effectively, the right to strike is guaranteed under Canada labour law.

B. ResoIution of Collective Disputes under Cbinese Labour Law

Chapter I of the thesis deals with the right to strike in Canada. As discussed in
that chapter, the attitude of the Canadian legislation is to iimit and regulate collective
employee actions. Strikes in Canada are confïned to the negation of new collective
agreements, that is, to econornic interest disputes. For the purpose of a cornparison
between Canadian and Chinese labour law, it is necessary to examine the Chinese
system of collective bargaining and resolution of collective disputes.

1. The System of Collective Bargaining in China

As discussed in chapter 1, provisions respecting the right to strake are in the

Canadian legislation respecting collective bargaining. Scriking pfays a major role in
the negotiation of collective contracts since it may be able to break the deadlock at the

bargaining table. However, strikes are prohibited in China. An analysis of the Chinese
system of collective bargaining is useful to understand this absence.

a Histoncal Background
I

At the early days when the People's Republic of China was established, the

Chinese government decided to set up collective bargaining system in both stateowned and private enterprises. In regard to the collective bargaining system in the

public ownership enterprises, the 1950 Trade Union Lmv sets out that trade unions in
state-owned or collectively owned enterprises have the rights to represent staff and
workers in order to participate in production management and to sign collective
contracts with management? Along with this, several departments of the Chinese
govemment had promulgated regulations in this respect. For example, the Ministry of
Textiles and the Ministry of Railways passed some interna1 regdations on
establishing collective bargaining systems in the enterprises under their leadership.

However,there was no national regdation in respect to the establishment of
collective bargaining in the state-owned or collectively owned enterprises.
As discussed in tbe above section, a main function of the Chinese union is to
guarantee the fuifilment of production targets. A stRke will affect the fulfilment of the
production. In addition, on the assumption of the same interest, the Chinese union
should safeguard the interest of the state and the enterprises. A strike wiU do harm to
the interest of the state and the enterprises. Consequently, none of the above
regulations guarantees a right to initiate a strike to the Chinese unions.

In regard to the coliective bargaining system in the pnvate enterprises, the
1949 Cornon Principle set forth the general requirements under its provisions." In

accordance with the temporary constitution, the ACFi'U published a policy on how to
establish collective bargaining system in private enterprises.- The capitalists of the

9M Ait 5 of the 1950 Tcude Union knu States: Trade unions in enterprises operateci by the state or by
cooperatives shalI have the right to represent the workers and staff members in taking part in
adrninistering production and in concluding collective agreements with management.

M7

Art. 32.

Guanyu Siying Gongshang Qiye LoOÙ Shuangfmg Dingli Jiti Hetong de Zanxing Bonfn
[Provisional Ways concerning the Conclusion of collective Agreements between the Capitalïsts and the

pnvate enterprises were required to engage in collective bargainhg with the trade
union in the enterprise on the p ~ c i p l of
e benefiting both of the parties? In addition,
article 6 of the 1950 Trade Union Law authorized the trade unions in private
enterprises to enter into collective contracts with the capitali~ts?'~
However, there is
no allowance for strikes for the negotiation of collective agreements in any of these
statutes.
The theoreticai bais for no right to strike in China, as analysed in chapter II,
is the harmony of the interests of the state, the enterprises and the workers. This
theory, no matter whether it reflects the reality of labour relationship under the

planned economy in China,is not a sound one respecting labour relationship in the
pnvate enterprises. It is understandable that there is a conflict of interest between the
capitalists and the labourers. On this recognition, the Canadian legislation grants the
employees a right to strike. The legitimacy of strike in Canada is that, as an econornic
sanction, strikes should be used for the purpose of negotiation new collective
agreements; as a resolution mechanism, strikes should be confined to economic
interest disputes. The regime of regulating strikes is about regulating econornic
conflict between parties of conflicted interests. Therefore, it is unreasonable io have a

Labourers in the Private Enterprises] Novemkr 22, 1949, in Dept. of Law, Renmin University of
China, Reference Mareriais tu Labour Law (Beijing: Renmn University Press, 1984) 200, supra note
92.

Ibid. Art. 1.
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Art. 6 of the 1950 T r d e Union h w provides: Trade unions in pnvate enterprises shall have the
right to reprwnt the workers and staff rnembers in conducting negotiations and tdks with the
employers, in taking part in the labour-capital consultation councils, and in concluding collective
agreements with the employers.

simple legal ban of serikes in the system of collective bargainhg in private enterprises
in China

b. Toûay's Collective Bargaining in China

From the year 1958, China was under the leadership of the Left and there was a
tendency to cancel the system of collective bargaining, a system originated from
capitalism. Noue of the enterprises kept collective bargaining with the related trade
union 6rom then on. In accordance with the Party's policy of rapid economic growth
set out in the year 1978, a lot of regulations on collective bargaining had k e n
published and the legal system of collective bargaining was re-estabiished in today's

China.
The Chinese system of collective bargaining includes the following statutes
and regulations. The 1994 Labour Law is the fmt statute weich merits attention. In
chapter three and £ive of the fmt labour code, there are several articles dealing with
collective bargaining."' Moreover, the Ministry of Labour published the Regulations

conceming Collective Agreements on December 5 , 1994.3'2It is the most important
regulation in regard to collective agreements in China. Since the regulation details the
general provisions set out in the labour code, it is sufficient to discuss the regulation
in order to understand the Chinese system of collective bargaining.
Articles 33 - 35 and û4 of the Labour Law.
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Jiri Hetong Guiding [Reguhtions conceming Coitective Agreements] December 5. 1994, in the
A W I ' U Study Materiah of Lobour Law (Beijing: Chinese Workers' Publishing House, 1995) 21, in

îhinese.

The Regulations conceming Collective Agreements is made up of £ive
chapters and forty-one articles. In chapter 1there are several general provisions
deaiing with the purpose of the regulation.)" the regulatory scope of the reg~lation,~'~
the legal enforcement of a collective agreement,"' and the approval of a collective
agreement? Chapter II sets forth requirements on the conclusion of a collective
agreement. It provides the concept;"' content3I8and the term of a collective
ag~ernent."~
It also details the procedure of collective consultation to conclude a
collective agreement by stating the concept of collective consultation^ the
representatives of the collective c~nsultatioo,~'
the principle of collective
and the time limit of a collective con~ultation.~~
Chapter III is about
cons~ltation~~

It declares the authority of the labour
the approval of a collective agreerne~~t.'~
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An 34 of the Lubour Law provides: A collective contract shall be subrnitted to the labour
administrative department after its conclusion. The collective contract shall go into effect automatically
if no objections are raised by the labour administrative department withinl5 days frorn the date of the
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administrative department on approval of a collective agreement.'= In order to keep
with the authority, this chapter addresses the content? procedurem and tirne limit of

the approval of a collective agreement.'"

Chapter N deals with the disputes

regarding collective agreements. Although the disputes regarding collective
agreements include both a dispute arising fiom the conclusion of a collective
agreement and a dispute arising from the implementation of a collective agreement."
it puts emphasis on the dispute arising from the conclusion of a collective agreement
and establishes a procedure for dealing with this kind of dispute by cons~ltation.~%e

resolution mechanism concerning a dispute arising fiom the itnplementatioa of a
collective agreement is set out under the Regulations of the People's Republic of
China on Handling Labour-Disputes in Enterprises."'Chapter V States that a labour
dispute arising from the conclusion or implementation of a collective agreement in the
institutional organizations with industrial management will be covered by this

receipt of a copy of the contract. This chapter is to detail the procedures of the approval of a collective
agreement which is set out in the Labour Law.
325 Art.

21.
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Art. 24 of this regdation pmvides: The approval of a collecave agreement inchdes the following
contents: 1. whether the two pames of a collective agreement are qualified parties; 2 whether the
collective consultation is in accordance with principles and procedures set out in the laws and
regulations; 3 whether the standards on working conditions in a collective agreement are lower than
those as stipulated in laws and regulations.

"Art. 25.
Art. 26.
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Art. 39.

regdation? In addition, it addresses the date on which the regulation wiii corne into
force? The following are some highlights in this regulation.
Article 7 of the regulation States:
The collective consultation is the activity of the representatives of the trade
union in the enterprise and the representatives of the corresponding enterprise
to consult to reach a collective agreement.

Article 12 provides:
The collective consultation should be in accordance with the provisions of
laws, rules and regulations and foilow the principle of equality and
cooperation. Neither of the parties should conduct any extremist activities.
On the basis of the concept of collective consultation provided in article 7,
article 12 sets forth an important principle in the consultation to reach a collective
agreement. The pnncipie is that no matter what happens in the course of the
consultation, neither of the parties can take extremist activities. In China. there are no
such words as strike or lockout in the statutes and regulations. However, every
Chinese knows the word "extrernist activities" in the area of labour relationship
means strikes and lockouts. That is to Say, according to the Regulations conceming
Collective Agreements, it is not lawful to declare a strike or lockout in order to reach a

collective agreement.
The treatment of strikes and lockouts is a notable difference between the
system of collective bargaining in China and that in Canada As analysed in chapter 1,
free collective bargaining in the Canadian sense means the parties of labour relations
332 Arî.

40.

333 Art,

41.

are free to agree or disagree. Within only lirnited constraints, either the employees or
the employers must be entitled to accept or reject the contract proposais made by the
other side. In order to break the occasional and unavoidable deadlocks at the

bargaining table, a sûike is pemiitted to perform its role in the collective bargaining
process. The ihnist of Canada labour law is to confine the use of the strike weapon to
the negotiation of new contact ternis, to economic interest disputes.
Under Chinese labour law, no strike is d o w e d for the purpose of collective

bargaining. The Chinese legal ban on stnkes cornes from the theory of harmony of
interests. The assumption of the hannony of the interests of the state, the enterprises
and the workers is the basis of the whole system of Chinese labour law. In accordance
with this, neither the enterprises nor the workers have independent interests; their
interests are protected through the work for the interest of the state. Under this
circumstance, collective bargaining is relatively meaningless. This assumption
whether it is correct or not under the planned economy is not the subject that the
thesis is dealing with. The starting point of the thesis is that it is not a correct one
under today's market economy. Since the role of central planning has decreased in the
market-driven economy, the govenunent planners no longer control economic
management at the factory level. The individual enterprises are given the authority of
self-management and they become independent from the state. Likewise, the workers
today enjoy the fieedom to establish and terminate labour relationship with an
enterprise on the basis of labour contracts. Since a labour contract concerns the
exchange of labour power for appropriate compensation, the interest of the individual

workers are their individual economic and property rights, a different interest fiom the
one the enterprise has. Therefore, the labour relations under the market economy,
which is similar to the one in Canada, have a different character than the ones under
the planned economy. It is t h e for China to examine the Canadian attitude to strikes
in fkee collective bargaining. To maintain the simple legal ban on strike action is
totdy unacceptable if China is going to have fiee collective bargaining.3Y

2. Resolution of Collective Disputes

As discussed earlier, the thrust of Canada labour law is to confine the use of
the sirike weapon to the negotiation of new contract terms. In a free collective
bargaining system, the two parties are entitled to agree or disagree with the contract
proposals made by the other side. On the recognition of the conflicted interests
between the employees and the empioyers, the Canadian legislature provides severai
mechanisms to break the deadlock when a collective agreement cannot be reached.
Strike is one kind of these resolution mechanisms. However, the Canadian legislature

set out restrictions for striking in order to reduce the use of it. On the assumption of
the same interest, strikes are banned in the process of collective bargaining under the
Chinese legislation. How does one deal with a collective dispute in accordance with
Chinese labour law? The following discussion intends to provide an answer to this
question.

The chapter will provide more discussion on this topic.

a Legislative Background

The forma1 mechanism to resolve labour disputes did not corne into practice in
China until the 1980s. In the early 1950s, the Ministry of Labour promulgated
Regulations on the Proceduresfor Resolution of Labour Disputes, which set out the

procedures of consultation, arbitration and lawsuit for a settlement of a labour

In the year 1987, the Chinese govenunent promulgated Provisional
disp~te."~
Regulations for the Resolution of Labour Disputes Ut State Enterprises, but the

regulation was suitable only for the resolution of labour disputes in state-owned
enterprises. The 1987 regulation was revised in 1993 with an extension to cover
labour disputes taking place in aLI kinds of enterprises. The foiiowing is designed to
provide background information on Chinese legislation on the resolution of labour
disputes for the subsequent analysis of today's resolution mechanism concerning
collective disputes.

(1) The 1950 Regulation

The Regulations on the Procedures for Resolution of Labour Disputes is the
fmt regulation conceming the resolution of labour disputes in China. Under the law,

where a labour dispute takes place in an enterprise, it shall be settled through

'''

Gumyu Laodong Zhengyi Chuli Chengxu de Guiding [Reguùziions on the Pmcedures for
Resolution of Labour Disputes], November 16, 1950, in Dept. of Law, Renrnin University of China,
Reference Materiais to Labour Law (Beijing: Renrnin University Press, 1984) 755, in Chinese. Supra
note 92.

consultation between the parties concemed? If the consultation fails, a labour
dispute in a state ownership or a co-operative ownership enterprise s h d be settled

through consultation held by the higher trade union of the involved trade union and
the higher responsible institution in charge of the involved enterprise; a labour dispute
in a private enterprise shaU be settied through the help of the industrial union in which

the involved trade union belongs to.3n
If a labour dispute cannot be solved through the consultation in which the
related trade union has participated, the parties may apply for mediation held by Iocal
labour administrative department; if the mediation fails, the labour dispute arbitration
Where a party involved in a labour dispute is
cornmittee shall make an adj~dication."~
not satisfied with the adjudication, the party may notiQ the labour administrative
department withui fifteen days from the date of receiving the ruling of arbitration, and
bring a lawsuit to a people's court."9
The 1950 regulation does not provide a procedure respecting the resolution of
collective disputes. But it sets forth a prohibition of strikes and lockouts. Article 9
States that in the process of the consultation, mediation and arbitration. the enterprises
are not allowed to lockout; while the labourers should maintain normal production.

The 1950 regulation is somewhat confused at this point. As discussed above, in spite
of the assumption of the same interest. which is strongiy arguable, there is nonetheless

336

Art. 5.

3"

Ibid.

338

Art. 6.
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a conflict of interest between the capitalists and the labourers in private enterprises,

which existed in the 1950s' China. The importance of the nght to strike in the
regulating of industrial conflict has been fuily discussed in the thesis. In a socialist
country where the workers are the masters of the state, how can it be omitted by the
legislation?

In sum the 1950 regulation establishes a formal mechanism to resolve labour
disputes. In principle, this rnechanism includes the resolution of labour disputes
through third party arbitration, as happens in Canada, but places more emphasis on
consultation held by related trade unions." In practice, the efiectiveness of the
regulation is minimal. Most employment-related disputes were resolved through the
consultation between the workshop directors and the disaffecteci worker. Trade unions
rare1y became in~olved.~'

(2) The 1987 Regulation

In order to facilitate the implementation of the labour contract system as
introduced in 1986,Y2the State Council promulgated Provisional Regulationsfor the
Resolution of Labour Disputes in State Enterprises. The 1987 regulation reaffiirms the

More cornparison of the Chinese arbitration and the Canadian arbitration will be pmvided in the
following part.
341

See H-K. Josephs "Labour Reform in the Workers' State: The Chinese Experience" (1988) 2
Journal of Chinese Law 202, at =O-25 1, supra note 289; H.K. Josephs 'Labour Law in 'Socialkt
Market Economy': The Case of ChinaT'(1996) 6 Columbia Joumai of Transitionai Law 560 at 562.

In the y w 1986. the State Council promulgated four important regulations with respect to hiring
and dismissal of workers in the state-owned enterprises. The four regulations are the following: 1.
Guoyinq Qiye ShrXing Laodong Hetongzhi k i n g Guiding [Provisional Regulations on the

procedures of consultation, mediation, arbitration and lawsuit to resolve a labour
dispute. Since the regulation specifies the procedure of mediation and arbitration, it is
more practicable than its predecessor, the 1950 regulation.
The 1987 regulation is suitable for the resolution of labour disputes in state-

The regulation provides a resolution process generally consisting
owned enterpri~es?~
of t h e steps: mediation, arbitration and lawsuit. This regulation reaffirms the trade
union's role in the resolution of labour disputes.

In accordance with the regulations, each enterprise should establish a
mediation committee to conduct mediation? The mediation cornmittee would
consist of representatives from the workforce, the enterprise, and the trade union.M5

The chairperson of the mediation committee should be elected by the committee
membersW6

-

-

--

- --

Implementation of the Contract Ernployment System in State-Owned Enterprises], July 12, 1986
(amended 1992); 2. Guoying Qiye Uuroyong Gongren Zanxing Guiding [Provisional Regularions on
the Hiring of workers in State-Owned Enterprises], July 12, 1986; 3. Guoying Qiye Citui Weiji
Zhigong k i n g Guiding [Provisional Regulations on the Dismissal of S t a a n d Workers in StateOwned Enterprises for Discipline Violations].July 12, 1986; 4 . Guoying Qiye Zhigong Daiye Baoxian
Zanxing Guiding [ P r o v k i o ~Reg
l ulations on Waiting-for-Employment [Unemployment] Insurance
for S t M d Workers in State-Owned EnrerprrSes] July, 1 2, 1986. See H.K. Josephs, "Labour Refonn
in the Workers' State: The Chinese Experience" (1988) 2 Journal of Chinese Law 202 for English
translations, introductions and discussions of al1 these regulations, supra note 289.
343 The regulations provide difiennt ways conceming different kinds of labour disputes. When a
dispute arises out of the performance of a labour contract, the parties may request mediation from the
enterprise's labour dispute mediation committee or directly apply for arbitration from the tocal labourdispute arbitration committee. However, if the dispute ariscrs out of expulsion, removal of naine, or
dismissal for violation of discipline, the parties should directly request arbitration,
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IIIthe context of the arbitration cornmittees, the regdation states that each
county, municipality. or district under municipal administration shouid establish an
arbitration cornmittee."' The arbitration cornmittee wiii be composed of
representatives from the labour administration department, the trade union, and the
organ with administrative responsibility for the enterprise involved in the dispute,"
and it will be chaired by highest ranking administrator in the labour administration
depar~nent.~~
Therefore, the Chinese unions are granted the right to participate in the

resolution of labour disputes. a right that the Canadian unions have under Canada
labour law. The Chinese unions, however, cannot function properly in its
representation of workers due to its subordination to the command of the Party.
The 1987 regulàtion has one article in regard to collective disputes. Article 4

states:
Where there are ten or more workers who have a common grievance, the case
shall be handled as a class action.
The class should appoint one to three representatives to participate in the
mediation or arbitration proceedings.
The regulation does not provide any detailed procedures on the resoiution of

collective disputes. However, Article 1 says that the regulation is enacted in order to
safeguard the normal production process and public order. Since the regulation is
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suitable for the resolution of labour disputes in state-owned enterprises, this provision

reaffm the Chinese attitude toward strikes on its assumption of the sarne interest.

b. Resolution of Collective Disputes in Today's China

The Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Labour-Dispute
Handlnig in Enterprises was published in 1993. The basis provisions of this

regulation are the same as those of the 1987 regulation. The 1993 regulation,
however, covea al1 kinds of labour disputes taking place in aii kinds of enterprises.'"

The following discussion of the resolution of collective disputes in China wiil
highlight the provisions conceming the resolution of a labour dispute arising from a
collective contract in the 1993 regulation.

'"

The notable differences between the 1993 and 1987 regdations are the followings: fin^ the 1993
regulation extended its coverage. The 1987 regulation only covered contract disputes or cases
involving the termination of workers in state-owned enterprises. The 1993 regulation covers labour
disputes taking place in al1 kinds of enterprises. The labour disputes may arise in respect of wages,
fringe benefits, and occupational safety and health as well as the disputes arising from a labour
contract. The extension of the 1993 regulation to ail kinds of enterprises in China reflects the
government's policy of having the same procedure applied to resolve labour disputes in both domestic
and foreign-investment enterprises. Moreover, the extension of the 1993 regulation to al1 kind of labour
disputes emphasizes the policy of resolution of labour disputes through administrative channels.
Second, the 1993 regulation deletes mediation a necessary procedure before arbitration. Art. 6 of the
reguiation allows the parties invotved in a labourdispute to seek mediation or directiy seek arbitration.
This provision gram more freedom to the parties involved in a labour dispute in choosing the
resolution process by themselves. It reflects the government's attitude toward the "long-tenn mediation
without decision (Jiu Tiao Bu Jue)", which is regarded as h d l to the stability of labour relationship.

(1) Prohibition of Strikes in the Resolution of Collective Disputes

The provisions in regard to dealing with a coilective dispute are mainly in
Lobour Low of the People's Republic of China, Regulations conceming Collective
Agreements, Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Lnbour-Dispute
Handling in Enterprises, and Rules concerning Ways the Labour Arbitration
Cornmittee Denling with Labour Disputes. According to ail these regulations, the

most important principle that shodd be followed in dealing with a collective dispute

is that neither of the parties is ailowed to take "extremist activities to intensify the
conflict".
Article 6 of Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Lubour-Dispute
Handling in Enterprises reads as follows:

Where a labour dispute takes place, ihe parties involved should seek a
settiement through consultation; if either party does not want consultation or
the consultation fa&, the parties involved may apply to the labour dispute
mediation cornmittee of their unit for mediation; if the mediation fails, either
party may apply to the labour dispute arbitration committee for arbitration.
Either party may also directly apply to the labour dispute arbitration
committee for arbitration. If one of the parties is not satisfied with the
adjudication of arbitration, the party may bring the case to a people's court.
In the course of dealing with a labour dispute, neither of the parties is allowed
to take any activity that may intensifj the conflict.
Article 40 of Rules conceming Ways the Labour Arbitration Committee
Deuling with Labour DisputePt says:

"'

Luodong Zhengyi Uiongcni Weiyuanhui B a ~ Gu*e
n
[Rules concerning Wnys the L d o u r
Arbitration Committee Dealing with Lubour Disputes] October 18, 1993, in the ACFTU Study
Materials of Labour Law (Beijing: The Chinese Workers* Publishing House, 1995) 52, in Chinese,
supra note 3 12.

Mer the notice of receiving a collective dispute is served or is publicly
announced, the parties involved should not conduct any activity that may
intensify the conflicts.
As discussed in the above section, in China, there are no such words as strikes

or lockouts in the statutes and regulations. However, a strike by the workers is

regarded as an activity that wili intensify the conflict. It is prohibited in the process of

a collective dispute. It is easy to understand this prohibition because the right to strike
is prohibited under the 1982 Constitution, the fundamentai law of the People'

Republic of China3=

'''

A relevant principle is set out in article 44 of the Regdarions of the People's Republic of Chim on
Labour-Dispute Handling in Enterprises, which reads as foilows: 'The labour dispute arbitration
comrnittee should make a report to the local government immediately after the settlement of a
collective dispute." This article empowers the local government to participate in dealing with a
collective dispute. It indicates the government's posture toward a collective dispute, which is. in order
to prevent strike action, the government is aiIowed to involve itself in the resolution of coIIective
disputes.
In practical terms, the way to deal with a collective dispute is as follows. On the one hand. where a
dispute arises. the local labour dispute arbitration comrnittee will organize related organizations to
conduct mediation. The related organizations include the higher trade unions of the union involved in
the dispute and the government department that is in charge of the enterprise involved in the dispute.
Usually, the mediation cornmittee wiIl cal1 the trade union and the enterprise involved in the dispute to
consult. Both ttie labour dispute arbitration and the upper trade unions wiI1 make suggestions to the
trade union and the enterprise. The local labour arbitration cornmittee will rnake reports to the local
government and follow its direction in al1 these process. On the other hand, the trade union involved in
the dispute should make a report to its upper trade unions in the course of the resolution. Because the
Chinese unions are organized in a national vertical structure and al1 the locd trade unions are under the
leadership of ACFIU, the higher trade unions of the trade union involved in a collective dispute have
the power to take part in the dispute. The higher trade unions will get praise from ACFZZT by this
participation if it works in soiving the dispute.

(2) Resolution of a Dispute Arising h m the Conclusion of a Collective Agreement

The dispute arising fiom the conclusion of a collective agreement is a dispute
of the two parties in regard to whether they want to reach a collective agreement, what
they want to set in a collective agreement or other things related to the collective
consultation. The way used to deal with a dispute arising fiom the conclusion of a
collective agreement in China is to handle the case "in CO-ordination".
Article 84 of Labour LQWof the People 's Republic of China provides:
Where a dispute aises fkom the conclusion of a collective contract and no
settlement cm be reached through consultation by the partied concemed, the
labour administrative department of the local people's govemment may
organize the relevant deparbnents to handle the case in CO-ordination.
Article 32 of Regdations conceming Collective Agreements reads:
Where a dispute arising from the conclusion of a collective agreement and no
settlement can be reached through consultation by the parties concerned, either
of the parties rnay apply in writing to the labour dispute coordination organ
under the labour administrative department for CO-ordination;the labour
administrative department may conduct a CO-ordinationif it regards necessary
even if the parties involved do not apply for mediation.

According to these provisions, the parties involved in a dispute concenùng the
conclusion of a collective agreement should fmt try to settle the dispute by
consultation.3s3If they cannot reach a setdement, they may apply for the CO-ordination
taken by the labour dispute CO-ordinationorgan under the labour administrative
department, the daily body in charge of dealing with a dispute arising from a

Art. 32 of the Reguùztionr concerning Collective Agreements.

collective agreement? However, it is not a kind of absolute freedorn since the labour
administrative department can deai with the dispute if it regards neces~ary.'~~
Under the law, the labour administrative department should deal with a
dispute arïsing from the conclusion of a collective agreement it in a prompt way. The
case should be solved within 30 days from the date the labour administrative

departrnents made the decision to accept it? Extension of the tirne limit due to the
complexity of the case or other objective reasons needed to extend shall not exceed 15
When the dispute arising from the conclusion of a collective agreement is

days."

solved. the labour administrative department should make a niling of the coordination. Both of the parties involved should carry out the r ~ l i n g . ~ ~ ~
The role of the Chinese arbitration in the settlement of a collective dispute
arising from the conclusion of a collective agreement is similar to that of the
Canadian interest arbitration. hterest arbitration in Canada is deigned to replace
strikes as the mechanism for resolving bargaining disputes. It is used as substitute
when the right to strike is removed by statute.lS9In interest arbitration, the board is
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Other kinds of labour disputes should be resolved within 60 days starting from the date of receiving the
application for arbitration. See art. 82 of the Labour Law.
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359 See A. Ponaak & L. Falkenberg. "'Resolution of Interest Disputes" in a Sethi, ed.. Collective
Burgaining in Canada (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson, 1989) 260.
In this article, the authors argued that the compulsory interest arbitration has reduced the likelihood of
negotiated settlements through the give-and-take of the bargaining process in ail democratic countries.

free to fashion its own solution by setting out in its award a new collective agreement
it feels is most appropriate under the circumstances.
The Chinese arbitration in respect to the disputes arising from conclusion of
collective agreements can be defmed as interest arbitration. Like the interest
arbitration. it is used to arrive at the terms of a collective agreement in situations
where the parties are forbidden fkom resorting to strikes or lockouts to realize their
collective bargaining goals. However, interest arbitration is most iikely to be
obligatory for Canadian public employees, such as fue fighters, polices and civil
servants; whiie in China, strikes are prohibited in both public and private sectors.
The notable difference between the Chinese and Canadian arbitration
originates from the different wumption of these two kinds of legai systerns. As
discussed in chapter 1. the recognition of a confiict of interest between the capitalists
and the labourers is the basis for Canada labour law to provide the right to strike to

the employees. As opposed to the strike-based system to resolve a labour dispute, the
interest arbitration prohibits strikes in the public sector. However, the premise of this
prohibition is that the Canadian legislation leaves the suike as a viable option in the
collective bargaining system. The purpose of the legislation is to balance society's
interest in safety and the workes' interest in coiiective bargaining.360A
fundamentaliy different doctrine of the hannony interest among the state, the
enterprises and the workers is the basis for the Chinese legal ban on strikes. The

xio Professor Paul Weiler provides an excellent illustration of how the contlicting intercan be
balanceci in essential industrial disputes. See f.C. Weiler Reconcilable Diferences (Toronto: Carswell,
1980) at 209-2 14,235-237-

Chinese legislation prohibits a i l strikes, no matter it occurs in the public sector or the
private one.

(3) Resolution of a Dispute Arising from the Implementation of a Collective
Agreement

The dispute arising from the implementation of a collective agreement is a dispute
of the two parties of the collective agreement in regard to the implementation,
modification or termination of a collective agreement. The usual cases in regard to the
disputes arising from the implementation of a collective agreement are the disputes
arising from the allegations that the parties do not carry out the collective agreement,
do not wholly carry out the collective agreement or do not cany out the collective
agreement in a proper way.
Article 84 of Labour Law of the People 's Republic of China provides:
Where a dispute arises from the implementation of a collective contract and no
settlement can be reached through consultation by the parties concemed, the
dispute may be submitted to the labour dispute arbitration committee for
arbitration. Any party that is not satisfied with the adjudication of arbitration
may bring a lawsuit to a people's court within 15 days from the date of
receiving the adjudication.

Rules concerning Ways the Labour Arbitration Commiîîee Dealing with
Lobour Disputes sets out a special procedure to deal with a dispute arising from the

implementation of a collective agreement. According to chapter W of the rule, the
labour arbitration committee should rnake up a special arbitration court, with an odd

number which is bigger than three, of the arbitrators to deal with such case?' The
special arbitration court should foUow the principle of "nearness". which means to
hear the case at a place which is near to the place the dispute ha~pened.'~*
The
arbitration court should make a decision on whether they will accept or refuse the case
within three days after they have received the application. The final decision of the
case should be made within 15 days after the arbitration court is made up." Extension
of the t h e lirnit due to the complexity of case or other objective reasons needed to
extend shail not exceed 15 days with the permission of the labour arbitration
c~rnmittee.~

The Chinese arbitration in respect to a dispute arising from the
implementation of a collective agreement has the sarne fbnction of the Canada
grievance arbitration due to its base of the existing collective agreements. In Canada,
the grievance arbitration is an adjudicative method of settiing industriai disputes
arising out of the application of the collective agreements' tenns. The arbitrator's role
is to determine the Iegai nghts of the parities under the existing collective agreements,

based on the evidence and arguments presented at the hea~tng.'~

Art. 37.
According to art. 17 of the nile, the labour dispute arbitration cornmittee may assign an arbitration to
deal with a simple labour dispute.
362Art. 38.
Most of the Chinese labour arbitration cornmittees have their own courts and the majority of the cases
are heard in the courts.
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As discussed eziier, Canadian collective bargaining legislation stipulates that
strikes are prohibited during the lifetime of collective agreements. For this reason, the
legislation sets fort.the grievance arbitration process to resolve the disputes arising

during the terms of a collective agreement. Aithough the grievance arbitration in
Canada is for the purpose of prohibiting the use of strikes in the resolution of labour
disputes, it dws not have the same meaning as the Chinese legal ban of strikes in its
resolution of labour disputes arising from the implementation of collective
agreements.
The thnist of Canada labour law, as noted in chapter 1, is to confine strike to
the negotiation of a collective agreement. On the recognition of the conflict of interest
between the employees and the employers, the Canadian legislation protect the
employees' rïght to strike. Once a collective agreement is achieved, it has binding
force on both sides. Disputes conceming the interpretation, administration or
violation of a collective agreement must be submitted to grievance arbitration or some
dispute resolution mechanisms other than strikes or lookouts. This prohibition of
suikes is on the bais that strike is protected to realize the collective bargaining goals.
However, on the assumption of the harmony of interest among the state, the
enterprises and the workers, the Chinese legislation has a legal ban on al1 suikes, no
matter the purpose of a strike is for negotiation of a new collective agreement or for
resolution of a dispute during the lifetime of a collective agreement. Putting it in other

way, the Chinese workers have no right to strike at ail.

In accordance with the Constitution. the Chinese legislation on labour
relations does not grant the Chinese workers a right to strike. Chinese labour law,

upon its face, is partidy sirnilar to the Canadian one. However, since the Chinese
system of labour law relies upon the theory of the same interests. strike action is
regarded as k i n g harmful to the state. the enterprises and the workers, and thus it
should be prohibited in the resolution of both the disputes arking from the conclusion
of collective agreements and the disputes arising from the implementation of
collective agreements.
The socialist market economy established in recent years greatly challenges
the theory of the hamiony of interests. The stage has been reached where the
conflicting interests between the two parties of the labour relations carmot be ignored

any longer. Hence, it is necessary to undertake Iegal reforms on the Chinese system of
labour law.

CHAITER IV
LAW REFORM PROPOSALS
IN RELATION TO THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM

Introduction

This chapter deals with law reform proposais in relation to the Chinese legd
system in regard to the right to strike. The fmt part of the chapter discuss the
necessity of the nght to strike in today's China on the basis of conflicting interests
under the socialist market economy. As analyzed in Chapter II, the theoretical reason
of no right to strike in China, in the point of view of the Chinese government, is the
harrnony of interests among country and the two parties in labour relations. The
foiiowing investigation of labour relations under the market economy is designed to
provide the theoretical reason of the conflicting interests and the statistics of labour
disputes are designed to provide a practical reason. The second part of this chapter
respecting specific legal reform recommendations on the relevant statutes noted in
chapter II and III is based on the cornparison between the Canadian and Chinese
legislation.

A. The Necessity of a Right to Strike in Today's China
As noted in Chapter II, the basic reason of no right to strike in China in the view

of the Chinese governent is the identical interest between the two paaies in labour
relations and that of country as a whole. In accordance with the theory, the worken

are the masters of the state under socialism. The state owns the means of production,
inciuding the assets of ali state enterprises, on behalf of the working class. Thus, the
fundamental interests of the state, the enterprises and the workers are identicai. This

kind of view, whether it is correct in the year 1982 is beyond the discussion. This
section atternpts to examine the characteristics of labour relations under today's China
to reach the conclusion of conflicted interest ktween two parties in labour relations the basic assumption of a right to suike under the Canadian legislation.

1. The Theoreticai Reason
As mentioned several times, the theoretical reason that there is no nght to

strike in China from the point of view of the Chinese govemment is the harmony of
interests among the state. the enterprises and the workers. Even if it had been an
acceptable view in the year 1982, it is not suitable in today's China on the ground that
the labour relations under the market economy are different from the ones under the
planned economy.

In the year 1982, the Chinese economy was a kind of planned econorny. First,
the planned economy played the leading role in the Chinese economic system in the

year 1982. Hu Yaobmg in his "Create a New Situation in AU Fields of Socidist
Modernization*', emphasized the significance of the planned economy in the Chinese
economic system? According to the report, the socialist public econorny with state-

owned economy as its Ieading sector had long occupied the predominant position in
China. It was both necessary and possible to practise a planned economy. In other
words, the main body of production and circulation, including the key products
needed by production to increase fixed assets and expanded reproduction, rnust be put
under unified planning. The capitalist market economy should not be adopted in the
socialist China.M7
Second, dthough China had its open-door policy in 1978 and the L a w of the
People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Invesrment

was published in July 1979,1' the foreign investment enterprises were very few in the

year 1982. In December 1981, there were only 40 joint ventures in China with an
aggregated investment of L 89 million US doiiar~.~Under
this circumstance, the
public ownership labour relations were the most important labour relations.

- -
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"Hu Yaobang. "Create a New Situation in Al1 Fields of Sociaiist Modernization - Report to the 12"
National Congress of the Cornmunist Party of China", ( 1982) 37 BR 1 1. at 18-19.
Hu was the First Secretary of the CCP at that time.
367 Renmin Ribao Commentator. "Institute an Economic Planning System Better Suited to China's
Conditions*', (1982) 4 1 BR 2 1, at 2 1.

xaIn regard to Chinese opendoor policy, see "ComuniquC of the Third Plenary Session of the 1 1"
C e n d Commîttee of the Comrnunist Party of China", (1978) 52 BR 6;
In regard to the Law of the People's Repubiic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment see (1979) 29 BR 24.
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In an article "'Prospectsfor China's Capacity to Absorb Foreign Investment " by Ji Chongwei.
adviser to the Foreign Investment Bureau under the Ministry of foreign Trade and Economic Relations,
the author stated that fiom JuIy 1979 to December 1981, the Chinese governrnent had endorseci 30 joint
ventures in China with an aggregated investment of 189 million US dollars. The enterprises were
selected on the basis of how well they met the needs of China's economic readjustment and growth.

The labour relations under the planned economy did not have the same

characteristic as the ones under the market economy because the two parties in the
labour relation were the state (via the enterprises) and the labourers." Neither the
enterprises nor the labourers had an independent status. Under the planned economy,
the planning bureaucracy played a major role in allocating outputs to production,
and making output. The enterpnses had very little
setting prices for f ~ s h e goods,
d

authority over their economic management, and al1 their profits had to be handed in to

the state. Under this excessive and rigid control of government planners, wages,
h g e benefits and working conditions were largely determined by the state. There

was no place for the free collective bargainhg between workers and management.
Unlike in Canada, there was no need for a Eramework of statutes dealing with
workers' representation and the use of economic weapons by workers and
management under the planned economy in China.
In the context of labour relations. the enterprises had no rights in labour

allocation. Labour in urban areas was alIocated by administrative government. Under
this system, which began in the late 1950s, all urban workers in China were employed

either by state-owned or collective enterprises through administrative a~signment.~'
They included 15 Iight industriai and textile projects, 3 foodstuffs and beverages enterprises, 9 factories
producing machinery and electrical appliances for civil use, 8 tourist, publishing and other service
projects, 3 farming and animal husbandry projects, one pharmaceutical plant and one r e n d service. Of
the 40 joint ventures, 35 were projects with investments of Iess than 10 million US dollars, 27 had
opened for business. See ( 1982) 17 BR 19, at 19.
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Some Chinese scholars cailed the labour relations under the planned economy labour administrative
relations. See Zhongtan et ai., A General Outline and Overview of Trade Union Theories In Time of
Transition Towardr a Socialist Market Economy (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1997) at 9 1, in
Chinese. Supra note 193.

The administrative assignment was undertaken by the government's labour and education bureaus.
The Chinese government uses an urban household registration system to control migration fiom the

ni

Neither the enterprises nor the job seekers had much forma1 control over this process.
, ~ system came
Since such assignment offered a lifetime job to the urban c i t i ~ e n sthe
to be known as the "iron rice bowi" - a guarantee that once a worker was hired. she
could never be f m d and could only be promoted, not demoted?
The labour relations under the pianned economy were cdled ''co-operation
between comrades" by the govement. This doctrine of labour relations put emphasis
on the Merence of social division of Labour between the enterprises and the
labourers, assuming that the state represented the interests of the whole society, while
the enterprises represented the interests of the labourers working there. Since the
interests of the labourers were involved in the interests of the state and the enterprises,
they would be protected in the process of working in the interests of the state and the
enterprises. It was unnecessary to provide a specific protection of the interests of the
labourers. Because this doctrine of labour relations excluded the possibility of
conflicted interests in labour relations, it obviated the need for special legal
procedures for their resolution, especiaily the right to strike.
countryside. Under the urban household registration system, a person could not move into a city legally
and obtain urban househotd registration unless she dready had a job in that city. Conversely the labour
and education bureaus would not assign an individual a job unless she had urban household
registration. For more discussions of Chinese system of jo b assignment before the labour contract
system, see H. K,Josephs "Labour Refonn in the Workers' State: The Chinese Experience" (1988) 2
Joumai of Chinese Law 202, at 2 1 1-212, supra note 289.
372 This system not only guaranteed a lifetime job to the urban citizens. but also to their children. a socailed substitution system. Under the substitution system, a retiree from a permanent job in a public
ownership enterprise could designate one of her children to succeed her as a permanent employee in the
same enterprise, aithough not necessarily the same positicn as that held by the parent- Ibid. at 2 13.

These workers in China were callcd permanent workers. They enjoyed irnmunity from dismissal.
except in case of egregious misconduct such as chronic absenteeism, criminal behaviour, or political
offences. Even if their enterprise partially or totally ceased operation, permanent workers were usually
asswed of full wages or relocation by the state to other permanent jobs. Permanent workers also could
expect an increase in income over their working Iives and a pension retirement. bid. at 210-21 1.

The term of the socialist market economy first appea~din Jiang Zemin's

report "Acceleration Reform and Opening-Up" at the 14th national Congress of the
Party.n4 In this report, Jiang stated explicitly that "the object of the reform of the

economic structure will be to establish a socialist market economy that will fùrther

liberate and expand the productive forces".nsThen, the First Sessions of the Eighth
National People's Congress, held on March 15-31, 1993, adopted constitutional
amendments." For the firs time in the history of the People' Republic of China, a
socialist market economy was written into the Constitution, and the planned economy
lost its dominance in China after four decades."

The labour relations under the market economy in today's China are different
from those under the planned economy. F i t of dl, there are private enterprises,
foreigncapital enterprises as well as the state and collective ownership. The interests
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Jiang Zemin, bbAccelerationReform and Opening-Up". ( 1992) 43 BR 9. A report delivered on
October 12, 1992 by Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the Central Cornmittee of the Chinese
Comrnunist Party, at the 14th National Congress of the Party. The report is entitled "Accelerating the
Reform, the Opening to the Outside World and the Drive for Moderation, so as the Achieve Greater
Success in Building Socialism Wiîh Chinese Characteristics".
Socialist market economy, according to the opinion of a Chinese economist Liu Guoguang, is a market
economy under the socialist system with market economy traits and basic socialist characteristics. Liu
stated that a socialist market economy, sharing general characteristics with a capitalist market economy,
has other distinct economic features that distinguish it fiom the capitalist market economy. 1. From the
political system point of view, the most important is the leadership of the Communist Party and the
people's govemment- 2. With regard to the basic economic system, socialist ownership is associated
wifh the public domain including state and collective ownership as the main entities, and individual,
private and foreign-fundeci economies as supplements. 3. The socialist allocation system mainIy follows
the principle of to each according to his work, and allocation of other production elements as an
attachrnent, giving consideration to both efficiency and social faimess. For more discussion of the
characteristics of Chinese socialist market economy, sec "Economist on China's Market Economy".
(1992) 46 BR 28-

nsIbid. at 18.

'"Supra note 3 at 14.
3nIbid.

between the employers and employees in the private and foreign-capital enterpnses
are conflicted interests due to the private ownenhip of production. The conflicted
interests under the socialist China in these enterprises are the same as the ones in

Canada. As discussed in chapter 1, the employees in the labow relations have different
interests than the one that the employer has. From the employees' side. their desire is
to increase wages, fnnge benefits and control their day-to-day working methods. The
employer, as the purchaser of labour. wants to gain more profits and determine what
is done by employees at work. Thus, the private owneahip of production embodies a
structurai antagonism of interests between ernployees and employer. China is no
exception.
Second the labour relations in today's public ownership enterprises are
different from the ones under the planned economy. Since the role of central planning
has decreased under the market economy, the enterprises have greater independence

and control over their own business. The individual factones are empowered to make
decisions on production and sales in response to the market forces of supply and
dernand, rather than in response to directives from the governrnent planning
bureaucracy. Instead of handing over al1 of their profits to the state, as was done under
the planned economy, the factories are required to pay an income tax, a business tax,

and a fixed assets tax to the state. More irnportantly, they are allowed to retain any
profits above these taxes for expanding production, improving worker welfare, and
paying higher wages and bonuses? Under these circumstances, the public-ownership

Supra note 128 at 1 168.

enterprises share the same interest of pursuing more profits, as the private enterprises
do.

In the area of labour relations, the labour contract system has replaced the
labour allocation by governrnent. The labour contract system, beginning in 1986,

auhorizes employers to hire regular employees under fixed-term contracts. In tum,
the workers are allowed to select their own employment initially or to change
employer once a contract expired. The parties to the contract each enjoy greater
freedom to terminate the employrnent relationship than the previous administrative
assignment.

The labour contract system is designed to reduce the problems generated by
the practices of labour allocation.37gThe most telling evidence of the success of this
system is China's rapid rate of economic growth in recent years.'" However, this
system bas brought great challenges to the Chinese workers. In today's socidist
China, just as in a capitalist one, a worker needs to exchange her labour power for
The most
appropriate compensation on the basis of the employment ~ontract.'~'
concem of the Chinese workers today is job secunty. Since there is a fixed term in a
labour contract, it means a worker may lose her job once the labour contract is
379 For discussion of the problems generated by labour allocation. see H. K. Josephs "Labour Reform in
the Workers' State: The Chinese Experience*' (1988) 2 Journal of Chinese Law 202 at 213-215, supra
note 289.

"

H. K. Josephs '2abour Law in 'Socialin Market Economy': The Case of China*'(1996) 6 Columbia
Journal of Transitional Law 560 at 560, supra note 34 1.
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Generally speaking, the labour contract system plays a positive rote in protecting individual
economic and property rights. However, this system is perilously close to the system of capitatist
exploitation condemned by Karl Marx.The Chinese potitical econornists took pains to distinguish
freedom of contract under capitalism from today's labour contract under socialist China. See H. K.
Josephs "Labour Reform in the Workers' State: The Chinese Experience" (1988) 2 Journal of Chinese
Law 202 at 226-229. supra note 289.

expired. Having felt cornfortable under the "iron rice bowl" system for almost 40
years:*

the uidividuai workers need some promise h m the enterprises of job

security, which is difficult to get. In addition, conflict arising out of the employment
relationship also includes the issues of wages, fringe benefits and working conditions.
On the workers' side, they require higher wages, more benefits and better workuig
conditions. On the side of management, they p m u e more profits. Therefore, under
the labour contact system the workers have differing rights and interests vis-à-vis
management in the public ownership enterprises.

In sum. under the market economy, the interests of the two parties in labour
relations, in every kind of enterprises, are conflicted interests. It is necessary to set up
special legal procedures for the resolution of the conflicts in labour relations,
especiaily the right to strike, as in the Canadian legislation.

2. The Practical Reason

The different character of labour relations under the market economy is the
theoretical reason for the necessity of a Bght to strüce. The following investigation on
labour conflicts and working conditions under todayTsChina is sufficient enough to
iflustrate the confiicted interests in practical terms.
According to the official statistics based on National Mediation Centre and
Labour Bureau records, labour disputes increased by approximately 65 percent in the

3nSupra note

128 at 1203.

year 1994, and 73 percent during 1995? Most of the labour disputes arose from the
employer's misconduct. Of the 12,358 cases brought for arbitration in the year 1993,
approxirnately 40 percent of the cases closed were resolved in favour of the worker(s),
and 20 percent in favour of management. The rest resulted in a compromise. '"In the

year 1994, there were 135,205cases brought before arbitration committees. 8,585
cases were closed in favour of the worker(s), which constituted 47.8 percent of a i l the
cases closed, and 3,592 in favour of the ernployen, which constituted 20 percent. The

In some cases, the misconduct of the employers was
rest resulted in a co~npromise.~~
so serious that the disputes have resulted in strikes."

The labour disputes concerning working conditions, especially those which
occurred in the foreign-funded enterprises, need to be highlighted. In the year 1994,
258 disputes of this kind occuned in public-owned enterprises and 84 in foreignfunded ones. The average number of workers involved in each of the 258 disputes in
public-owned enterprises was 28.6 while those in each of the 84 disputed in foreign
ones was 5 1.3.'" Aithough the absolute number of the labour disputes in foreign-

'* U.S.Dept. of State, "ChinaCountry Report on Human Right Practices for 1996'. at 33. Supra note
159.

Human Rights Report for 1994. at 105. Supra note 159.

The ACFI'U, Lectures on the Threc Ways respecting the Implernentation of the Lobour Lmv
(Beijing: Chinese Workers' Publishing House, 1996) at 49, in Chinese.
In the year 1995, the A C i T U published three ways respecting the implementation of the Labour Law of
the People's Republic of China These three ways are 1 . Provisional Ways concerning Trade Unions'
Participation in Equal Consultation and Conclusion of collective Agreements; 2. Provisional Ways
conceming Trade Unions' Resolution of Labour Disputes; 3. Provisional Ways concerning Trade
Unions' Supervision of the Implementation of the Laws on Labour.
'135

Infra note 4 1 1.

' ~ 5
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Jiang Wandi, "A New Problem - Labour Relations in Foreign Enterprises", (1995) 20 BR 17 at 1718.

fundpid enterprises is smaller than that in public-owned enterprises, the dispute

proportion in the former enterprises is much higher than in the latter ones because the
public-owned enterprises is stüi the majority of enterprises in China3=
As foreign investment has increased dramatically in China in recent year~,"~

notorious iliegal actions by foreign enterprise managers have k e n brought to light,

These events
especially the poor working conditions they provide for the ~orkers.~"
include extending working hours without additional pay and hazardous Living and
working conditions. There are three unbelievable cases. In November 1993.84 fernale
workers were killed in a fire in a Shenzhen toy factory run by a Hong Kong
businessman. They were burnt to death because al1 the exits were locked for fear that
workers might steal the toys. One month later, 62 workers were kiiled in a Taiwaneseinvested factory in Fujian Province for the same reason. In early May 1994, 11 people
were killed and two dozen injured when a five-storey factory dormitory building
collapsed in Shenzhen. The factory's Hong Kong manger housed more than 100

The completed investment in fixed assets of the country in 1995 was 1,944.5 billion yuan. Of this
total, the investment of state-owned units was 1,082.2 billion yuan, the investment of collective units
was 297.8 billion yuan, and urban and rural residents' investment was 238.1 billion yuan, the
investment of other types of ownership was 326.4 billion yuan. See "Statistical Communiqué of the
State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China on the 1995 National Economic and Social
Development (March 1, 1996)" (1996) 14 BR 22 at 24.
389 In

1995, foreign capital actuaily utilized amounted to USS48.4 billion, up 1 1 percent over the year
1994. By the end of 1995. there had been 234,000 oveneas-funded enterprises in China, or 28,000
enterprises more than that at the end of 1994. Ibid. at 26.

"

The labour disputes involving Chinese worken and foreign bosses have increased in ment years.
According to data provided by the A W , the number of labour disputes which occurred in foreignfunded enterprises in the year 1994 was 3.57 times that in the year 1993. Among ail the collective
labour disputes occumng in the year 1994.45 percent of them occurred in foreign-funded enterprises.
In some cases, the tension between bosses and Chinese workers intensified and the angry workers
would not only go on strike but also cause physical injury and even destruction of equipment, See
supra note 385 at 48; Supra note 387 at 17-18.

B. Law Reform Proposais

The analyzed conf'icted interests between the workers and management,

which are the assumptions of the fkamework of a right to strike under the Canadian
legislation, are the bais to rely upon for the following Law reform proposais on the
specific statutes discussed in chapter II and III respecting a right to strike in China
The purpose of this section is to make some practicai recomrnendations within the
Chinese legai system. Each subsequent recommendation is on the basis of the former
recommendations.

1. Under the Constitution

The Canadian constitution does not include an explicit provision in regard to a
nght to strike, comparable to what had appeared in the 1975 and 1978 Chinese
constitutions. But it guarantees the freedom of association under the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. As discussed in chapter 1, in the Alberta Reference, Dickson C.I.C.

argued that the nght to strike is protected under the freedom of association. The Chief
Justice's judgement, although it was dissenting, is more impressive than the
judgement of LeDain and McIntyre a.,
and thereby it is the most important inference
respecting a right to strike under the Chinese constitution.
The legal reform suggestion in regard to the nght to strike under the Chinese
constitution is that it is not necessq to set forth a clear provision of a right to strike
under the fundamental rights and duties of citizens in the Constiturion. However, the

right to strike should be implied in the protection of &dom of association, which is

protected under the 1982 Constitution.

The reason for the omission of the right to strike under the Chinese
constitution is to take account of the Chinese conditions. Jiang Zemin in his report at
the 14th National Congress of the Party. emphasized the Party's motivation of

economic growth and required ail the Party mernbers to redouble their efforts to

One of the major tasks that the Party mernben
promote economic devel~prnent.'~~
were asked to MNwas to put forward reform of the political structure and bring
. ~ ~ stressed
about great advances in socidist democracy and in the legd ~ y s t e r nJiang
the need to maintain social stability to Chinese economic development and declared

that the Party must adopt effective measures to put an end to the disorder?

To a certain extent. striking represents a potential threat to social order. As
mentioned in chapter II,the practical reason of no nght to strike under the 1982
Constitution is that the government regarded the right to strike as an eminentiy
political act which will put its sovereignty in danger. It is the last thing that the Party
wants to bear since the Party's authority rests primarily on its ability to maintain

stability, as well as the success of economic reform. Not to include a right to stdce in
the Constitution is not only in accordance with the Party's motivation of economic
growth, but also with the Party's emphasis on utilizing means other than sviking to

resolve labour disputes. It is more practical to omit a clear provision of a right to
392

Supra note 374 at 22-23.
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Tbid. at 23.
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Ibid.

strike in the Constitution and detail it in the relevant statutes than to add it in the
Constitutionwhich will make the Party become sensitive to this issue and have no

possibility to protect a right to svike in China.
However, the rïght to strike is so important a hindamental human right that it
shodd be irnplied under the freedom of association under the Chinese constitution.
As discussed in chapter II, article 35 of the 1982 Constitution provides protection of

fkeedom of association to Chinese citizens. The right to participate in and organize
trade unions is specifically protected under the Lubour Law of the People f Republic
of China and Trade Union Low. Thus, in the context of the right to strike, the

circumstance in China today is similar to the one which the Supreme Court of Canada
had faced in the collective bargainhg trilogy, which is whether the constitutionai
protection of freedom of association includes the protection of "freedom to engage in
conduct which is reasonably consonant with the lawful objects of an association".3q5
As discussed in chapter 1, in the judgment of Dickson C.J.C., the Chief Justice
held that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association, in the specific context
of labour relationships, should protect the freedom of the individuals to engage in
activities for which the organization was established. It is not unreasonable to take
account of the Chief Justice's interpretation of freedom of association under the
Chinese constitution. More specificalIy, freedom of association, in the area of the
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Supra note 6 at 12.169.

labour relations, should include the workers*h e d o m to organize, to bargain and to
~tri.ke.3~
As Dickson C.J.C. argued in his dissent, the right to strike is intemationaily

recognized as a fundamental freedom under the U. N. International Covenant on
Economic. Social nnd Cultural Right?* a d U. N. International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights?" Since Canada has acceded to both Covenants, the Canadian
legislation is not allowed to abrogate the right or make it meaningless. In the Chinese
context, the nght to strike should be protected in its dornestic legislation because
China ratified ihe U. N.International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights in October 1997 and the right to strike is expressly protected under this

document, although China is allowed to regulate the right to strike under its statutes.
Furthemore, it is necessary that the right to strike should be included in
freedom of association, a freedom which is constitutionally protected. As discussed
above, the significance of the Chief Justice's judgment is his recognition of the value
of striking in potentially promoting greater justice for working people. As analyzed
already, the labour contract system, starting in 1986, brought an end to the life-long
employment through adminisirative assignment in China. Since then, the worken in
China have to face the challenge to hire out their labour on a labour contract basis. In
general, the Chinese labour force, both in urban and rural areas, is charactensed by an
oversupply of manpower. In the year 1996, there were more than LOO million surplus
'%

Ibid.

"1966. G.A. Res. 2200 0.
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ibid.

rurai labourers in China," as weli as sorne 5.2 d i i o n unemployed h a n residents?
Under this circumstance. the Chinese working people, who are in name the masters of
the state, are actually "liable to be prejudiced by the actions of some larger and more
powefil entity, like the govemment or an employer''?

The Constitution should

function to enable the workers "Who would othemise be vulnerable and ineffective
meet on more equal tenns the power and strength of those with whom their interests
interact and, perhaps, ~onflict''.~
The right to strike, if it is implied in the freedom of
association, is the just means through which the workers can seek to attain their
purposes and Wfi1 their aspirations.
The Chinese constitution. as indicated in chapter II. is not only binding on the
govemment. but also on the people. The 1982 Constitution imposes on Chinese
citizens a duty to observe labour discipline and public order. Since strikes are
prohibited under Chinese labour law, a strike is considered in violation of both labour
discipline and public order. However, the legal reform suggestion respecting the
Chinese constitution is that the right to strike should be included in the protection of
freedom of association. It is, therefore, necessary to re-evaluate the meaning of labour
discipline and public order.
As suggested above, the protection of a right to strike is implied under the

protection of h e d o m of association; there is no explicit provision in regard to a right

'" Supra note 388 at 29.
Ua

Qian Ning. "ArdwusTasks Ahead for Ninth Five-Year Plan Period " (1996) 2 BR 18. at 29.
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Supra note 6 at 12,179.
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to strike in the Constitution. This is an important change in the interpretation of the

has supreme legd authority, it is
Chinese constitution. Because the C o ~ i t u t i o n
difficult to conduct relevant refonn respecting a right to strike under Chinese labour
law if there is no change in the interpretation of the meaning of labour discipline and
public order under the Constitution. Furthemore, since the detailed provisions in

regard to the requirements and procedures of a strike will be set out under Chinese
labour Iaw, which will be discussed later, a lawful timely strike should not be
regarded as in violation of labour discipline or public order.

2. Under the Labour Code

The discussions in chapter III respecting the nght to strike under the Labour Law
of the People's Republic of China are in Chapter 1General Provisions, Chapter III

Labour Contracts and Collective Contracts and Chapter X Labour Disputes of this
code. The legal reform suggestions on the L4bow LOW are in these specific chapters

on the assumption that the right to strike is constitutionaily protected under freedom
of association in the Constitution.

a Under Worken' Rights

The general provisions in chapter 1of the Labour Lmu include the provisions
of the rights to the Chinese labourers. In the trade union context, labourers are granted

the right to participate in and organize trade unions in accordance with the law. This
right can be divided into two kinds of rights. One is the right to participate in tmde
unions and the other is the right to organize trade unions. The Chinese worken are
assumed to have the nght to organize trade unions under this provision. Although it
seems clear that the right to strike should be protected within the right to participate in
trade unions, it is better to provide a specific provision on this right, as in the Canada
Labour Code.

Section 8(1) of the Canada Labour Code sets out the basic freedoms to
employees by stating that "every ernployee is fiee to join the trade union of his choice
and to participate in its lawful activities". Since the Code details the requiremeots of a
legal strike, the employees are protected to participate in a strike in accordance with
the Code. As discussed in the above suggestion, the Chinese Constitution is silent on
the issue of the right to strike. Thus, it is necessary to make it clear that the laboures
have the nght to engage in the lawful activities of the trade unions under the Labour
Law, especially the right to participate in a legal strike.

b. Under Collective Contracts

The collective bargaining in today's China is established after the
promulgation of the Labour Law. The Labour Law,which took effect on January 1,
1995, permit5 workers in a l l types of enterprises to sign colIective contracts with the
enterprises. It is the fmt tirne that collective bargaining becomes a formal system in
China's industrial work force. Aithough collective bargaining is k i n g implernented

fmt in non-public-owneahip enterprises where capital interests are clearly delineated,

approximately 44 percent of enterprises were oficiaiIy on collective contracts as of

ne establishment of a collective bargaining system in China is "from top to
are several problems coming out in this process. On the side of the
b o t t ~ m " There
.~

management, the majority of those who have aot concluded a collective contract are
the enterprises that run into dimculties in production. Since in these enterprises,
overtime work is usual and it is difficult for the management to pay the overtime
wages, the management are afraid that the conclusioo of collective contracts will put
them into trouble. In regard to the enterprises that have concluded a collective
contract, few of h e m treat it seriously and most of the collective contracts are general
provisions adopted fiom the statutes. In some cases, the management put their
regulations into the collective contracts to restrict workers? It is clear that al1 these
conducts of the management arke from the guarantee of their interests. without taking
account of the interests of the workers.
On the side of the workers, the problem is that most of them do not realize the

function of collective contracts. They regard collective contracts as being useless on
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Hurnan rights report 1996, at 34. Supra note 159.

JM

The labour administrative department has played a signifrcant role in establishing and popularizing
the system of collective contracts. (1) The Ministry of Labour conducted the system of collective
contract after the Labour Law was promulgated at the following selected places: Guangdong Province,
Beijing, Fujian Province, Shenzhen. Xiamen, Qingdao, Chengdu and Dalian. (2) The labour
administrative department, together with the ACFi'ü, pubIished several policies concerning the
establishment of collective contacts systems. (3) According to the Labour Law. collective contracts
must be submitted to the local labour administrative department for approval. See Zhongtan et al., A
General Ourline and Overview of Traàe Union Theorîes In Tirne of Transirion Towarùs a Socialisr
Market Economy (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1997). at 253, in Chinese. Supra note 193.

"Bai Qingfeng & Zhang Shuhua, "Collective Bargaining: Appeal for Legislation" March 24. 1996.
Worker's Daily at 4.

the ground that the statutory legislation provides requirements on wages, labour
insurance, workuig conditions and other issues concerning labour relations; while the
labour contract details the rights and duties between the individual worker and the
management.- Actually, if a collective contract does not deal with the particular
issues in a specific enterprise or the popular issues concerning the workers in an
enterprise, it needs to give way to statutes and labour contracts. Indeed, coliective
contracts are different fkom the labour relations statutes and labour contracts. The

Lobour Low provides that legd collective contracts have binding force to both the
enterprise and the worken, and the standards on working conditions and labour
payrnents in labour contracts shaU not be lower than those as stipulated in collective

con tract^.^ Hence, collective contracts are assumed to be more detailed than labour
relations statutes and should contain generai provisions respecting terms and
conditions of empioyment, which are not included in labour contracts.
How c m coliective contracts play their full functions on the side of
employees? The following case provides a good answer. On March 8, 1995, a work
stoppage occurred at Beijing Xiehe Aoguang Shopping Center, a foreign joint
venture. Approximately one hundred workers engaged in the svike d e r the
negotiation of a collective agreement broke down. The strike was to force the boss to
make a clear answer concerning the issues of the establishment of a labour disputes
mediation cornmittee in the shopping centre, the conclusion of labour contracts with
individual worken and the guarantee of wages by the employer in the coliective
Ibid.
Art. 35 of the Labour Law.

agreement The dispute was resolved through the mediation organized by Beijing
Labour Disputes Arbitration Cornmittee with the conclusion of a collective contract."
As noted above, strikes are not permitted under the Labour Law. It is difficult

to get accurate statistics on strikes for the purpose of negotiation of collective
contracts. but it is not unreasonable to Say there are some strikes for this particula.

purpose in today's China. As discussed in the fmt section, there are conflicts of
interests under the market economy in all kinds of enterprises. Since the right to strike
is protected under freedom of association in the Constitution. as suggested above, and
the collective bargainhg system. is going to be well established and function better, it
is predicable that there wili be more and more strikes for negotiation of collective
agreements in f u t u r e . Therefore, a general provision needs to be put under the
Labour Law in the chapter of collective contracts, which stating that the Law pmtects
the workers' nght to take collective action for negotiation of a new collective

agreement. The detailed provisions in regard to strikes are to be set out in the
legislation of collective contracts.

c. Under Labour Disputes

Another chapter relevant to the right to strike under the Labour Law is
Chapter X, regarding labour disputes. As discussed already, labour disputes have

Supra note 405 at 4.
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Infra note 41 1.

increased dramaticdy under the market economy. One particular characteristic of
Chinese labour disputes is the large nurnber of collective disputes. According to

official statistics provided by the Ministry of Labour and the ACFTU, in the year
1994, the number of collective disputes brought before mediation committees was
32,645. which was a 72 percent increase over the same p e n d in 1993. Dunng the

year 1994, 1,482 collective disputes were filed to arbitration committees, which was
1.2 times of the number in 1993. The number of the workers involved in the

collective disputes increased by approxirnately 11.4 percent in 1994, which
constituted 67.7 percent of the number of dl workea involved in labour disputes?'

The general mechanism for resolution of a collective dispute has been set out
under Article 84 of the Labour Law,which is a method of consultation and coordination to senle a dispute arising from the conclusion of a collective contract. and

a method of consultation, arbitration and fawsuit to resolve a dispute aising from the
irnplementation of a coilective contract. Neither strikes nor lockouts are pennitted
under the Labour Law. However it does not mean the non-existence of strikes.
Indeed, worker strikes have occurred with such frequency and the Ministry of Labour

has stopped officially denying the existence of strikes since the year 1993:'

"O

'

Supra note 385 at 48.

"' According to China Country Report on Humun Rightc Practices, in the year 1993. two cases of
strikes were widely reported in the Chinese press. One was the strike of workers in eIeven foreigninvested enterprises in Tianjin, They initiated a work stoppage for the purpose of disregard for local
regulations by foreigners and of the need to establish unions. The other was the strike to protest poor
working conditions and alleged mistreatment of the workers by the management in a foreign-owned
footwear factory in Xian by 1,200 workers. During the year1994, there were 244 labour disputes
resulting in strikes. One of largest welI-documented cases involved a foreign-invested enterprise in
Shekou in Shenzhen speciai economic zone at which 1,300 workers stnick over working condition. In
August 1995, a strike occurred when 600 female workers at a South Koran clothing factory in Hebei
Province went on protest against excessive overtime hours. The number of work stoppages in the year
1995 was 1,870. In March 1996, six hundred workels at a joint venture hardware-manufzcturing

As discussed already, king a h i d that strikes will put its sovereignty in

danger, the Chinese govemment does not protect a right to strike to Chinese workers.
However. it is noi wise to maintain a simple legal ban on strikes despite their
existence. Strikes can be regulated and controiled under the legislation, as in Canada

In order to follow the Party's policy of social stability, it is necessary to add an article
in this chapter of the Lobour Law to provide general principle concerning strikes. The
detailed procedures in regard to strikes are to be provided in the legislation of the
resolution of labour disputes.

3. Under the Legislation of Collective Contracts

The attitude of the Canadian legislature toward a right to strike, as analyzed in
chapter 1. is to confine the use of the svike weapon to the negotiation of a new
collective contract. The limited nght to strike is set out under the Canadian system of
collective bargaining. Accordingly, the legal refom suggestions conceming the nght
to strike are mainly in the context of collective contracts legislation. The following
suggestions include the requirements of a strike, the definition of "suike", the
protection of striken and trade unions and regulation of picketing.

factory in the Shenzhen special economic zone went on strike to protest unpaid back wages and
excessive overtime. In Wuhan, six hundred o f unemployed workers participated in a sitdown protest in
front of the entrantes of the Wuhan government and Hubei provincial govemment offices. See Human
right report 1993-96, supra note 159.

In Canada, whether a purposive restriction should be put into the definition of
saike is highly controversial. The famous oneday work stoppage at the time of the

"National Day of Protest" on October 14, 1976 provided a good example to illustrate
the different opinions of courts and labour boards across Canada on this issue."'
However, the requirernents of a strike under the Chinese legislation should make a
positive answer to this question.
As noted, the main reason that the Communist Party rejected a right to strike

in China is its fear of the politicai aspect of a strüce. The Chinese government regards
every strike as a threat to its sovereignty, and thus, concludes that the right to strike
should not be protected under the Chinese legislation. However, there could be a ban
on political strikes retained while perinitting carefully regulated economic strikes.
Indeed, in Canada, there will be some strikes mainly for politicai purposes,'"

Although the Canadian
but the fact is that politicai strikes are still e~ceptional."~
legislation does not provide a purposive restriction on strikes, the thnist of Canadian
labour law is to confine the strike action to economic interests. With an explicit
restriction on political strikes, the Chinese legislation cm function well to limit
political strikes and therefore relieves the Party's major concem.

Sec chapter 1 for detailed discussion.

'"Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario Teachers' Federation. Court File NO.97-CV-L 34721.
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division).
Il4 British Columbia Hydm and Power Authoriiy,

(19761 2 Can. L.R.B.R 410. at 418.

In regard to the timelessness of a strike, there should be a legal ban of strikes
during the lifetime of a collective agreement, k e the Canadian legislation. Free
collective bargaining in Canada means both parties are entitled to agree or disagree.
Once the two parties have reached a collective agreement. it has binding force on both
sides. A dispute respecting the interpretation, administration or violation of a
collective agreement should not resort to strike actions. The work stoppage by
employees should be confined to the purpose of settlement of a collective agreement.

The collective bargaining system in China was re-established in the year 1994
afier it has disappeared for 20 years. It has not been well established in just five years.
This disadvantage of the Chinese collective bargaining system can be changed to an
advantage if China adopts a superior model at the beginning of its establishment. The
Canadian legislation on regulating strikes to negotiation of new contract remis
provides China a practicable model because it represents a hindamental cornmitment
to industriai peace and stability once a collective agreement has been concluded.
What China needs most today is a stable society for economic development. A legai
ban on suikes during iifetirne of collective agreements will help achieve this.

Respecting the Canadian restriction of no strikes before certification, it is
unnecessary to put it into the Chinese law. As mentioned above, al1 Chinese unions

are established on the approvai of the ACFI'U. No independent unions are allowed in
China. Putting it in other way, the trade union established on the approval of A C F ï U
is the only lawful union in an enterprise; it is also the only lawful centre for the

workers to contract with their enterprise. In reality, the majority of the Chinese
workers belong to the union branches in their enterprises. In accordance with the 1992

Trade Union Law, every productive and administrative units that have twenty-five or

more staff and workers is required to estabiish a primary trade union cornmittee."'
The ACFKJ primary attention focuses on the public ownership enterprises. In
collective and state-owned enterprises, ody 8 percent of workers have chosen for
their own reasons not to join the union in their enterprise~.'"~
In regard to the foreign
investment enterprises. 91 percent of them had union branches as of the end of
1995:" and 80 percent of workers in these enterprises belonged to the union

branches? Aithough it is doubdul that the ACFT'U is a union in the Canadian sense,
the ACFïU is the only lawful union in today's China which has the majority support
of the Chinese workea. Since the Chinese union is protected to safeguard the
legitimate nghts and interests of the workers and conduct lawful activities under the
Labour Law and the Trade Union Law, it can take the piace to organize a strike.

which is not prohibited in the reformed system.
However, China faces a specific problem in regard to its union. As analyzed in
chapter II,the practicai reason that there is no right to strike in China. in my point of
view, is that Chinese union is not able to organize a strike. Chinese trade unions are

"6

Human rights report 19 96 at 32. supra note 159.
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Ibid. at 33.

Supra note 193 at 199.
As discussed earlier, since the misconduct of management in foreign-funded enterprises was very

serious, the Chinese governrnent and the ACFTU have turned heir attention to the establishment of
trade unions in the foreign-funded enterprises. However, diversification in types of enterprises over the
Iast decade of reforrn had incteased the number of workers outside the sphere of the ACFIV. It is an
important subject to deal with a right to strike to unorganized workers, but not the one the thesis is
dealing with because the basis of the thesis is that the nature of strike is for the purpose of collective
bargaining and collective bargaining is betweem the union on behalf of the employees and the
employers.

not independent organizations. They are under the leadership of the Party.It is not the
thesis topic to solve the problem of the independence of Chinese unions. At present, it
is sufficient to Say that the Chinese union could function properly to organize a strike
as happened in the Solidarity movement, if the Party changes its posture toward the

independence of the trade union for its purpose of protection of the Chinese workers
(for example, if the Party accepts the distinction between an economic and political
strike). Hopefully, Chinese union and Chinese workers need not wait for an
unbearably long time.

b. Definition of "Strike"

As discussed in chapter 1, the Canadian definition of "strike" generally means the
employees' actions in combination or in concert or in accordance with a common
understanding designed to restrict or limit output. Considering the Canadian
legislation, the following items should be included in the definition of "stnke7' in

China
(1) The number of employees. Under some Canadian legislation, there is a
majority principle, which requires that the majority of the bargaining unit vote in
favour of a strike before a strike occurs. There is no conception of bargaining unit in

China The Chinese legislation grants the Chinese workers the right to organize. In
accordance with the 1992 Trade Union Lmu,the basic unit of union organization is
the primary trade union cornmittee which is established in productive and

administrative units that have twenty-five or more staff and worker~."~
In practice, a

primary trade union is established in most Chinese enterprises and the rnajority of the
Chinese worken belong to the primary union in their enter prise^.^^ Therefore. the

majority pnnciple in China means that the majority of the members in the trade union
which is involved in the labour dispute. Based on this principle which should be set
out in the procedure of a strike, the employees engaged in a strike s h ~ u l dconstitute
the majority of the members in the involved vade union?
(2) The purpose of the action. As analyzed earlier, the purpose of a svike is
very important in the system of coilective bargaining. The Canadian legislation

recognizes this importance and sets forth a requirement that a stnke must be aimed at
Limiting or restricting output. It is not enough to constitute a strike that more than one
employee stops work. The reason that the Chinese government opposes a right to
strike, as mentioned several times, is the Iack of distinction between economic strikes
and political strikes in the Party's view. In order to make the right to strike practicable
in China and to keep hannony with the above suggestions. a strike for political reason
should not be protected under the umbrella of the Chinese legislation. Striking as an
economic weapon should be restricted in the economic scope.

'19

Art. 12.
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Supra note 4 15 - 4 18 and the accompanying text.

There is a difference behveen the majority who decide to go on strike and who are actually striking.
However, they have a same b a i s which is the whole members in the involved union.

c. Protection of Strikers and Trade Unions

A general principle in the Canadian legislation respecting the employment status

of a striker is that an employee who participates in a la-

strike is protected under

the statutes. It is an unfair labour practice to rehise to employ or threaten to dismiss an
employee who is exercising the nght to participate in a la-

suike. This principle

should be included in the Chinese legislation respecting the right to strike.
As discussed above, today's labour contract system put the Chinese workers
into labour market. They have to establish labour relations on the basis of a labour
contract. Under these relations, the employee is bound to work and the employer is
bound to pay. Moreover, both of them are entitled to terminate the relationship in
accordance with the la&. Thus, the legislature should prevent the employer from
terminating the employer-employee relationship by reason only of the employee
ceasing to work as the result of a lawful strike. In accordance with it, employees who
participate in a lawful strike retain the rights to their jobs, seniority and social
security. Conversely. employees who participate in an illegal strike forfeit the nght to
their jobs. Conceming the Party's policy to a rapid economic growth, the statute
should not prohibit the ernployers' using replacement workers during a strike.

One specific problem in regard to this protection principle is the protection of
the trade union staff. The discussion of the past and present role of Chinese trade
unions in chapter II has provided an investigation of trade union staff under the new

condition of the market economy. Aithough the 1992 Trade Union Law emphasised
the unions' function of protection, most trade union staff are afraid of k i n g disrnissed

if they Say NO to the management in order to protect the interests of the workers.
However, as the representative of the workers, a trade union plays a significant role in
organizing a strike. The legislation should provide a specifc protection to the trade
union staff by guaranteeing their jobs and positions and impose a legai responsibility
on employers if they run counter to the legislation. Although it may be difficult to
convince trade union staff that they have really protected by putting such provisions in
legi~lation;'~
at least the legislation on paper gives a positive recognition of their role
in strikes and this recognition wili gradually encourage them in making the right to
strike more practicable in China.

d. Confining the Right to Strike
As indicated in chapter II,the right to strike was protected under the 1975 and
1978 constitutions. But there was no effective mechanism for ensuring its
implementation. More specifically, there is no right to strike under the 1982
Constitution. Thus, union picketing is a wholly new issue under Chinese labour law.
It is not appropriate for China to adopt the Canadian law of picketing right now, but

the basic principle in regulating picketing could be adopted in China.
Generally speaking, the Canadian law of picketing is that primary picketing is
protected in order to support a lawful strike, but secondary picketing of a third party is
prohibited. The legislation does not allow trade unions to expand rights associated
with econornic conflict beyond the parties directly involved in the conflict. This

In reaIity. there are great gaps betwecn the Chinese legislation on paper and in pracace - an
intersting subject that has been discussed in regard to the Chinese constitution in chapter II.

principle could be adopted under Chinese labour Law to regulate strikes, and the right
to strike shouid be carefully c o d î e d to only the employer dkctly affected.
The importance of this restriction, in the Chinese context, is in the political

realm as well as in the economic area As analyzed above, the biggest obstacle
respecthg the right to strike in China is the Party's attitude towards strike actions. For
the purpose of rnaking practicable legal reform suggestions in Chinese labour law, the

Paxty's attitude c a ~ obe
t ignored. The former suggestion in regard to the purposive
restriction has set out a prohibition of politicai strikes in China To codne industrial
conflict in a certain scope without expanding dangers to the society through
widespread industrial disruption is not only in accordance with the former prohibition,
but also significant in Iirniting strikes in the area of industrial relations. Therefore, it
should be included in the Chinese law of regulating strikes.

4. Under the Legislation for Resolution of Labour Disputes

Under Canada labour law, a strike is regarded as a weapon for negotiation of
collective agreements. There is a legal ban on sirikes where compulsory interest
arbitration is substituted. Under Chinese labour law, the procedure to solve a dispute
arising from the conclusion of a collective agreement includes consultation and coordination. Strikes are prohibited in the procedure.
As discussed in chapter III, the Chinese way to resolve a dispute arising from
the conclusion of a collective agreement looks similar to the Canadian interest

arbitration because of the prohibition on strikes in both of these procedures. However,

the difference between them is that the Chinese prohibition on strikes coven ail kinds
of labour disputes, no matter they occur in the pubic or private sector; while the
Canadian prohibition is in the area of the public sector.
As suggested in the former section, strikes should be allowed for the purpose

of negotiation of a new collective agreement under the Chinese system of collective
bargaining. Following this, the resolution mechanism of labour disputes arising from
the conclusion of collective agreements should include saüces. This reformed
mechanism cm keep the original procedure of consultation and CO-ordination,but
needs to detail the co-ordination procedure because there is no explicit provision
respecting the CO-ordinationprocedure under the current legislation. More

importantly, it needs to add mediation in the pre-strike procedure.
First, where a labour dispute arises from conclusion of a collective agreement,
the parties involved should apply for CO-ordinationwhen the consultation fails. The
labour administrative department should organize a coordination cornmittee io

hande the case. The CO-ordinationcornmittee, which is cornposed of equal number of
representations from each side of the dispute, equal number of representatives from
the higher trade unions and the govemment department in charge of the enterprise, is

granted the right to examine the dispute, creating both an opportunity and an
obligation for the parties to continue negotiation. If the commission reaches an
agreement, it is legally binding.
Second, if an agreement is not reached in the CO-ordinationprocedure, the
parties must submit the matter to the labour dispute arbitration committee for
mediation. The mediation procedure should follow a special one, which is similar to

the one set out in the Rules conceming Ways the Labour Arbitration Commiîtee
Dealing with Labour Disputes. That is, the labour arbitration cornmittee should make

up a special mediation committee to deal with the case. The special mediation
committee should follow the principles of nemess and promptness. If the mediation
procedure is unable to settle the parties' differences, a strike is permitted after a
majority vote of the trade union members in the involved union.
One question which caonot be lefi out here is the Canadian legislation
respecting strikes in public sector. As argued earlier, the right to strike is very
important in free collective bargahing. However, the legislation should protect public
interest as weii as safeguarding the workers' interest. It is for this reason that the
legislation prohibits strikes for Canadian public employees in some jurisdictions. '=
The Iegislative prohibition of freedom of strike is accornpanied by a mechanism for
dispute resolution - interest arbitration - to ensure that the Ioss in bargainhg power is

balanced by access to a system which "is capable of resolving in a fair, effective and
expeditious manner"? It is an important issue respecting legislative prohibition of
freedom to strike for public sector employees, but not the one the thesis is dealing
with. Under the legal refonn suggestions relevant to Chinese labour law, it is
necessary to provide a suggestion that there should be a legal ban on strikes in a series
of industries that are essentid to the national economy. The list of the industries need
not to be provided in the legislation, but could be made in specific regulation on the

basis of economic growth.

'* Supra note 6 at 12.183-12.186.
Supra note 6 at 12,185.

In respect to the resolution of a dispute arising fiom the irnplementation of a
collective contract, Labour Law of the People's Republic of China sets forth a

procedure containing consultation, arbitration and lawsuit with a prohibition of
strikes. As discussed in chapter III, the Chinese resolution mechanism is similar to the
Canadian grievance arbitration on the ground of the prohibition of strikes. However,
in Canada, strikes are viable options in the colIective bargaining system. The
restrictions on strikes during the lifetime of collective agreements under the Canadian
legislation are to force the employees to use techniques other than strikes for dispute
resolution. Since strikes are allowedfor the purpose of negotiation of a new collective
agreement in the reformed Chinese system, China takes the sarne way which sets forth
arbitration procedure to solve a dispute arising from the impiementation of a
collective agreement, as Canada does.

The theoretical bais of no right to strike in China is the same interests arnong
the state, the enterprises and the workers. Under the planned economy, neither the

enterprises nor the workers had independent interests in labour relations. However,

the socialist market economy in today's China has brought si@cant
labour relations in China.

changes in

In the private ownership enterprises, there is a clear confiict of interests
between the employers and the employees. In the public owneahip enterprises, the
interest of the workers become an independent interest vis-à-vis the interest of the
management on the ground that the state, with its main function of macro-regdation,
is no longer involved in labour relations. Thus, the Canadian theory of conflicted
interests and its practice of protection of a right to strike are undc ubtedy significant.
It is time now to discard indiscriminate underestimation of the Canadian experience
from an opposite legai system. In the labour law theory and in actuai practice, mutual

exchange might be very productive in terms of promoting better working conditions
and ensuring nghts of worken, the basic airn of labour law.

CONCLUSION

Labour Law developments in China are representative of the development of
the economy and the legal system generally. At the present time, labour legislation

reform is needed to meet the needs of the Chinese socialist market economy. To
reflect present realities, novel approaches are required concerning legal regdation of
labour issues, such As the right to strikc.
As discussed in the thesis, the assumption of conflicting interests between the

employees and the employers is the b a i s for the protection of a nght to sû-ike under
the Canadian legislation. By contrast, the doctrine of the harmony of interests arnong
the state, the enterprises and the workers is the basis for no right to strike in China. It
is not the purpose of this thesis to examine the differences of the econornic and

political systems between China and Canada which lead to the different approaches.

It is, however, appropriate to conduct a comparison between these different
approaches. using it as a starting point for future development of Chinese labour law.
This comparison, 1believe, has several significant functions. F i t , it provides China a
wholly different modei of regulating strikes. On a fundarnentaily different
assumption, the Canadian legislation protects the right to strike to employees,
regarding it as a mechanism for regulating economic conflict between parties having
conflicting interests. As analyzed in the thesis, labour relation under the socialist
market economy in today's China are similar to those in Canada. It is necessary to reexamine the Chinese recognition of the right to strike from a new perspective. This

comparative research offers China an opportunity of understanding a new approach,
and thereby conmbutes to its fmding of a better solution of regulating labour relation
in today's C b a

Second, this cornparison is extremely useful for iaw refonn in relation to the
Chinese legal system. As argued in the thesis, it is not a wise choice to maintain a
simple legal ban on strikes in China in spite of the kquency of strike actions. The

Canadian mode1 of regulating strikes provides China a solution of preventing or
resolving industrial confiict. It wiil assist China in building its own legal system under
the market economy.

In order to produce a working hypothesis for today's China, this comparison
needs to provide a sharp criticism on the Chinese system. As argued in this thesis, the
existence of conflicting interests in the labour relationship under the market economy

needs special legal procedures for their resolution, especially a right to suike, which is
absent in China It is the basic point of the comparison that China should adopt a
foreign solution that has proved satisfactory in its country. such as the Canadian
model?

In his book Reconcilubk D@rence. Professor Weiler discussed Canada's dismal record of
industrial unrest. Supra note 360 at 57-64. However, the nature of Canada's strike problem has changed
markedly in m e n t years.

IX

Work Stoppages in Canada. 1985-95
Stoppages

Days Not Worked
( ~ s )

However. this adoption does not mean a complete rejection of the whole
Chinese system - indeed it is impossible. It does mean that China should conduct a

serious investigation of its own national law and thereby build its own mode1 with a
consideration of a solution fkom a different legal system.
It is understandable that China and Canada are clearly quite different in their
economic structure and political systems, not only in theory but also in practice. Their
legal systems reflect the Merences. As discussed in the thesis, the two countries have
whoily different doctrines respecting labour relation. But it does not follow from this
that a cornparison of these two legal systems is impossible. Different legal systems
can be compared if they solve the same factual problem that is, answer the same legal
need. In other words. a cornparison of different legal systems can be rneaningful with
function of the compared subject as its b a ~ i s . ~What
' ~ is the function of a right to
strike? It is to enhance justice in the workplace and society; it is to protect the
legitimate rights and interests of the workea - both in Canada and in china.'"

225
168
LOS
133
98

Days not worked are measured in units of 10,000.
Source: Workplaee Information Directorate, Human Resource Development Canada.

"K.Zweigert & H.Kotz, introduction to Comparative Law vol. 1 trans. T. Weir, 2" ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987) at 42,
1 of the Labour Law of the People f Republic of China provides:This Law is formulated in
accordance with the Constitution in order to protect the legitimate rights and interests of labourers,
readjust Iabour relationship, establish and safeguard a labour system suited to the socialist market
economy, and prornote economic development and social progress.

4nArt.

A Su-

of the Contents of the Lubuur Lmu of the People's Republic of China

The 1994 labour code contains thirteen chapters and one hundred and seven
articles. It touches upon every aspect of labour relationship. The foliowing are the
contents of this code.
Chapter 1General Principles, covers article one to article nine. This chapter
States the legislative purpose and the regulatory scope of the Code."

It imposes the

responsibilities on the State in the regdation of labour relationship."

In addition, it

details the rights and obligations of the employees and the e r n p l ~ y e n ; and
~ declares
the legal status of Chinese trade unions in labour relationship."' This chapter is
regarded as the spirit of Chinese labour law.
Chapter II Promotion of Employment, covers article ten to article fifteen. This
chapter emphasizes the policy of helping Chinese citizens to establish a labour

In keeping with that policy, it prohibits discrimination on employment
relati~nship.'~~
and gives special protection to fernales, persons with disabilities, minors, and

Art. 1-2.

49~rt,5-6;9.
='Arl" 3 - 4 .

"' Art. 7 - 8.
4nArt. 10- 11.

demobiiized ar~nymen?~Inorder to guarantee the ri&& of the juvenile workers. it
simultaneously States the minimum work age and gives special protection to juvenile
w~rkers.~~
Chapter III Labour Contracts and Collective Contracts, covers article sixteen
to article thirty-five. This chapter is the most extensive chapter of the Code. In regard
to labour contracts, it gives the conception of "labour contra~t"?'~
the principles in

making out a labour contract and the invalidity of a labour contract? It provides the
forms?'

contents,"' and texms of a labour contract?% details the conditions to

terminate and dismiss a labour contract and the prohibitions on termination of a
labour contract.%

regard to collective agreements, the Code grants the workes the

right to conchde a collective agreement with their enterprises, which has disappeared
for almost thury years in China."% order to implement this right, it specifies the

433

Art. 12 - 14.
Art. 15.
Ari. 16.

-

Art. 17 18.
437

Art. 19.

"'Ibid.
d39

Art. 20.

* Art. 23 - 32.
Art. 33.

procedure in making a collective agreement," the contents of a collective
agreement"

the enforcement and approval of a collective agreement?

Chapter N Working Hours, Rest and Vacations, covers article thirty-six to
article forty-five. The Code states the working h o u system and stipulates restrictions
It 'also declares rest in every week, the legal holidays and the
on overtime w ~ r k . ~

annul vacation for ernployee~.~
Chapter V Wages, covers article forty-six to article fifty-one. This chapter
the level and kinds of wages? In order to
states the principles of distrib~tion,~~
~
it
protect the employees' right to be paid, it sets out minimum w a g e ~In. ~addition,
details the ways to pay wages and guarantees wages to be paid on legal holidays?
Chapter VI Occupational Safety and Health, coves article fifiy-two to article
fi@-seven. The law imposes the responsibility on enterprises in the protection of
occupational safety and health.451It sets forth the requirements on the facilities in

working places, the specialized training for labourers engaged in specialized

"'Ibid.
U3

Ibid.

44.4

Art. 34 35.

-

Art. 36 - 37: 39; 4 1-44.

Art 38; 40; 45.
Art. 46.

Art. 47,
Jj9

Art. 48 - 49.

'50m50-si.

"'

Art. 52.

operations:*

and the procedure for statistics, reports, and dispositions of accidents of

injuries and deaths, and cases of occupational diseases."

In addition, it empowea

labourers the rights to refuse to operate in dangerous conditions?
Chapter W Special Protection for Female and Juvenik Workers, covers
article fifty-eight to article sixty-five. This chapter cornmits the State to provide
special protection to female and juvenile workers? In regard to the protection of
female workers, it prohibits femde worken from engaging in a certain kinds of
work? It details the protections for female workers during their menstmal period,

pregnancy, mateniity, and breast-feeding period? In regard to the protection of
juvenile workers, it forbids juvenile workers from king manged to do specific
work,'" and assigns the duty upon ernpioying units to provide regular physical
examination to juvenile worker~.*'~
Chapter VIII Occupational Training, covers article sixty-six to article six-nine.
This chapter describes the system of vocational training.%

accordance with this

system, it places the responsibility on the State and people's govemment to expand

.Is2
Art.

55.

453

Art. 57.

"s4

Art. 56.

455

Art. 58.

4"

Art. 59.

' ~ 7Art,

60 - 63.

Act, 64.
459

Art. 65.

MO Art.

69.

vocational training?' Simultaneously, it requires employing units to establish a
system of vocational training-*

Chapter M Social Insurance and Welfare, covers articie seventy to article
seventy-six. It declares the policy of developing social insurance undertakings with
the coverage of old age, illness, work-related injury, unempioyment and childbearing? In order to implement this task, it addresses the ievel of social
insurancewand the sources and management of social insurance funding? In
addition, it States the role of labourers and employing units in the development of

social welfare undertakings.'
Chapter X Labour Disputes, covers article seventy-seven to article eighty four. This

chapter focuses on the settiement of a labour dispute. It describes the principles in
dealing with a labour dispute.a7 More specifically, it details the procedures of
consultation, mediation, arbitration and lawsuit to resolve labour disputes.a8 In
accordance with the procedures, it describes the composition a labour dispute

Axt 66 - 67.
$62 Art.
563

68.

Art. 70;73.

-Art. 71.
565

Arî. 72;74.

-

=Art.. 75 76.
567

Art. 78.

Art. 76;79; 82 - 83.

mediation cornmittee and a labour dispute arbitration c o ~ n m i t t e eFuaher,
. ~ ~ ~ it sets out
the procedures in dealing with collective
Chapter XI S u p e ~ s i o nand Inspection, covers article eighty-five to article
eightyeight. The law empowers the labour administrative department with the nght
to supervise and inspect the implementation of the laws, rules and regulations
conceming ~abour?~'
It also authorizes relevant departments, trade unions and any
organizations or individuals to supervise the implementation of the ~ a w . ~ ~ '
Chapter XII Legal Kesponsibilities, covers article eighty-nine to article one
hundred and five. The law places legal responsibilities upon employing units and
labourers when they commit the acts in violation of the Law? it proceeds to address
the legai responsibilities on any functionaries of the labour administrative department

or other relevant departments, or the functionaries of the State or the agencies in
charge of social insurance funds when they violate the Law?
Chapter XIII Supplementary Provisions. covers article one hundred and
six to article one hundred and seven. This chapter declares the date when the Law
cornes into force? In addition, it assigns a task to the people's govemment of
provinces, autonomous regions and municipdities directly under the Central
80 - 81.

J69 kt,

ArL 84.

"' Art, 85 - 86.
'"Art. 87 - 88.

"Art- 89 - 102.
-

Art. 103 105.

Govenunent to work out the implementing measures for the system of labour contract
according to this Law and in iight of their local conditions?

The 1994 Labour Law of the People's Republîc of China is Chinese fmt
labour code. It transfomis the government labour policies into the legal form as
statute. It is the most important legislation in the area of labour relationship. But the
whole system of Chinese labour law includes aot ody the labour code, but also the
specific regdations dealing with each aspect of labour relationships.

"'Art. 107.
476

& 106.
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